CHANGING ROLE OF BORDER AREAS AND REGIONAL POLICIES

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In memory of dr Francis “Frank” CARTER,
a geographer of London School of Economics,
who died prematurely on 4th May 2001
– a wonderful, unforgettable colleague
and co-author of the preceding volumes in this series

Editors, authors and friends
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FOREWORD

At the turn of the 20th century the importance of regional policy and problems it involves greatly increased. It has become a subject of both theoretical works and practical activities: new fields of regional research are being developed and new regionalisms and regional movements come into being.

The transformation of socioeconomic systems in Europe has magnified the importance of regional structures, their features, and internal and external relations.

In particular, the border areas have been revaluated: their development means an international co-operation and implies their new functions in the contact zones with other countries.

In political and regional considerations the borders were traditionally understood as barriers. As a matter of fact, till recently they effectively isolated border regions of neighbouring countries thus adding to economic and social marginalization of such areas. In the present circumstances they require a specific socioeconomic policy, changes in their functioning and a new approach to their historically grounded structures and ties.

The socioeconomic condition of border areas is often marked with a conjuncture resulting in structural crisis. Attempts at revitalization of borderlands have shown that the effects of permanently peripheral position can not be alleviated by simple measures of economic stimulation. A chance for improvement consists in the openness of borderland, as it is the case of the regions within the European Union.

Borderlands are closely connected with the economy of the whole country and the regions they belong to. They form zonal systems demanding special socioeconomic and political strategy. Considering that the possibilities of transborder co-operation are scarcely used till now, the borderland are potentially areas of importance in the development strategies of every regional structure.

The academic researches dealing with borderlands have contributed to a classification of border structures and systematization of the current scientific output in this area.

The papers included in this volume focused on four groups of issues:
- state policy and international co-operation in border zones;
- cultural and political dimension of borderlands;
- problems of Polish-German borderlands;
- borderlands of the former socialist countries and local initiatives.
Special attention has been given here to the processes of social mobility in transborder areas as well as to economic and sociocultural revivification of border regions. The situation in the European Union remained an important consideration in analyzing these processes. It seems that the presented studies encourage further investigations into socioeconomic and political phenomena occurring in border zones and regions.

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NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES OF URBAN AREAS ALONG FRENCH BORDERS

At the beginning of the year 2000, eleven urban areas (see Fig. 1) were involved in cross-border co-operation, with two other structures in formation. This co-operation movement concerned big cities (Lille, Strasbourg, Nice and Bayonne) as well as small ones (Longwy, Villerupt, Sarreguemines, Saint-Louis, et al.). These cities are in a peripheral position, especially in a centralized state like France; the role of these cities was above all to defend the national territory. The urban planning was under military control which limited spatial extension.

Now, however, with the abolition of borders due to the formation of the European Union, these eleven urban areas define new strategies of development through cross-border urban planning. New urban areas are appearing with new names like ‘Grootstad’, ‘Basque Eurocity’ and ‘Kilbri’.

The first section of the paper seeks to define the cross-border area, its organization and goals, and then present some examples in order to show that the main goals are similar. Then, we will attempt to answer the question whether cross-border urban policies are really successful, or are there still brakes for an optimal effectiveness?

1. DEFINITION OF A CROSS-BORDER AGGLOMERATION

1.1. The statistical definition

Each country has its own definition of an agglomeration. In France, an agglomeration has a minimum population of 2,000 inhabitants with no more than 200 meters between constructions and each commune of the agglomeration has a minimum of 50 inhabitants.
If we apply this definition to communes along the French border with Luxembourg, there are six border agglomerations (see Fig. 2). On the other side of the border, however, Luxembourg has another definition, with more criteria: minimum population of 10,000 inhabitants, a density of population of 700 inhabitants per square kilometre, etc. It is possible for just a part of the commune to be involved; so a commune can belong to two agglomerations like Sanem (see for example Fig. 2). There are four agglomerations in the southern urban area of Luxembourg (‘urban area’ is in Luxembourg a territorial planning division).

1.2. Political definition

A political cross-border agglomeration results from the will of local authorities in urban or rural communes who want to work together in a cross-border association. This is different from the statistical definition. A defined political agglomeration cannot be imposed on the statistically defined area (see for example Kilbri – Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Cross-border agglomerations between France, Belgium and Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
It is also possible to make a distinction between an agglomeration based on statistic or a morphological cross-border urban area (‘morphological euro-agglomeration’ or ‘euro-agglo’ with reference to euro-city or to euro-region) and the political one that is simply ‘political euro-aggllo’ or an ‘operational euro-aggllo’ because local authorities try to define a common development strategy on an enlarged area in order to improve transport infrastructure, equipment, amenities, more and more interdependence and therefore a real operational cross-border agglomeration.

2. ANALYSIS OF BORDER AGGLOMERATION STRATEGIES

2.1. Steps towards cross-border urban area structures

Cross-border co-operation in border urban areas began in the 1990s. It is a recent development due to the construction of the European Union and the progressive abolition of borders. Today, borders do not separate anymore, but bring territories and people together. Urban areas test new policies of town planning in a cross-border dimension. In most cases they are local initiatives (Tab. 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of creation</th>
<th>Population (in thousands)</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grootstad Lille Metropole</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>COPIT (5 intercommunal structures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED of Longwy</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>Cross-border association of PED of Longwy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVA (Esch-sur-Alzette – Villerupt – Audun-le-Tiche)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Cross-border association EVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILBRI</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Cross-border association of KILBRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbach – Saarbrücken-Sarreguemines</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg – Kehl</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Strasbourg – Kehl Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinational agglomeration of Bale: ATB Economic area of ATB</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>600 740</td>
<td>558 1,416</td>
<td>Politic Committee Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Genevan area</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>650</td>
<td></td>
<td>Franco-Genevan Regional Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menton-Vintimille</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Eurocity Bayonne – San Sebastian</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Consorcio GEIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border agglomeration of Sambre</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 projects: Dudelange-Volmerange Perpignan-Rosas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Different kind of agglomeration structures can be analysed through the examples of Grootstad, Bayonne-San Sebastian and the ‘PED of Longwy’.

Grootstad is formed by five intercommunal structures from Flanders, Wallony and France. In 1991 they decided to create a ‘cross-border intercommunal permanent conference’ called COPIT. Then, in 1998, Grootstad was defined and three committees of co-ordination were created involving 74 persons.

For Bayonne-San Sebastian, at the beginning (in 1993) there was just a protocol of cross-border co-operation between the district of Bayonne Anglet Biarritz and the Diputacion Foral de Guipuzkoa. After an informal co-operation in 1995, they decided upon the creation of a common legal structure in order to work in an intercommunal association. Thanks to the Bayonne Agreement in March 1995, after the creation of the Eurodistrict Bidasa-Txingudi, the ‘consortio’ – a legal structure in Spanish law – Irun-Fontarabie-Hendaye was created (1999). Another legal structure was also created in 1997; it is a GEIP (‘Groupement Européen d’Intérêt Economique’ – Economical Interest European Group) with the name of the structure being ‘cross-border Observatory of Basque Eurecity San Sebastian-Bayonne’. Gradually, it is becoming a more integrated structure.

In the case of Longwy, the first step was undertaken in 1985 with the creation of the European Pole of Development (‘Pôle Européen de Développement’) of Longwy from European Union and three states. It was created as an economic goal because the local mining area was in decline. They planned a ten years development. This experience was not successful. For a sustainable development, it was necessary also to take into account settlements, services, environmental quality.

So in 1992, local authorities suggested the development of a cross-border agglomeration. In 1993, the project was accepted after a resolution signed by three territorial planning ministers. The project was controlled by a cross-border structure. In 1996, the ‘cross-border association of EPD agglomeration’ was created with 21 communes (today 25). This was a success; so now in Lorraine there are three cross-border agglomerations and soon there will be four. There is also a cross-border network Sarreguemines-Sarrebrücken-Forbach.

These structures are still in the course of evolution according to new agreements and further possibilities of more integrated intercommunal structures.

2.2. Main goals: methodology and means

The three examples of Grootstad, Basque Eurocity and Longwy can illustrate the goals of cross-border urban co-operation.

1. For Grootstad, the main goal is to encourage the emergence of a Franco-Belgian metropolis and realize a cross-border urban development scheme. Several actions had already been undertaken in the field of public transport, water management, economic development, cartography and regional planning; now a cross-border scheme is under preparation for planning and development. There is a technical partnership with the urban development agency of Lille Metropole. The project has been financed in part by the program Terra – its financial assistance given to an innovative approach in regional planning (fifteen projects were financed in part by Terra in Europe for the period 1997–2000).
2. Bayonne-San Sebastian: this urban axis is trying to encourage and stimulate the creation of an urban system within the euroregion. It is also trying to promote the conurbation Bayonne-San Sebastian to the status of European conurbation and in order to have more balanced regional planning along the Atlantic Arc as defined by the European Union report 2000+

There are several actions to develop, rationalize and co-ordinate transports, amenities, and service structures along this axis in order to favour economic development.

The committee of Bayonne-San Sebastian has written a charter of cross-border co-operation as for many other cross-border structures (for example the case of Geneva). Six working groups were defined: culture, environment, geographical information system (GIS), tourism, health-social services and sport, with the projects financed by Interreg.

3. In the case of Longwy, the goal is to define a common regional planning and the development of the cross-border urban area. They have just finished the elaboration of a charter after having realized the GIS. The charter involves five fields of co-operation: employment and wealth creation, an urban network organization, equal access to infrastructures and knowledge, management and development of cultural and natural patrimony, improvement of the territorial image. The recommendations in each field have to be adapted in national and regional legal documents (land use plans, scheme of urbanism and planning, etc.).

This cross-border co-operation is considered to be a model for smaller cross-border areas that are situated in the neighbourhood. The association of Longwy helps them with the elaboration of charters. Even the smallest cross-border agglomeration, called Kilbri, has defined many projects in economic development, urbanism, transports, environment, culture and tourism. However, this small structure has low financial means and just small projects are realized, such as cross-border bike roads.

The goals and means of development will depend on the kind of agglomeration involved in the co-operation; two main kinds of cross-border urban development can be defined and divided, each one in two parts according to:

1) cross-border agglomerations polarized by a border urban pole with two cases:
   a) French agglomerations that polarized large cross-border areas like Lille and Strasbourg;
   b) agglomerations that depend on foreign border poles like Forbach and Sarreguemines under the domination of Saarbrücken, Saint Louis and Weil-am-Rhein under Bâle or Annemasse under Geneva;

2) agglomerations including a polycentric cross-border system along a line:
   a) along the coast on long distances: Menton-Vintimille and Bayonne-San Sebastian;
   b) along a valley with short distances: city network of Sambre and the three cross-border agglomerations between France and Luxembourg.

Whatever the size and characteristics of the cross-border agglomeration, the goals are to reinforce the economic and social cohesion of these areas and to encourage a sustainable territorial development. The new European orientations for the period 2000–2006 are still particularly interesting for cross-border co-operations, but the European Union cannot alone manage and lead this dynamic of territories and also guarantee the successful outcome of this process.
3. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CROSS-BORDER AGGLOMERATIONS

3.1. Encouragement from the European Union to the local governments

Peripheral territories have new possibilities of development thanks to the European regional policy with the program ‘Interreg a’, created especially to encourage the development of cross-border urban areas. For the next period of 2000–2006, Interreg III was defined with a special attention to structures that reinforce links between urban and rural areas.

The European Union encourages these cross-border co-operations in order to have a more coherent supraregional area on a macroregional level like for example the macroregion ‘Centre or Capitals’ as defined in the report ‘Europe 2000+’, and by the European Community Development Scheme.

The regional policy of the European Union is also encouraged by states. French legislation relating to territorial administration shows the evolution of the French state position towards cross-border co-operation. Several laws and agreements allow the creation of cross-border structures as, for example, the Karlsruhe Agreement (23 January 1996). In April 1997, another step was done with the creation of the ‘Cross-border Operational Mission’ (COM) in Paris. It represents a platform of experiences, a network of people involved in cross-border co-operation. One of its aims is to help urban areas by defining cross-border strategies of development. But cross-border structures have to pay a subscription. The main French border agglomerations and their foreign partners are members of the COM: Lille Metropole, Bale- Saint-Louis (ATB), Franco-Genevan area, Metropole of Côte d’Azur (Menton-Vintimille), Basque Eurocity. The Cross-border Operational Mission has organized meetings and conferences and published many reports.

So today, there is a desire to favour cross-border co-operation from the local administration level to the national government and the European Union. But there are still obstacles.

3.2. Still a lot of obstacles for a successful cross-border co-operation

One of the most important problems is the organizational structure of the cross-border association; it is a legal problem. Agreements such as the ‘Karlsruhe Agreement’, allow the creation of ‘cross-border co-operation local group’ which can take decisions according to its local competences but France is still a centralized state and Karlsruhe Agreement is still not applied.

Besides, the local authorities involved in cross-border co-operation have not the same competences. There are great imbalances between territories on each side of the borders; different economic and social situations can disturb a coherent regional planning because territories are in competition.

The conditions of cross-border co-operation are different along borders; there are seven states around France with their own institutions, organizations, laws, history and economy. For example between France and Luxembourg, the co-operation is favoured by
the fact that both sides of the border speak the same language and the administration structures are similar (communes have to develop intercommunal co-operations because they are too small for economic, environmental projects, etc.). However, Luxembourg offers a lot of advantages to enterprises (less taxes, technical helps, low wage charges, etc.) so there is a flow of enterprises and migrants towards Luxembourg that destabilizes a balanced development along the border. It is not easy to develop co-operation under such conditions. But Luxembourg City and the north-south urban axis Metz-Nancy are even more developed and the small border urban areas have the feeling that they are forgotten by the regional and national power. The cross-border co-operation can be described as a counter-movement against metropolization.

In comparison, the co-operation between urban areas along French-German border is different. They have to face other problems: different languages, important differences between territorial and administrative structures (Saarland has big communes since the reform of the 1st January 1974 – the French communes are very small, with low budgets and competences compared to the German ones.). The concepts in urban planning are different, different references for maps, etc. Another main obstacle that also exists between France and Luxembourg, but not so prominent as with Germany, is a historical antagonism that has marked mentalities. This psychological aspect is due to the movements of the border between Saarland and Moselle. In spite of great interdependence between both sides of the border (there is a huge cross-border labour and trade market), it will take time to define a real cross-border urban area strategy. What has been done for the moment results from the initiative of the German side because Saarland is overbuilt, so cross-border urban area policies can offer new possibilities of development to the capital of Saarland (more and more German people buy land and houses in Lorraine along the border because prices and taxes are lower than in Saarland, but they are growing up very quickly and that create tensions between German and French people). Small communes on the French side, compared to Saarbrücken and its urban community, are afraid of becoming the periphery of Saarbrücken capital. In fact, it is already done. Cross-border co-operation reinforces the process of metropolization of Saarland capital towards Forbach and Sarreguemines with, for example, the development of transport infrastructure managed and paid above all by a Saarland company (the ‘tram-train’ between Saarbrücken and Sarreguemines). It is more a city network logic than an agglomeration logic. On the other hand, with Bale and Geneva, it is the case of Saarbrücken in a bigger scale concerning the development of these urban areas on the French side, with also the same problems of differences between the size and power of communes.

The situation is different between Alsace and Baden-Würtemberg; the big city is on the French side and the co-operation between Strasbourg and Kehl does not result in an expansion of Strasbourg towards Kehl; a lot of French people work in Kehl and some of them even live there (1,100 Frenchmen live in Kehl), so cross-border town planning is also a necessity to improve transports infrastructures, environment, etc.

It is difficult to integrate a large territory like in the case of Grootstad, to co-ordinate the development of 2,500 km² on binational territory; it is also complicated for a smaller, but trinational territory. An enlarged territory also has the problem of the adhesion and integration of local populations.
Cross-border co-operation is a reaction in order to find new ways of development. The European Union encourages this by the distribution of Structural Founds with Interreg; it is a way to balance territorial planning and gradually national governments recognize this original way of development by signing agreements despite existing hesitations. But it is inadequate to eliminate competition between territories. So cross-border co-operation is a necessity for a more coherent urban planning. It has to take into account the risk of another territorial fracture with hinterlands and cross-border co-operation has to take place in the regional and national territorial plans as at the European level.

4. CONCLUSION

Border areas have a great role to play in the process of European integration, to reinforce the coherence of European territory in construction. Most dynamic borderlands are urban areas; they benefit from a special section of Interreg (Interreg III a after Interreg II a).

French borders are becoming laboratories of cross-border union experiment where the issue of whether territorial recomposition is done according to agglomeration logic or according to urban network logic can be examined.

It is just the beginning of these strategies. They have not really proved their effectiveness. In spite of great progress made to favour these cross-border unions like the Karlsruhe Agreement, barriers are still important on juridical, legal, institutional field as well as on linguistic and psychological grounds.

The concept of a ‘Europe of regions’ and the idea of a ‘Europe of cities’ encourage these regional and local initiatives, in particular through the distribution of Structural Founds.

The process of ‘cross-border agglomerations and network of cities’ has to take place in a more general territorial planning dimension, at a euroregional level like the Basque Eurocity has already planned, and a macroregional level. But that presupposes a good knowledge of institutions and laws for a harmonization of Europe as a whole.

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CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION ON THE EXAMPLE OF BALTIC EUROPE

1. SHAPING OF COASTAL CROSS-BORDER ZONES

From the very beginning of geographical research marine areas constituted an important subject. Perhaps the process of man dominating the seas gave grounds to the development of geography as a science.

Regions located by the sea maintain contacts with regions located on the opposite seacoast. Lands located over the sea are parts of states there situated. Their mutual relations change in time. They depend on the following factors:
- geographical location,
- sailing conditions,
- distance,
- development level with respect to transport and communication means,
- attracting port cities in the coastal region,
- political relations,
- complementary nature of economy,
- cultural conditions.

The first five factors are typical of co-operation across the sea. The remaining ones are of a universal nature.

Geographical location of the coastal regions may either favour contacts across the sea or limit or even eliminate such possibilities. Favourable conditions occur when:
- the regions for potential co-operation are situated on both coasts of the sea laying inside a continent, like e.g. the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea or the Black Sea;
- two regions of two different countries are located on the two banks of a strait or natural sea channel;
- a coastal region neighbours on a nearby island which belongs to an overseas country;
- two neighbouring islands belonging to different countries are separated by a strait;
- between a centrally located island or chain of islands and coastal areas located on the both sides of the sea where one of the regions and the island belong to one country whereas the other to an overseas state;
- between two regions of two different countries located on both sides of a sea bay
where the sea route between them is shorter than by land or countries on both sides of the bay divided by a third country located further in the bay (Fig. 1).

![Diagram of sea land relations favouring cross border co-operation](image)

**Fig. 1.** Sea land relations favouring cross border co-operation  
Source: Author's study.

Other configurations of geographical location are possible but do not favour cross-border co-operation to such degree.

**Sailing conditions** such as the number of stormy days, fog, waves, sea currents, tides, icing, bathymetry, types of coast, natural and artificial barriers may limit shipping and due to a high risk for passengers and cargo may cause periodical close down. Modern types of ships, navigational means and radiotechnical devices eliminate these barriers to a certain degree.

**Distance** by sea plays a very significant role in defining the extent of co-operation and activity scope. Coastal regions located close to each other, separated by a channel or strait, usually show cultural similarities and develop many various forms of co-operation much easier. There is a clear tendency to integrate regions located on two coasts into one economic region. Coastal regions further distanced from each other often meet more problems (due to time and cost of travel) or even barriers making co-operation difficult. Co-operation may take the form of parallel projects performed independently on both seacoasts.

**Development level with respect to transport and communication means** plays a fundamental role in contacts between regions lying on two seacoasts. The development of shipping had initiated the first links between those living across the sea. The developments in size and speed of sea units facilitate carrying cargo and passengers. Ferries, fast catamarans and hovercrafts have cut the time needed to cover the same distance from a few days to a few hours. Ports on both sides had to be adapted to service
such vessels. Underwater cable links and contemporary methods of satellite communication facilitate the process of quick mutual communication.

**Attracting port cities in the coastal region** become the centres\(^1\) of regional co-operation. Without port cities cross sea co-operation would not be possible. Airports in this case play a solely complementary role. After some time the links of a sea town with its region may become decentralised. Some of the old peripheral areas may become new subregional core centres, however, the main co-operational access will always run through a sea town.

**Political relations** between countries lying on two sides of the sea may vary considerably. Wars and military conflicts at sea exclude any form of co-operation. In the case of two parties identifying with opposite military and political sides, information on unidentified submarines causes tension and a freeze in international relations. Elimination of conflicts and military blocks, peaceful coexistence, correct and friendly relations create an appropriate political climate and open the way to wide co-operation on various levels.

**Complementary nature of economy** especially market economy as well as trade, transit services, commercial co-operation, business services, investments of a complementary nature decidedly favour contacts across the sea.

**Cultural conditions** are a factor which have an impact on co-operation with partners across the sea. Civilisation, national, religious and language differences and fear stemming from historical experience pose certain barriers. These can be overcome to a certain extent thanks to economic co-operation and recognition of national interests (Chojnicki, 1998).

The ‘coastal cross-border zone’ most often comprises two neighbouring areas divided by seawaters. Their structure has a bio-centric nature. Changes in the structure of a coastal cross-border zone progress slowly while changes initiated in the subsystem on one side do not necessarily cover the overseas counter part. The settlement network is dominated by two port town complexes lying on two sea coasts.

The remaining elements of this structure are organised around crystallised centres forming subsystems, which are part of the ‘coastal cross-border zone’. Each of these subsystems features a different degree of closure with regard to its economic and social environment and to the subsystems lying on the two sea coasts. As the degree of closure varies, the openness of particular subsystems varies in the two areas as far as capital, information and power flow etc., are concerned.

Areas bordering across the sea are interested in solving common problems. These problems include communication between them and access to wider markets which was limited due to the sea barrier. Co-operation also focuses on joint actions connected with the marine environment (protection of the natural marine environment, sea pollution, protections of coastal shores, etc.) use and development of marine resources (renewable power sources, marine tourism, etc.) and comprehensive actions in solving practical problems (e.g. safety at sea, life saving services).

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\(^1\) The author refers the theory of centres formulated by W. Christaller (1933) and core regions by D. Whittlesey (1957). According to the above the core region provides an organisational centre. The centre is usually the transport network centre and usually is of urban character.
Furthermore, sea cross-border zones often share the historical and cultural past and trade traditions. In the case of some zones conditions provided allowed for a wider range of co-operation embracing many spheres of contemporary life.

The shaping of coastal cross-border zones is a complex process dependent on both land and marine factors referred to above. Although every example is to a certain extent an individual and specific case and the pace may differ, certain common stages of the development of such zones can be identified (Fig. 2).

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 2. Cross border coastal region development model**

*Source: Author's study.*

Stage A – port town centres are situated on both sides of the sea with surrounding areas shaped under their influence. Shortage of transport modes or appropriately developed means excludes the possibility of covering the distance by sea. Wars, political conflicts between sides lying on opposite coasts or sea blockades introduced by third parties can also isolate an area from possible forms of contact.

Stage B – the development of shipping makes first sporadic contacts feasible, however political tension and cultural differences exclude closer relations.

Stage B₁ – a centre situated on one coast takes advantage of its economic and military position at sea, gains outposts on the opposite coast and continues colonial type of expansion drawing economic benefits.
Stage C – regular shipping lines are established, most often ferry lines, underwater cables make direct telephone communication possible, correct political relations are maintained. Political-military preferences cause certain reservations and fears of the other partners, slight cultural differences are visible, the complementary nature of the economy is visible though economic co-operations focuses on a few selected spheres only. Personal contacts among inhabitants are initiated.

Stage D – modern, fast transport means such as hydrofoils, hovercrafts or the latest generation of catamarans for carriage of passengers and vehicles, connections by air and satellite links are introduced. Stability, political and military co-operation, complementary social and economic relations facilitate the integration and development on both seacoasts. This leads to free trade flow, unconstrained movement of people and capital flow.

Stage D₁ – full integration takes place, all modes of transport and communication (as in stage D) and furthermore, thanks to the development of modern technology in constructing transport routes, where hydrological and hydro-geological conditions allow it, links in the form of bridges, tunnels or mixed systems – in some parts bridges in others, most often in sectors situated in the central part of a strait or channel – tunnels. Only well developed countries, which possess the required technical and financial resources can afford to carry out such projects. Full political and military stability, co-operations and next integration in all spheres of life, the transfer of modern technology, freedom of movement both ways and economic benefits lead to improving the living standard on both sides of a well developed coastal cross-border zone.

Marine cross-border co-operation can also occur between land neighbouring coastal zones. In such cases marine co-operation is one of the elements complementing typical forms of cross-border co-operation.

The bigger the number of co-operating cross-border centres around a given water basin the faster is the process which can give rise to a powerful region round the whole water basin. Thus, there is a potential for the Baltic zone, the Mediterranean zone, etc.

2. EXAMPLES OF MARINE CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION

Political transformations in the 1990s created favourable conditions for a better use of economic and intellectual potential of all countries lying around the Baltic Sea. Baltic co-operation may constitute an important key in the integration processes on our continent.

Countries in Baltic Europe have their own long, common history and today experience a revival of their identity. The factor uniting the society of Baltic Europe, both culturally and in scope of development, is maritime tradition, which shapes specific values as the sea has united people through centuries, especially traders and sailors cementing awareness of common fate and interests, teaching mutual respect for language, culture and religious differences.

The proper development of co-operation is conditioned by a broad and advanced knowledge of partners in the process. In Baltic Europe the zones involved in developing cross-border co-operation include (Fig. 3).
Storstrom (Denmark) – Ostholstein (Germany), cross-border co-operation has taken place for several years. Economic co-operation (economic consulting), support for small and medium-sized business, transfer and implementation of new technologies, joint work on strategy development, development of tourism, protection of the environment and due attention to power economy, education, culture, employment, ecology, farming and information exchange between authorities on the national, regional and local level are the main areas covered by this co-operation.

Fig. 3. Areas of marine cross border co-operation in Baltic Europe
1 - Kvarken & MittSkandia; 2 - Archipelago Co-operation; 3 - South Finland-Estonia; 4 - Oresund;
5 - Storstrom - Ostholstein; 6 - STRING; 7 - Bornholm - South-East Scåne; 8 - Fyn - KERN; 9 - Baltic Euro-region; 10 - Euro-region Pomerania
Source: Author's study.
In 1998, the co-operation zone also covered Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Storstrøm, Western Zeland, Copenhagen and Scania. The project String (South-Western Baltic Sea Transregional Area – Investing New Geography) obtained financial resources from Interreg II C amounting to 1344 thousand Euro at the end of 1999. The aim of the project is sustainable development of the area, enhancing of economic potential, integration, and development of international functions and elaboration of a common strategy for full mobility of man, goods and information. Support for road and track transport modes from Schleswig-Holstein to southern Sweden across Danish islands is to shorten duration of transport so that cargo from Malmö can be delivered to Hamburg in 2 to 3 hours while ICE trains are to cover the route Hamburg – Stockholm in five hours. In order to achieve the assumed objectives joint studies are made on spatial development and economic development, increasing the region’s competitiveness, promoting sustainable development, economic and social cohesion, development of trade and creation of new work places as well as protection of cultural and nature heritage. Another important issue is the support of technology transfer and closer co-operation of university and research centres, student and scientist exchange programmes with partners in the region. The STRING project is to be a ‘development drive’ and example of co-operation in Baltic Europe.

Öresund (Denmark – Sweden), development of co-operation between Zeland and Scania began in 1996. It embraced development of the labour market and elimination of unemployment connected with the development of future transport links between Malmö and Copenhagen. A joint Council arranges meetings during which representatives of Zeland and Scania solve problems relating to cultural, language, tax system, training and employment differences. The existing Öresund Council and Öresund Contact were transformed into a Danish-Swedish Öresund Committee in 1992. The main reason for establishment of the above was the plan of national governments to construct a bridge – tunnel linking Malmö and Copenhagen. The project was started in 1993 and finished in 1999 and released for public use in the middle of the year 2000. The target plan for the area projected by Swedish and Danish authorities is transformation of Öresund into an international economic, scientific and transport centre.

Archipelago Co-operation (Sweden/Finland), covers 40 thousand islands stretching from Stockholm, across Åland Islands to south west Finland. From the geological, historical and cultural point of view this area is an integrated whole. Cross-border co-operation was initiated in 1970 and concentrates on joint actions in tourism, promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (craftsmanship) and culture. Since 1978, the co-operation took place under the patronage of the Nordic Ministry Council. The representatives of local authorities established the Island Co-operation Council, which co-ordinates and implements various forms of co-operation. Improvement of the economic structure, increase in employment, manufacturing of the same products under the same brand name of the region are the fundamental objectives of the programme which is a protective umbrella for a number of various cross-border projects. The Åland Islands are to a large extent autonomous (internal affairs, budget, own flag and post

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stamps) and remain outside the EU tax system. The tax rates offered to insurance companies and in particular marine insurance are the most attractive in all Nordic countries. The water transport network have a direct impact on development of tourism, (the basic industry of the islands), trade and the financial sector. Any limitation in ferry shipment which occur have a visible impact on the economy in the area.

**Kvarken & MittSkandia** (Finland/Sweden), co-operation initiated by Kvarken Council of the province Vaasa (Finland) and Örnsköldvik (Sweden) at the end of the 1970s. It concerned joint projects on entrepreneurship and culture. In 1993, the scope of co-operation was extended in terms of both space and theme. A study on economic reconstruction of the Gulf of Bothnia was conducted. Project Bothnia focused on cross-border co-operation of the public and private sectors with special attention put on development of small and medium-sized enterprises and the tourist sector. The project consists of two parts: Bothnian Innovation aiming at development of scientific research and result implementation and regional co-operation, and Bothnian Bonus aiming at organising tourist fares and promotion of tourism in the marine area.

**Southern Finland – Estonia**, cross-border co-operation was initiated after Estonia gained independence and concentrates mainly on development of small and medium-sized enterprises, educational and cultural co-operation and development of telecommunication and ferry links.

**Bornholm – South-East Skania** (Denmark/Sweden), cross-border co-operation initiated some time earlier gained impetus in 1990 with promotion of tourism, ferry services, support for sustainable development, joint research projects and exchange of pupils, students and civil servants.

**Fyn – Kern** (Denmark/Germany) is an example of marine cross-border co-operation between the Danish island of Fionia and a group of towns situated in Schleswig-Holstein around or near Kiel Bay. The towns include Kiel, Eckerförde, Rendsburg and Neumünster (K.E.R.N). Joint research was undertaken in the field of new technologies, particularly computer science, marine technology and medicine. Well qualified staff, university centres and research institutes, companies with advanced know-how and the high quality natural environment and good transport links create potential conditions for cross-border development of the region that transgress the borders of Baltic Europe.

Furthermore, in 1989 a new form of international co-operation between seven Baltic islands belonging to five different countries called **Baltic Sea island (B7)** appeared. It includes Bornholm (Denmark), Gotland and Oland (Sweden), Hiuma and Sarema (Estonia), Ålands (Finland) and starting 1993 Rugia (Germany). These islands traditionally attracted trade but are peripherally located with respect to main national economic centres. Traditional industries: fishing, family farming, exploitation of natural resources including stone quarries belong to declining branches of economy. Their main problem at present is poor access, which in many cases is a derivative of poor quality ferry services. Only Rugia and Olandia have a permanent link with the mainland.

The islands feature unique, in European scale, tourist value while their location favours promotion of cross-Baltic co-operation in the cultural and educational spheres. Joint efforts are made to find a compromise between protection of the natural environment and local development. Co-operation also involves adapting growing tourism to the unpolluted environment. Baltic islands co-operate in developing an economic structure complying with and complementary to the needs of the tourist trade.
Within the framework of the Baltic Island Project, Bornholm, Gotland and Ålands co-operate, apart from the tourist sector, in the field of small-scale entrepreneurship. Bornholm and Sarema established a common organisation for youth exchange programmes related to cultural issues called Baltic Bridge.

The development of ferry links and big passenger traffic confirm the growing importance of cross-border marine co-operation.

An additional factor facilitating co-operation and ensuring wide access to European information is membership in the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) seated in Gronau. Baltic marine cross-border regions involved include Öresundkomiteen, Ålands, Landskapstyrelse, Österbottens, Förbund (Finish part of Kvarken) as well as the Euroregion Pomerania and Baltic Euroregion.

3. EUROREGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN BALTIC EUROPE

Poland showed a growing interest in cross-border co-operation at the beginning of the 1990s. Euroregional co-operation is a specific form of co-operation featuring a high degree of institutionalisation. Up to date, 14 Euroregions have been established in Poland. Baltic areas of Euroregional co-operation along the Polish marine border are the Baltic and Pomeranian Euroregions.

Baltic Euroregion, established in 1998, operates in the areas of Bornholm (Denmark), city of Liepaja and its area (Latvia), the Klaipeda District (Lithuania), the Pomerania Voivodship and the Warmia-Masuria Voivodship (Poland), the Kaliningrad District (Russia), the provinces of Kronoberg, Kalmar and Blekinge (Sweden). The area covered by the Baltic Euroregion are of open character and can undergo further changes. Euroregion, sometimes referred to as ‘Small European Union around the Baltic’ is aimed not only at facilitating contacts between people, uniting young people, acquainting them with history and contemporary issues of their neighbours and eliminating historical based prejudice but also at improving the living standard of people inhabiting the area. Among objectives there are also find programming works towards sustainable development of the area covered as well as assistance in establishing co-operation between regional and local authorities.

Co-operation objectives are to be realised by supporting cross border economic projects and agreements in such fields as industry, agriculture and forestry, transport and communication, exchange of know-how and transfer of technology, protection of the environment and fighting crime. Furthermore, joint municipal projects in border zones such as sewage treatment plants, and waste management serve to this aim. An important instrument for realisation of the Euroregion’s objectives is intensified co-operation in the field of spatial planning in cross-border zones, development of border crossing infrastructure, vocational and language training, scientific and cultural exchange, sport and tourism as well as protection and care for a common cultural heritage.

Other important fields of co-operation in the Euroregion include running of data basis and media networks as well as prevention activities and combating of natural disasters, fires, environmental hazards and other emergency situations.

Euroregion Pomerania, was established in 1995 in Szczecin. The Polish side is represented by communities from the West Pomerania Voivodship and the city of
Szczecin, whereas the German side by 6 areas and three cities from two lands Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenburg. At the end of 1998, one of the most dynamic regions both culturally and economically in Sweden – the Union of Scania Communities joined POMERANIA. The biggest Swedish city to join the Euroregion was Malmö.

Thus, POMERANIA took on a marine, trilateral Polish-German-Swedish character. The basic area of life and work of its inhabitants are maritime economy, tourism, culture, agriculture and protection of the environment. All these spheres lie in the mainstream of co-operation. Efforts are being made to broaden this co-operation to include Danish community unions from Zeland.

The aim of co-operation in the Euroregions include the following:
- improvement of life standard of the inhabitants by joint support for investments and economic programmes, vocational training and programmes aimed at eliminating unemployment,
- exchange and co-operation of various vocational, scientific, cultural, youth groups,
- improving the state of the natural environment,
- development of economic co-operation, exchange of know-how and transfer of technology,
- development of co-ordinated, cross-border spatial planning,
- development of a complex database on the Euroregion,
- development and adjustment of the existing infrastructure to the needs of cross-border and regional traffic,
- co-operation in eliminating the effects of emergencies and natural disasters.

Officially, Pomerania links Polish and Scandinavian partners across the Baltic since 1998. However, real co-operation started much earlier. The Pomerania Euroregion runs an extensive exchange programme for young people and close cultural co-operation. An example of co-operation in the region in the scope of cross-border tourism and joint promotion is a agreement signed by Świnoujście on the Island of Uznam, German Rugia, Swedish South East Scania and Danish Bornholm under the name ‘Four Corners of the Baltic’ and the so called round ticket for ferry lines joining the ports of Ystad, Smirsham, Rönne, Świnoujście, Sassnitz and Mukran. This project also helps to popularise the beauty of architecture and the natural environment (gardens and landscape), supports and makes more common the culinary heritage and develops information technology flow between all four partners.

The cementing factor for society of Baltic Europe in both civil and cultural sense, is maritime tradition, which preserves awareness of common fate and interest teaching mutual respect for language, culture and religion differences. The contemporarily developing maritime regions of cross-border co-operation are one of the steps in this direction.

4. FINAL REMARKS

The process of developing cross-border co-operation, though progressing slowly, shows clearly signs of a growing trend. It covers examples not only of the water basins such as the Baltic and the North Sea but also the Mediterranean Sea. A factor
accelerating the process and scope is the financing granted from European Union aid funds. In extreme cases, when co-operation develops slowly, limiting of funds or their lack can lead to stagnation or lack of mutual contact. A sudden worsening of political relations between countries lying on different coasts of the sea can also hamper co-operation. However, the dominating examples indicating economic, cultural and political benefits that the coastal regions gain from the co-operation and the regular growth in number allows for the assumption that the process will continue.

In the 21st century Europe will be a Europe of regions. Political and economic transformations of the developing Baltic Europe will no doubt have a definite impact on integration processes in Europe, on their expansion and even a probable correction in that direction. The developing cross-border coastal regions are an important element in the process. They should be a point of departure for further decisions and actions towards full Baltic integration.

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LOCAL ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN THE PROVINCE OF WEST POMERANIA

As a border region adjacent to the European Union, the Voivodship of West Pomerania engages a great deal of cross-border co-operation with its closest neighbours in Germany and Scandinavia, as well as with other countries in the Baltic region. It also maintains close contacts with the Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Ukraine, China and the Czech Republic, although these relationships are not of major importance. The importance of cross-border and interregional co-operation is demonstrated by the fact that it is included in the development strategy of the Voivodship of West Pomerania as established by the provincial legislature. One of the fundamental issues with regard to the region’s development policy is the determination of priorities for the Voivodship of West Pomerania’s foreign co-operation. The voivodship keeps up the foreign contacts of the former Voivodships of Szczecin and Koszalin as well as commitments resulting from agreements, letters of intent, treaties and other documents declaring the will to co-operate with foreign partners.

The Voivodship of West Pomerania’s co-operation with its closest neighbours takes place on two levels: the level of local government institutions and the level of eurorregional organisations. The communes of the Voivodship of West Pomerania participate in the operations of the three euroregions of Pomerania, Pro Europa Viadrina and Baltic. The underlying idea behind the functioning of the euroregions includes promotion of European unity, creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the communities of the various countries, and evening out of the standard of living in the euroregions. These goals may be achieved by joint planning, by obtaining funds and by implementing ventures associated with the economy (in the wider sense), culture, education, environmental protection and other fields important for the region. The Pomerania Euroregion is steadily increasing and occupies the largest territory (on the Polish side), and therefore is the most active among those euroregions. Its activities are more and more diverse and include more and more new types of activity. As a result more and more frequently the priorities and types of activities taken by the parties making up Pomerania Euroregion distinguish them from other euroregions. It has therefore been proposed that a document be drafted entitled ‘Conception for Cross-Border Development and for the Operation of Pomerania Euroregion for the years 2000–2006’. This will be a planning document which establishes areas of activity for the
whole territory of the euroregion as well as means for their realisation. It is intended to
be a continuation of the existing conception, adapting it to new conditions. Euroregions
may still take advantage of PHARE CBC, a fund for small-scale euroregional projects,
which is the most important of the instruments supporting local initiatives. Foreign aid
funds help to bring about integration by improving the infrastructure and transport
system, and promoting tourism and business activity in a wide sense. The fundamental
goal of the PHARE CBC programs is to support development of cross-border co-
operation and assist in raising the level of development of border areas, secure borders,
and improve Poland's internal security. Since the mid-nineties finance has been approved
and obtained for more than 30 projects in the area now known as the Voivodship of West
Pomerania. More than half of these projects are associated with protection of the
environment, the others being associated with transport, public utility systems, human
resources and economic development. The largest number of projects involve areas
adjacent to the border and in the city of Szczecin, as these areas are of greatest interest
for foreign partners (because of their proximity to the European Union). For the years
2000–2006 the Department of Development Strategy and Spatial Planning of the
Marshal's Office of the Voivodship of West Pomerania has recommended another 23
projects (out of 71 submitted) whose originators have applied for additional funding from
the cross-border co-operation program PHARE CBC. Apart from the fields mentioned
above these projects also include rural areas. The voivodship is also taking advantage of
other European Union assistance programs such as ISPA (associated with protection of
the environment) where four projects have been submitted, and SAPARD (concerned
with development of rural areas) where 27 projects have been submitted.

Most of the projects being implemented are associated with protection of the
environment, as common environmental protection is one of the priorities of Pomerania
Euroregion, and is considered to be the most important objective after raising the living
standards of the inhabitants of the region through common support of investment projects
and economic programs, extension and modernisation of the transport infrastructure in
border areas in order to improve the cross-border flow of people and goods, and support
of the idea of European unity and international understanding. In the future, programs
associated with development of rural areas will play a leading role. This tendency can
already be seen in the active role of one of the five working groups formed within the
structures of Pomerania Euroregion. Working Group II was formed to deal with tourism,
rural areas and the natural environment. One of its first tasks was to carry out an analysis
of the state of tourism in the euroregion and to set up a database of tourism-related
projects and institutions responsible for the development of tourism on the Polish side of
the border. After that, work was begun on implementing projects associated with
a number of environmental issues, including creation and maintenance of protected areas,
and improvement of the condition of the environment in the euroregion. The last joint
project to be initiated was aimed at activating rural areas.

Inappropriate management of the natural environment (on both sides of the border),
the constant adverse impact of the existing social and economic system (directly
proportional to the size of the population in the area; the number of urban and rural
centres; the level of economic development; the type of economic activity engaged in;
ecological awareness; and spending on ecological initiatives), as well as the growing
ecological awareness of the population have meant that environmental issues are beginning to have fundamental significance. The state of the environment on the Polish side of the border is rather diverse. The southern and eastern part of the area are in a relatively good condition, while the northern and western parts, due to the high degree of environmental degradation resulting from high population density and concentration of industrial facilities, have been classified as an environmentally hazardous area. The worst affected part of the environment are flowing waters. Over 90% of rivers carry water classified as being outside purity grades, though lakes and coastal waters are in a much better condition. Air pollution is caused by the emission of hazardous dust and gas, mainly by the power stations (the Lower Oder Power Station Complex), while there is also a large amount of dumped waste due to the chemical works at the town of Police, the shipyards, the sugar factories, and a paper factory. On the German side of the border the environment has been affected to a much lesser degree. In recent years minor air pollution has been noted in this area, and lower than average proportions of dust, sulphur and carbon compounds have also been recorded. However figures are unfavourable with regard to the amount of dumped industrial and domestic waste, with 10% more than the average for the whole German province adjacent to the border being recorded. On the other hand the contribution of industry to environmental protection amounts to around 25% and is higher than the average for the whole province. When planning environmental investments the greatest emphasis is placed on protection of waters.

Before co-operation began protection of the environment was carried out separately by Poland and Germany within their state borders. This approach proved to be ineffective. On the Polish side of the border more than 70% of protected areas are located along the Oder and around Szczecin Bay. The Wolin National Park was established here, as well as several landscape parks (the Szczecin Landscape Park of the Beech Forest, the Lower Oder Valley Landscape Park, the Cedyinia Landscape Park) and nature reserves (the Świdwie nature reserve). In the German part of Pomerania Euroregion, which is acknowledged as being the most beautiful and appealing part of Germany in terms of its landscape, the Oder mouth is of special importance, and is subject to protection in the administrative districts of Uckermark and Barnim. Other valuable protected natural areas are the three national parks: the Pomeranian National Park, with its shallows and numerous species of coastal birds, the Brandenburg National Park Unter Odertal, the Jasmund National Park, with its chalk coast, the peat bogs at the mouth of the Piana River, the moors at the mouth of the Ucker River, and the Biosphere Reserve of Schorfheide-Chorin and Northern Rugia. Cross-border co-operation has given rise to a series of measures which have resulted in the creation of a cross-border protected area called the Polish-German Lower Oder Valley Park, which includes Brandenburg National Park Unter Odertal and two Polish landscape parks: Cedyinia Park and the Lower Oder Valley Park. Its administrators in Schwedt and Gryfino have set up numerous joint natural education and ecological programs. Moreover, Polish and German ecologists are co-operating within the joint Odermündung Fund, and the ecological problems of the border area are discussed at the forum of the Joint Committee for Protection of the Environment of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and the Szczecin Region. As part of joint measures (under an international agreement) a Polish-German sewage treatment plant has been constructed and put into operation in
Świnoujście. The plant also serves the German resorts of the Isle of Uznam: Ahlbeck, Herinsdorf, and Bansin. Plans for further measures pay special attention to expanding the Świdwie reserve and working together with the Germans to create an international nature reserve called Świdwie-Gottesheide. This is part of a larger project aiming at creation of the Oder Estuary International Biosphere Reserve, which would include Cedynia Landscape Park, the Lower Oder Valley Landscape Park, planned reserves on the isles of Lake Dąbie, the planned Protected Landscape Area of the Wkra River Forest (together with the Świdwie-Gottesheide nature reserve), the planned Protected Landscape Area of the Goleniów Forest, and Wolin National Park. Other interesting projects include a plan to create a Euroregional Centre for dismantling and recycling used cars and domestic appliances which would help solve the growing problem of their disposal and safe neutralisation. This problem was also raised at a specially organised scientific conference entitled Waste Management Policy in the Light of Regional Development. This was just one of numerous conferences, seminars and meetings organised to allow discussion and sharing of experiences in dealing with problems that are of great importance for both Germany and Poland. Co-operation is developing equally rapidly on other levels. There are groups involved in economic co-operation, transport and the infrastructure, education, social issues for young people, culture and sport, co-operation with regard to administration and municipal institutions, as well as public order.

Joint measures are not only being undertaken within formal co-operative relationships within euregions or other border area organisations. Creation of conditions for local initiatives and subsequent support to activate the local population are just as important as participation in the work of the numerous international organisations. Agreements are frequently made and co-operation takes place between areas which are divided by the border line, but share similar problems and conditions for development, without the participation of formal state, provincial or euroregional structures. These contacts are especially important for culture, education, tourism, protection of the environment and the labour market, and they often result from the initiative of professional or social groups, or from the needs of neighbouring communes separated by the border. Co-operation and cultural exchange carried out at the Castle of the Pomeranian Dukes in Szczecin is also developing extremely rapidly. Together with its partners from the German side of the border (for example from Greifswald, Schwedt, Gartz, and Stralsund) the castle organises concerts (e.g. the cyclical Orchestra Workshops), exhibitions (e.g. Historical and Modern Szczecin) and musical, theatrical and artistic events. A large number of cultural and educational institutions are looking for partners that engage in similar kinds of activity. For example the Contemporary Theatre in Szczecin, together with Uckermärkische Bühnen in Schwedt organises the event Theatre Without Frontiers on an annual basis, and with the support of the Szczecin authorities Polish-German literary meetings are held under the title of Dialog as well as events included in the project ‘The Polish German Literary Ship’. Other bodies which co-operate with each other are: the Society for the Popularization of Science in Szczecin and the German Folk University of Mecklenburg and Vorpommern (developing adult education); Szczecin’s academic institutions and scientists who co-operate with their German counterparts (e.g. the Greifswald University, the Baltic Academy in Travemünde, public administration schools); the State Archives in Szczecin which co-operates with the National Archive in
Greifswald; the Pomeranian Library in Szczecin, which co-operates with the Berlin Staatsbibliothek; journalists involved in the German-Polish Journalists’ club Under Stereotypes; radio stations involved in running the joint radio station Pomerania Radio; youth hostel associations of the Voivodship of West Pomerania and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; and local tourist associations (e.g. in Świnoujście, Rugia and Ahlbeck). Mutual contacts, projects and training programs are maintained by most social and professional groups: historians and conservators of historical monuments; street workers; nurses; disabled people; inhabitants of rural areas; and many others. Special interest groups are also interested in developing contacts: chess players, beekeepers, numismatists, and aviation and yachting enthusiasts. One impressive achievement of co-operation between teachers, schools and authorities of border communes and boroughs is the establishment of Polish-German secondary schools in Gartz and Löcknitz; bilingual classes and programs conducted by German teachers in some of Szczecin’s secondary schools; and the co-operation of kindergartens in Police and Löcknitz. Owing to the co-operation of Szczecin’s Pomerania Euroregion offices with the administration of the Zoological Garden in Ueckermünde it has been possible to include lessons in the German ‘ZOO School’ in teaching programs for children from Polish kindergartens and primary schools. On the other hand the German side has been able to enrich its educational programs by taking advantage of the experience of Polish teachers. There are plans to set up an International School of Commerce (in the commune of Kobyłanka). The Polish and German police forces, customs services and border guards, fire services, prosecutors, judges, government administration, planners, labour offices and trade unions co-operate with each other on a daily basis. An example of another type of international co-operation is the Polish-Danish project Environment-Employment-Education, which combines elements of education, environmental protection and creation of permanent jobs. On the Polish side the project involves officials and institutions associated with education, the labour market, ecology, protection of the environment, and agriculture and forestry, while on the Danish side the project involves representatives of the Ministry of Labour and a Danish consulting company.

Joint measures resulting from an awareness of mutual benefit allow the barriers and prejudice present in community relations in border areas to be broken down. This especially concerns relations between today’s Polish inhabitants of border areas and their former German inhabitants. Increasingly Polish and German Roman Catholic and Protestant priests are involved in forging and maintaining such contacts. One of the consequences of these activities is the gradual elimination of mutual grievances and prejudice, which began with the solution of problems caused by the Second World War. Joint efforts have brought about the reconstruction of a mausoleum in Maszewo in honour of those who died in the First World War; the creation of a collection of the remains of the municipal cemetery in Police, as a symbolic monument to unity; and the unveiling of plaques and monuments dedicated to the dead and war victims of all nationalities in cemeteries in many towns (Goleniów, Chojna, Trzebiatów, and Szczecin). These initiatives demonstrate a willingness to engage in friendly co-operation and provide a solid basis for forging further contacts both formal, between various institutions, and social, where the most important factor is the willingness of individuals whose interests and opinions may be very similar, and who may live near one another, but who are separated by the border.
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STATE REGIONAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF BORDER ZONES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

1. SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERLAND FOR THE STATE DEVELOPMENT

Problems of borderland including cross-border co-operation are not new in European context. Like the European Union countries, also other countries tried to reduce disadvantages of border regions resulting from their marginal position and to improve living standards of their inhabitants by implementing a regional policy. For instance, in the Spatial Planning Charter (1981) the borderland is defined as special territory where “the purpose of co-ordinated international policy is to open borders, to provide border discussions and co-operation and to use commonly infrastructural facilities, and to make easier direct contacts of related regions and cities in order to support still closer contacts of population”.

Significant changes that took place in Central Europe after 1989 came to light both in central and, especially, in marginal (border) regions of different countries. These regions receive quite new chance relating to regional development including also cross-border dimension. Social and economic transformation that started up in the Czech Republic after 1989 significantly effected the spatial structure of the country. From the location of Central Europe clearly results its transition function within European political, economic and social space. One of the most important development factors relates to the geographic position in the sense of location in relation to national and international sources of capital and innovations. Generall, “the closer to Prague or to the west border of the Czech Republic a region is situated and the more its area is urbanised, the more attractive it is” (Hampl, 1996).

Marginal border regions received new chances earlier. The development dynamics was renewed in the western part of the country. This part of the country is at present in close contacts with regions of the most advanced European countries and considering quite good quality of the environment (except Northwest Bohemia) it can become a territory with the significant holiday function and tourist industry and also a destination for foreign investors. Compared with this the eastern part of the country loses its position and this was worsened by the split of Czechoslovakia. In particular East Moravian regions are jeopardized by gradual marginalization deepened by different social and economic development on the other side of the border (Ilner, 1995).
2. REGIONAL POLICY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT RELATING TO BORDER REGIONS DEVELOPMENT

The Government of the Czech Republic passed the Principles of Regional Government Policy in their resolution of April 8, 1998. Its aim is to ensure that the regional policy in the Czech Republic will respect basic principles of the regional structural policy issued by the European Union. The state will primarily focus on encouraging the problematic regions, among which there are especially structurally affected regions (8 districts of the Czech Republic altogether) and economically weak regions (10 districts of the Czech Republic altogether).

Other regions, including the border ones, can be also supported if the Government of the Czech Republic decides so. Such regions, composed generally of border districts (35 altogether), were established in view of cross-border co-operation programme (Phare CBC) on Czech-German and Czech-Austrian borders in accordance with European Commission regulation. The similar approach was adopted in case of new CREDO programme supporting the cross-border regions co-operation on Czech-Polish and Czech-Slovak borders.

The CBC and CREDO programme include 16 (out of 18) structurally affected and economically weak districts. These numbers reflect the fact that a considerable part of economic and social problems of regional development in the Czech Republic is concentrated actually in border zones.

Nevertheless, in the borderland of the Czech Republic there are very often different internal and external opportunities for their development. 35 out of 76 districts are defined as border districts, i.e. neighbouring with another state. They cover about half of the area of the Czech Republic and more than one third of the population number. The character of changes in different border regions reflects historical development of contacts with neighbouring region and so the border regions in the Czech republic strengthen their differentiation. We can speak about Czech-Bavarian and Czech-Austrian border regions represented by impervious barrier, Czech-Saxon and Czech-Polish border regions, always with similar political, economic and social development on both sides of the border and finally about the new Czech-Slovak border regions established between countries with long common development and surviving economic, and especially cultural and family relations.

3. CURRENT RESEARCH OF BORDER REGIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Department of Social Geography and Regional Development at the Faculty of Natural Science of University of Ostrava (the Czech Republic) has participated for two years in the elaboration of a grant project (funded by Grant Agency of the Czech Republic) "Border regions position in regional development of the Czech Republic considering the Czech Republic joining the European structures". Project objectives are concentrated on the research of changes of social economic structure of border regions including effect of cross-border co-operation and regional policy of the Czech Republic and on assessment of the Czech Republic integration into European Union at regional
level. So, the project objectives reflect the actual need to find specific approach to monitoring or/and regulating the social economic development in border regions of the Czech Republic but at the same time they contribute to the general theory of the regional development. The research is concentrated namely on marginality of the position, barrier existence and diffusion of innovations.

Three-year project (1999 to 2001) will be developed in the following stages: (1) border effect study and its implications for development of borderland and inland of the Czech Republic, (2) setting the typology of the borderland of the Czech Republic from social, geographic and environment point of view, (3) developing the strategy of Czech border regions preparation in connection with the Czech Republic entering the European Union stressing the competition ability and ability to co-operate, (4) draft measures and instruments of the regional policy for the further development of border regions in the Czech Republic.

In 1999 the stage 1 was completed by the research study “Geographic analysis of the Czech Republic borderland” divided into 10 main parts: (1) theoretical introduction to the problems, (2) environment, (3) agriculture, (4) population, settlement and housing, (5) labour market, (6) industry, (7) transport, (8) services and (9) coherences at the national political, international and regional level. The last part (10) is summarization.

Environmental conditions can become a barrier to the regional development which particularly concerns two ‘handicapped’ regions – the North West and the Ostrava regions. It follows from the observation of regional differences leading to the typology of the borderland, that in most pollutants the situation differs first of all in the northern and southern regions. Changes in the inner structure of agricultural land resources of border regions of the Czech Republic are visible and desirable after 1989, or they take a positive trend. Differences between fertile and less fertile regions will probably increase not only in the whole republic but also within the borderland. In no case can we bank on self-sufficiency of these regions in the whole assortment of agricultural products.

The borderland as a whole has a highly mixed character as to the aspect of population development, with prevailing stagnation of citizens. In the development of migration balance, a change has been observed since 1997, which could be explained foremost in relation to the cancellation of ‘iron curtain’. The citizens there are younger, though in comparison to the inland they show less favourable education structure. Of the total amount of 2,286 municipalities, 255 had a status of city, and the proportion of town citizens reached 72%.

Since 1990 the total economic activity has decreased quite significantly in the labour market – in particular in the North-Bohemian and North-Moravian regions. These regions also show the highest unemployment rate and the most unfavourable development of job opportunities. Commuting has spread especially in the Czech-German borderland (including season workers), but its intensity has already culminated.

A higher concentration is in the Czech-Polish and Czech-Slovak borderlands, but it is first of all the Czech-Bavarian section, which shows a dynamic development. It follows from the comparison of regions, that concentration of industries is higher in border regions than in the inland ones. In spite of the ongoing transformation, the influence of old industrial regions prevails in the regional structure of industries in the Czech Republic.
The evaluation of transport conditions – based on the presence and number of border crossings along particular sections of the state boundary – shows that the highest permeability is toward Slovakia (first of all thanks to the South-Moravian part) and the lowest one is in the direction of Austria. Almost a half of passenger cars cross the state border at the frontier between the Czech Republic and Germany. Representation of services exceeds the average level more frequently in borderlands than in the inland. It can not be definitely asserted that it is directly connected with the geographic position. More probably it is due to an internal (structural) conditions: the presence of interregional centres (e.g. Liberec, Zlín, České Budějovice), significant tourist industry often linked up with balneology (Karlov Vary, Jeseník) or transit functions (Cheb, Břeclav, Náchod).

Changes in the 1990s in the Central-European space have a major influence upon the development of the Czech Republic, especially in border regions. It is evident that cooperation with the other countries of the Visegrad group is highly needed. The process of framing the interests of the Czech Republic should be harmonised with European endeavour to enforce in integrated Europe, including the idea of regions beyond their frontiers – Euroregions. Their task can be taken as a mean, but also as an institutionalised body of cross-border co-operation. There are nine Euroregions on the Czech Republic frontier at present.

4. CONCLUSION

The development of cross-border civil contacts, effect of local and cross-border civil activities creates new relations between citizens on both sides of the state border. Together with the renewal of civil society on new democratic conditions on the Czech side there is developing the cross-border dimension of this civil society. This is a natural feature of the modern society, national interests (expressions) are suppressed. Peculiar was the attitude of B. Loewenstein (1988) to the national, i.e. to Czech: “Even Czech history is not the history of Czech ethnic but it is the history of permanent coexistence, common gaining access to neighbours, taking over the forms of life, thinking, culture, technique, economy”. At present we can see it as under informal contacts and under formalised co-operation in the form of Euroregions.

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THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF POLAND AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION

The transborder co-operation, which has existed in the Western Europe since the 1950s, developed in Poland after the year 1990. After ten years, some euroregions came into existence nearly on the all length of the Polish borders. The transborder co-operation is just being planned or developed in the regions. Generally, the co-operation with different regions lying on the other side of the country's border is established in the reason of some local societies. But in the last ten years, since the first euroregion was created, some clear trends of its development can be indicated. After introducing the new administrative system in 1999, the communal and provincial competencies have changed, new territorial structures – the districts were introduced and the number of provinces was reduced. Considering the territorial administration changes and the institutionalisation of the transborder co-operation, the country's administrative division will influence the development of economic, ecological and transport connections now existing or in potential euroregions. Therefore, it is important to know in what rate the new administrative structure has adopted the area and its economical potential of the provinces to the co-operation and competitions with similar regions bordering with Poland. Estimation of the today's transborder co-operation and the influences of administrative division on the possibilities of Polish development are also very important.

* * *

It seems that though adjusting law and economy is independent of administrative divisions, yet the development of direct co-operation with our neighbours, co-operation in the border zones and euroregions, are dependent to a great extent on a new territorial demarcation of land. All the more that apart from the formal demands conditioning our joining of European Union, regional co-operation and that across the border help to build up mutual trust and friendly relations. In case of Poland, however, there are fears concerning expansion of foreign capital and, what is emphasized by the media, loss of sovereignty. Regionalization of the land according to the pattern of European Union countries, like for instance Germany, in the eyes of not only nationalistic politicians seems to be introduction to the partitioning of Poland. Therefore already during the first parliamentary discussions, the issue of number and size of new territorial divisions analogous to those of our neighbouring countries appeared.
According to the first bill of municipal reform, provinces in Poland were to acquire the right to independent foreign policy in the scope of common investment in environmental protection, development of economy, student exchange, utilisation of the waste and prevention of cataclysms. Although, the campaign of some members of the parliament led to the change in these competencies given to the local authorities, the aspect of international co-operation should play the key role in the future demarcation of land, as the new administrative structure of the country is being built for the coming decades – not only for the period proceeding our entering the EU. On account of potential necessity of regional co-operation across the borders after Poland becomes a EU member, it has been postulated to introduce fewer than 12 new provinces so that they be able to function as partners and compete with neighbouring regions in the united Europe.

The idea of regional and crossborder co-operation appeared in the Western Europe in the 1960s, followed by the notion of ‘Europe of regions’ and increasingly decentralizing processes giving growth to autonomy of particular regions in western countries. The classic example is the development of political parties and separatist groups aiming at getting or increasing the autonomy of some regions in Belgium, Spain, Italy or Great Britain. In the case of Poland, some politicians deciding about creating a great number of provinces maintained that the existence of one big Silesia or Wielkopolska could result in the growth of local authority at the expense of the central power. And whereas cultural regional differentiation of Poland can be viewed as its virtue, setting limits to the central reigning elite by any form of big regions, expanding autonomy would lead to decentralization of the government’s power.

Changes that took place in Poland after 1989 disintegrated the structures of power functioning before and brought about new decision-making centres. Range and territorial extent of administrative and municipal authorities have undergone crucial changes, too. As spatial demarcation of land always influences social and economic relations along with communication network in the given region, the distribution of economical powers has changed as well. Thanks to the investments, new economic centres are developing and these already existing are being transformed. Local authorities make a lot of economic decisions. The structure of Roman-Catholic Church, which has always possessed informal yet significant political and economical power, evolved as well. From the point of view of electoral geography, it is worth examining the changes in the extent and influence of territorial structures of political parties which are reflected in electoral preferences and political attitudes.

The problem of a new territorial demarcation always accompanies periods of governmental shifts. In the new political, social and economical landscape of Poland after 1989, the old decision-making centres disappear and the new ones are coming into existence. As mentioned before, administrative divisions affect social and economic relations together with the transportation structures. Therefore it seems appropriate to examine the influence of these administrative demarcations on how the local and provincial governments are shaped. In Poland, in the years 1945–1996 quantitative and structural changes in territorial demarcation of land occurred a few times. For political and economical reasons new administrative and economical centres were formed. There were efforts to decentralize government with the effect just opposite to what was planned. It is interesting to compare new divisions of Poland with these in neighbouring countries.
countries, in particular the Czech Republic and Germany, which together with Poland create 8 of 13 euroregions existing on the borderline of Poland, such as ‘Nysa’ that consists of these 3 countries and ‘Pomerania’ where Swedish districts join German and Polish ones. After Poland was admitted to the NATO its entrance to the European Union and establishing partnership with our eastern neighbours are the most important goals of Polish foreign policy.

In the Western Europe regional autonomization was accompanied by establishing euroregions which, contrary to pre-existing fears, play crucial role in the integration of particular European countries. The increase in the importance of local groups and autonomous regions caused institutionalized regional co-operation in Europe both between regions and in cross-border co-operation. Already in 1971 the European Association of Transborder Regions was founded, which 10 years later ratified the Borderland Regions Charter concerning economic and cultural co-operation. In 1985 the Council of European Regions – later known as the Gathering of European Regions – was established. Acting under the auspices of European Council, the Permanent Conference of Local and Regional Governments of Europe and the Regions Committee is present in the EU body. The last two admit as their members also representatives of smaller administrative divisions, which is of importance to commune councils and their unions along the southern and western border of Poland.

After Poland and its neighbours gained sovereignty, the idea of euroregions found its advocates also in the Central Europe. On the transborder territories of Poland 13 euroregions were created (Tab. 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euroregions</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Polish partners</th>
<th>Provinces which take part in euroregion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karpaty</td>
<td>14.02.1993</td>
<td>Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary</td>
<td>Małopolskie, Podkarpackie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprewa-Nysa-Bóbbr</td>
<td>21.09.1993</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Lubuskie, Wielkopolskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Europa</td>
<td>21.12.1993</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Lubuskie, Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viadrina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatry</td>
<td>26.08.1994</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Małopolskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug</td>
<td>29.09.1995</td>
<td>Belarus, Ukraine,</td>
<td>Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niemen</td>
<td>06.06.1997</td>
<td>Belarus, Lithuania,</td>
<td>Podlaskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pradziad</td>
<td>02.07.1997</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>Opolskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bałtyk</td>
<td>22.02.1998</td>
<td>Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Sweden</td>
<td>Pomorskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Zachodniopomorskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śląsk Cieszyński</td>
<td>22.04.1998</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>Śląskie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lubuskie and Pomorskie (West Pomerania) voivodships participate in 3 euro-regions – what is the proof of high activity of their former governments. On the border with Germany there are 4 euroregions, with the Czech Republic – 5, with Slovakia – only 2. On the borders with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Lithuania they are only 4, but they are larger than those on the western and southern border of Poland.

Founded in 1991, the Euroregion Nysa was the first euroregion in the southwestern Poland. It was formed by towns, districts and communes of the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland. The following years saw establishment of another 12 euroregions. In this process we can distinguish 2 phases. In the years 1993–1995, six new euroregions were created, including three with German participation. Next years: 1996–1998 meant formation of another six euroregions – 4 of them on the border with the Czech Republic. This scheme of appearance of euroregions is to some extent determined by the degree of autonomy and centralization of the power in our neighbouring countries.

On the border of Poland with Germany and the Czech Republic there are 8 euroregions, whereas on its border with 5 other neighbours there are only 5 euroregions (Fig. 1). Therefore it is rational to compare administrative reforms carried out in these two countries with closer look at changes in the degree of centralization of power and the adjustment of new administrative divisions to co-operation and competition in view of prospective admittance of the Czech Republic and Poland to the European Union.

There are significant differences in size and the administrative structure of the divisions constituting particular euroregions and their genesis. On the western and southern borders of Poland euroregions are established on the basis of bilateral agreements between neighbouring districts, clearly aiming at improving communications, tourist infrastructure, and co-operation in the field of ecology. So they are local initiatives confirmed by international agreements in the phase of well-developed co-operation at the local level. On the contrary, in Poland’s eastern borderland euroregions were established by the means of strong, governmental and administrative domination (euroregions: Karpaty, Bug, Niemen and Baltyk). The difference in the territorial structure of administrative divisions which are eager to participate in the eastern euroregions is visible.

The provinces are usually the smallest divisions and at the same time the lowest reference of decision making and the execution of the tasks. If we take borderland territories in Western Europe as the ideal pattern of euroregion formation, then the eastern transborder regions seem to negate the very idea of euroregion. It is characteristic that stereotypes and phobias concerning political and economic domination of the stronger partner in euroregion co-operation are typical for politicians, but not for inhabitants of the region.

Euroregions present almost at the whole length of Polish borders, including territories on both sides, allow the development of co-operation in the most important for local societies spheres. Solving ecological, economical, social and transport problems together helps to create local links, allows to get to know each other, and change negative stereotypes and phobias resulting from both the lack of previous contacts and the propaganda in the former Soviet Union, East Germany and Polish Peoples Republic. In the long run, the phenomenon of euroregions, apart from bringing local benefits, can be one of the ways to the united Europe in the next century. In comparison to governmental regional structures euroregions seem to be most effective in creating new European
order, affecting also basic administrative structures and allowing direct contacts between inhabitants of transborder territories.

Fig. 1. Euroregions on Polish borders in the new administrative division
Source: Kozanecka (2000).

For obvious reasons the process of extending the NATO, which included in the first place the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland decided about political future and security of Central Europe region; similarly, starting the direct talks about entering the EU will determine the progress in economic transformation of the region – yet in the future it will be the local initiative and co-operation which will give shape to the relation not only within transborder zone but also between the countries. In this aspect changes of territorial structure in Poland and the Czech Republic, introduced in the last 2 years, create new conditions to the development of crossborder co-operation between the engaged sides.
After the crisis of socialistic system in Poland, a new government, chosen in
democratic elections, quickly decided to carry out administrative reform of the country.
However, changeable political courses of the following cabinets, and the blockage of the
reform by the PSL (the Polish Peasant's Party) in the period of its rule, caused that the
reform was possible only when the coalition of the AWS (the Electoral Action
'Solidarity') and the UW (the Liberty Union) took over the stir of the power in 1997.
Introduced by the government of the prime minister Jerzy Buzek and prepared by the
minister Michał Kulesza, the concept proposed division of the land into 12 large, self-
governing provinces, 300 districts, each consisting of at least 5 communes. Introduction
of municipal reform was necessary as more fundamental reforms were planned. In case
of success, the reforms carried out by the government and positively welcomed by the
citizens, would guarantee maintaining the power of the government coalition in the next
elections. The main goal of this reform was to give the rule to the citizens, in concert
with the concept of passing on duties, responsibilities, finances and the right to decisions
from the higher to the lowest level of authority, i.e. communes. The new demarcation
of land into provinces was accompanied by the change from two- to three-level system of
territorial administration. The intermediate level between new provinces were to be
districts. This structure of power more accurately than the previous one corresponds to
the model of decentralized country and allows initiation of local contacts and co-
operation on the lower level than it was before.

Administrative reform was to be followed by the total reforms of the authority
performance and according to its first concepts: economic policy, the army, finances,
foreign policy, law, spatial planning on the country scale and some issues concerning
culture, education and health services would stay within the competence of the
authorities. The only representative of the state on the level of province was to be
voivode, who with the help of respective services would put into practice state policy on
the territory entrusted to him. All the other questions, according to the reform
assumptions, were to be dependent on municipal authorities: provincial parliament with
its board and the marshal, district parliament with the starost (foreman) and the mayor of
the commune with its council. Yet, already at the beginning of the debate on the planned
competences of the provincial parliament, some political elites expressed their conviction
that the power so far reaching in the hands of citizens will deprive the government of the
real control over the provincial authorities and the influence on the financial decisions.
Realisation of this reform scenario would additionally mean abolition and decrease in the
number of the departments of all ministries. At the same time influence and the range of
competence of ministerial officials would be limited, and by their politically conditioned
advance, the power of the party comprising the coalition would be somehow hampered.
So already at the moment of the announcement of municipal reform concepts and new
demarcation of land linked with it, the conflict between party interests and the welfare of
citizens, contributed to the favour of the different model.

The moment of the conception of the reform was burdened with the sin of
'partiocracy' which can be described as a reluctance to giving the power into the hands
of citizens, especially when the power means possibility of acquiring finances, granting
posts in the state and municipal institutions and offices. Because of the above arguments,
loss of political maturity and responsibility, and the arrogance of Polish elites towards
the citizens, the territorial and municipal reforms were carried out by the cabinet of J. Buzek in the outrageous way. In the initial version, in concert with the opinion of economists, spatial planners and geographers, the new division introduced 12 provinces in place of previous 10 economic macroregions. Although ministerial team of experts favoured the division into 10 regions, nevertheless, for the sake of successful transborder policy with eastern neighbours of Poland, it was agreed that 2 more provinces with the authorities in Białystok and Rzeszów be created. All the more that along our northern and eastern borders with ex-Soviet countries, regional co-operations is mainly the initiative of the state or provincial authorities.

From the economic point of view, Z. Gilowska, expert on municipal issues, believes that the ideal regional division would be introducing 8 big provinces. The number of 12 provinces is just the result of compromise and demarcation of Poland according to geographical, cultural and metropolitan net of divisions. New municipal system parallel to the competence of voivod designated by the government, established also the legislative body – provincial parliament and the executive body – provincial board of trustees with its marshal. The governmental project presented by minister M. Kulesza provided for formation of the following provinces: Dolny Śląsk (Lower Silesia), Małopolska, Małopolska Wschodnia (East Małopolska), Mazovia, Vistula Pomerania, Pomorze Zachodnie (West Pomerania), Śląsk (Silesia), Warmia and Mazury, Wielkopolska, the Białystok Province, the Lublin Province and the Łódź Province. The above division is comparable to other countries similar to Poland as the number of inhabitants and the area are concerned (Tab. 2).

| Table 2. Division of Poland (12&16) and some selected European countries into regions |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Country           | Area in thousand km² | Population in thousand | Number of regions | Area of region in thousand km² | Population in thousand |
| Ukraine           | 603.7             | 50,300            | 25              | 24.1             | 2,012            |
| Germany           | 357.0             | 82,020            | 16              | 22.3             | 5,126            |
| Poland (12)       | 312.7             | 38,666            | 12              | 26.1             | 3,222            |
| Spain             | 505.0             | 39,371            | 17              | 29.7             | 2,316            |
| United Kingdom    | 244.1             | 59,126            | 11              | 22.2             | 5,375            |
| Poland (16)       | 312.7             | 38,666            | 16              | 19.5             | 2,416            |
| France            | 551.5             | 58,850            | 21              | 26.4             | 2,802            |
| Italy             | 301.3             | 57,650            | 29              | 10.4             | 1,988            |


In accordance with the aims of administrative reform, the range of tasks and duties of voivod as well as municipal authorities have changed considerably. New provinces should be, according to the reform’s intention, as strong as possible. In Polish situation only big provinces (excluding Silesia) fulfil this condition. As E. Wysocka warns small provinces will not be the partners for big and economically strong regions in Western Europe, to which Poland aspire. These Polish provinces will not be able to compete with them even when Poland joins the European Union. According to E. Wysocka, in the case of Poland, keeping in mind the level of its economical development, it is necessary to
introduce 8 big provinces instead of 12. The government with the minister M. Kulesza and the assembly dealing with administrative reform issues share this view. Obviously, the reform should primarily protect interests of the state and its people – not interests of political lobbies or elites losing their offices or even local societies, which can unite in supradistricts alliances. As the result of the above presumptions, the government presented the bill of the demarcation of land into 12 provinces (voivodships).

However, after the first presentation of the project, contradictory declarations of the prime minister, the vice-minister responsible for the execution of the reform, and heads of the most powerful clubs in the parliament appeared. The decision about increasing the number of provinces was made after the representatives of one of the clubs made announcements inconsistent with postulates of the government designated by themselves.

After the president vetoed the division proposed by the government, the 16 provinces project turned out to be politically compromising solution. The provinces proposed were as follows: Pomerania, West Pomerania, Warmia-Mazuria, Lubuskie, Kujawy-Pomerania, Mazovia, Podlaskie, Lower Silesia, Wielkopolska, the Łódź Province, the Lublin Province, Podkarpackie (Carpathian), Świętokrzyskie, Malopolska, Silesia, the Opole Province.

Among the provinces designated on January 1, 1999, pre-existing disproportions resulted immediately in many conflicts. Częstochowa addressed the European Council with an official complaint, and in Koszalin, a lot of manifestations, protests and pickets were organised to retain the old province. In fact, up to now, it is not clear what criteria, apart from the need of gaining political consensus, determined creation of more provinces, 16 not 17, and why the Świętokrzyskie Province was established while Central Pomerania with Koszalin as capital was not. Included in the project, the 17th province of Central Pomerania would be larger than, formed as the effect of political bargaining, the Opole province and economically comparable to the already planned Podlaskie province and would consist of 14 districts similarly to many other provinces, like Świętokrzyskie, Lubuskie and the Opole Province (Fig. 2).

After the reform was implemented which introduced new 3 level administrative division, not only the territorial structure of the state changed but also the profile of the responsibilities attributed to the new municipal bodies. After long discussions in the parliament, following rather political than economic rationale, it passed a bill dividing the country into 16 provinces (województwo), 373 districts (powiat) including 65 ‘urban districts’ (powiat grodzki) established in cities, and 2489 communes. It must be stressed once more that the number of provinces meant political compromise not justified by the economic situation (Tab. 3).

Although all mean values describing provinces such as their area and population are as all statistical data burdened with inaccuracy, but if compared, appears very uneven administrative division of the land, which refers to both provinces and districts. As to the area of provinces there are sharp disproportions between provinces Mazowieckie (Mazovia) and Wielkopolskie as opposed to Opolskie, Świętokrzyskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie. The same applies to the number of population, which is the highest in provinces: Mazowieckie, and Śląskie, whereas in other (Lubuskie, Opolskie, Podlaskie, Świętokrzyskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie) is 40% to 60% lower. Number of inhabitants and economic potential enables the province Śląskie to face its economical tasks but 3 others (Opolskie, Świętokrzyskie and Lubuskie) will be forced to deal with serious
The administrative division of Poland and the prospects of the transborder co-operation

economical problems or what is more probable rely on central authorities assistance and informal political connections thanks to which such economically weak provinces appeared. This informality of political connections is more stressed by the fact that thanks to the reform the authority was split between the voivod (wojewoda) and provincial government. This structure, however, does not prevent double services submitted to the voivod and provincial parliament. Lack of differentiation of competences attributed to these two authorities, that is those related to state and to province, can lead to diminishing responsibility for failures. This arrangement can be the first step to reshaping municipal authority into quasi-political power and to forming political and municipal relations referred to as territorialization of the power.

Fig. 2. New administrative division of Poland into 16 provinces (January 1, 1999).

Statistical data prove that 3 provinces out of these added to the 12 originally established are below 75% of the average area and population. These are: Lubuskie, the Opole Province, Świętokrzyskie and one of the first established, Podlaskie.
Table 3. Area and population of new regions in Poland as for the beginning of 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces (województwo)</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population (thousand)</th>
<th>Number of districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td>312,685</td>
<td>38,653</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolnośląskie</td>
<td>19,946</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kujawsko-Pomorskie</td>
<td>17,970</td>
<td>2,101</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubelskie</td>
<td>25,115</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubuskie</td>
<td>13,985</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łódzkie</td>
<td>18,223</td>
<td>2,653</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Małopolskie</td>
<td>15,141</td>
<td>3,223</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazowieckie</td>
<td>35,715</td>
<td>5,070</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opolskie</td>
<td>9,412</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podkarpackie</td>
<td>17,890</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podlaskie</td>
<td>20,180</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomorskie</td>
<td>18,293</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śląskie</td>
<td>12,309</td>
<td>4,865</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Świętokrzyskie</td>
<td>11,672</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmińsko-Mazurskie</td>
<td>24,202</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wielkopolskie</td>
<td>29,942</td>
<td>3,355</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachodniopomorskie</td>
<td>23,032</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Informacja... (2000).

From the economical point of view – considering the tasks which are to be financed from their own resources – another three provinces, apart from the already mentioned, should be liquidated and annexed to neighbouring provinces, thus creating really economically strong regions. It applies to the provinces: Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Podkarpackie. Eventually Poland, instead of being divided into 16 provinces of so varied economical potential, would consists of 9 economically powerful regions centred around the biggest towns: Szczecin, Gdańsk, Poznań, Łódź, Warsaw, Wrocław, Katowice, Cracow and Lublin (their regions’ names would derive from the province capitals). Such solution seems reasonable bearing in mind the 1999 confrontation of regional economic potential of the countries – candidates to the European Union. It turned out that among 10 economically weakest regions, there were 5 Polish provinces: Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Podlaskie, Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie and Lubelskie.

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EURO-REGIONS – INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN STATES

Integration is one of the most often discussed phenomena on our continent. It is interesting for representatives of many scientific disciplines – economists, lawyers, sociologists, geographers, etc. Politicians talk about integration, there is all-around information in media. Euro-regions question is present too. For some people they are exemplification of our participation in integration process and a step towards European Union, for others – they are the symbols of state’s disintegration.

To solve the title problem (Do Euro-regions lead to European integration or disintegration of European states?) one needs to define notions such as: state and Euro-region. It seems that in almost all descriptions of a state, irrespective of historical periods and philosophical trends, there are three constantly repeated elements. They are: territory, law or government and people (community). A state is territory, marked by its borders, where certain law is in force. People living there are obeyed to this law and in that way declared loyalty towards the state. The domain of the sovereign state is legislative power and the execution of law.

What are Euro-regions? They are institutionalised forms of trans-border co-operation. Because not always one can find the word ‘Euro-region’ in the names of the cross-border associations it is important to remember that the bodies of this kind are:

1) based on international and national law,
2) associations of the regions which share common international border (land or sea),
3) associations which are realised on the local level (not central) – subsidiarity,
4) associations which have their own statutes and organisational structure,
5) their main goal is to improve the standard of living of the local community.

Euro-regions have, similarly to states, legal, social and territorial aspects.

Above definitions let us formulate another questions:

1. How do Euro-regions influence state territory? How is it marked in space and what are spatial bounds in the regions? Can we call them regions?
2. What is legal basis for Euro-regions? May their structures and competencies lead to autonomy?
3. How are the Euro-regions perceived? Has any kind of loyalty to Euro-regions been created?
Five Euro-regions with Polish participation and two western ones were selected for study. They were Euro-regions: Bug, Carpathian, Nysa, Pomerania, Tatry and Maas-Rhein, Euregio. In Poland selection was based on several premises:
- from all Polish borders – western (Nysa and Pomerania), eastern (Bug and Carpathian), southern (Tatry and Carpathian), northern (Pomerania),
- neighbouring with the EU Members – (Nysa and Pomerania),
- with different borders – land borders, and see borders (Pomerania),
- of different development – relatively well economically developed Polish regions (Pomerania), and lagging regions (Bug and Carpathian),
- of different size – small (Tatry), and vast (Carpathian).

The interdisciplinary character of the study impacted on methodology. To assess homogeneity of the Euro-regions, their economic connections and to describe their role in the process of the European integration non-survey methods were used. One needs to mention here document study – data from the European Union, Council of Europe, OECD and other international organisations’ documents. In this group one can also find Euro-regions documents as reports, statutes, agreements.

Strictly geographical study was map analysis. Thanks to that method one could trace border changes in the regions, dispersions of ethnic cultures, languages, etc. I used transparency to catch the dynamic dimension of the processes.

Survey research, after Fink and Kosecoff (1985) methods of collecting data directly from the people, were used too – self-administered questionnaires, non-standardised interviews and mail-questionnaires. The researched population was made up of citizens of the Euro-regions – 80 in each national part and their elite – 20 in each. The questionnaire was translated into eight languages. Eventually almost 1,500 questionnaires were conducted.

After examining the legal framework of Euro-regions and their structure one can say that this aspect of their activity does not negatively affect the state and state’s power. All Euro-regions are based on international and local (internal) law. International acts are:
- European Charter of Regional Self-Government,
- European Charter of Local Self-Government,
- European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities.

All these acts were created under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the last one was prepared by the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR). The Treaty of Maastricht is another important document. It gives constitution for regional policy and development in the European Union. None of these laws interferes in the states’ autonomy, none gives special status to Euro-regions. On the other hand we should remember that local autonomy and regional self-government with representative bodies are integral part of the federal idea of integrated Europe. It is clearly stressed by the AEBR. The Association endeavours to found the trans-border public institutions and notices the changing role of modern European borders.

On the state level, in Polish case, Euro-regions function on the basis of Polish constitution, self-government acts and associations law. There are not any acts on Euro-regions themselves.

States’ integration is not affected by Euro-regions competencies either. Euro-regions are rather an idea of trans-border co-operation and meeting forum then effective power.
The list of their aims is long: they consider various aspects of social and economic life but because of lack of transfer to competencies the aims cannot be realised. Euro-regions can initiate co-operation between trans-border partners. Most often they implement projects connected with culture and nature protection. So far no functional bounds have been created in any part of presented Euro-regions.

From the geographical point of view it is difficult to treat Euro-regions as regions. They do not keep to the premises of homogenous territories, they are not functional areas. Particularly in Central Europe we can observe strong influence of hermetic (at least in the last fifty years) border. People could not visit each other and communicate for many years. Old relations were broken. National parts of Euro-regions are not regions either (Tab. 1).

Common features for all Euro-regions are:
- ethnic and culture diversity,
- numerous ethnic conflicts,
- bad economic situation, old industry, high unemployment ratio, low GDP, pollution,
- large contribution of natural borders – mountains ranges, rivers,
- large number of ‘young’ states and ‘new’ borders,
- non-complementary areas,
- problems with border-crossing in Central and East Europe.

Euro-regions inhabitants and local elite were asked to assess Euro-regions’ effectiveness. They also were to comment on process of European integration and Euro-regionalisation. The most striking findings about Central Europe was that people supported trans-border co-operation (80.2% of the respondents) more than the prospective membership of their country to the EU (75.4%). In Poland only 63.4% of respondents wanted their state to integrate with the European Union. Those numbers were characteristic for whole country not only for border regions.

In Western Euro-regions we could observe a different situation. There almost all respondents were for the EU model of integration. According to EUROBAROMETR Report No. 50/1998 the average support for integration among the EU citizens was 54%, and in Holland 75%, in Germany 48%, in Belgium 47%. Probably the benefits of integration are more visible in border areas than in other parts of Europe.

Respondents wanted future Europe to be a confederation. Basic advantages and disadvantages were connected with economy. People expected also some political benefits.

It is important to stress that in Central Europe only three out of four respondents had heard about Euro-regions. In Euro-region Tatry the result was the worst. It may be the result of lack of information in the media. In over 80 thousand articles published in Gazeta Wyborcza, one of the most popular newspapers in Poland, only 370 contained word ‘Euro-region’. A word ‘region’ was mention in 28 thousand items.

Over three-fourth of answering people declared that the Euro-region was something they encounter rarely or seldom. It confirms the thesis about low effectiveness of trans-border structures. Respondents clearly described their expectations towards Euro-regions. Most often they pointed culture, nature protection and tourism as the most important aims in trans-border co-operation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euro-region</th>
<th>Aspects</th>
<th>historical</th>
<th>cultural and ethnic</th>
<th>social</th>
<th>economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tatry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Polish and Hungarian possessions, long common history</td>
<td>Polish, Slovak and Hungarian colonisation, highlanders, language continua</td>
<td>neighbours accepted, attachment to the region and state, strong feeling of state’ citizenship</td>
<td>of the same tourists and agricultural functions, lagging industry, no formal connections, border trade, problems with border-crossings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nysa</td>
<td></td>
<td>till the Second World War practically homogenous, people movements after the War</td>
<td>till the Second World War practically homogenous, people movements after the War – new autochthones, Slavonic and Germanic languages</td>
<td>attachment to the region and state, strong feeling of state’ citizenship, reluctant acceptance of the neighbours</td>
<td>of the same industry and tourists functions, no formal connections, border trade, numerous border-crossings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomerania</td>
<td></td>
<td>till the Second World War practically homogenous in Pomerania, people movements after War</td>
<td>till the Second World War practically homogenous, people movements after War – new autochthones, Slavic, Scandinavian and Germanic languages</td>
<td>attachment to the region and state, strong feeling of state’ citizenship, acceptance of the neighbours on Polish side, reluctant acceptance on German side</td>
<td>border trade, different level of development, on Swedish side stronger functional connections with Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpathian</td>
<td></td>
<td>complicated, Austro-Hungarian influences, real melting pot, many new states, people movements after the War</td>
<td>different languages, cultures, great spatial dispersion of ethnic groups and nations</td>
<td>attachment to the region and state, strong feeling of state’ citizenship – the only exception Hungary, various conflicts still alive (Polish-Ukrainian, Slovak-Hungarian, etc.)</td>
<td>border trade, connections possible but difficult to identify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Polish, Ukrainian and Russian possessions, Polish colonisation</td>
<td>language continua, border zone many nations and cultures, frontier culture</td>
<td>attachment to the region and state,</td>
<td>border trade, but not just in border area, strong need for economic cooperation difficult to realise because of states’ economic situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Very few people could find positive results of Euro-regions activities in the region economy or crime fighting. Citizens of Western and Eastern Euro-regions had the same opinion on that matter.

Respondents had the same answers to the question about trans-border co-operation obstacles. People mentioned here historical and ethnic conflicts. It showed deep fossilisation of problems. The data also revealed a reluctant acceptance of foreigners. The least popular nationalities were Romanians and Ukrainians. In Germany less than 30% of respondents wanted people from neighbouring countries to visit the Federal Republic.

In Eastern Europe another phenomenon is correlated with the law acceptance, i.e. lack of face-to-face contacts and visits. People do not travel abroad. There are very few border-crossings. One needs to have passport and expensive insurance to leave the country.

Less than on out of ten respondents believed that Euro-regions might threaten the unity of the state. Slightly more than 20% of respondents wanted Euro-regions to be represented on international arena without consultation with the member-states’ central governments. Paradoxically, the most reluctant group was the elite.

Euro-regions were not high in the hierarchy of loyalties. People felt they were citizens of their states first of all. Only 1.2% of respondents identify with the Euro-region and seven out of one hundred regarded it as his or her private motherland.

The above results show that Euro-regions are not perceived as structures dangerous for states’ unity. Moreover, the documents analyses confirmed this fact on legal level. One cannot find any proof to support the thesis about functional relations between territories co-operating in Euro-regions either. Euro-regions seem to be the part of European integration and as such they need to be treated as a process. They should be assimilated into national and the EU regional policies. The citizens of the border regions clearly pointed their role – co-operation in culture and tourism. There is still much work to be done in these fields.

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EXTERNAL MIGRATION AND LABOUR FLOWS.
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS
(OPOLE SILESIA CASE)

1. INTRODUCTION

The Opole region belongs to those areas of Poland which are affected by emigration processes in a particular way. It is in this area that one can discern a certain clearly marked individuality of external migration processes referred to, by some researchers into the question of population translocations, as ‘migration monoculture’ (see Grygierek, 1997; Jazwińska, Łukowski and Okoń, 1997), that is the ethnically-based, one-directional (Germany-bound) emigration of local Silesian population residing in rural areas of the central and eastern part of the province. The feature seems to affect the whole of the migration processes in the country as well as to make the Opole region distinct on the map of Poland in this respect.

Migration to Germany displayed a permanent character in the years 1951–1997 and comprised 192.1 thousand people on the whole, rising to a mass movement scale especially in the periods of liberalization of passport issuance regulations or migration policy implemented by the state authorities. The beginnings of the emigration of the autochthonous population to Germany were connected with the project of ‘joining families’ launched at the start of the 1950s. Judging from the perspective of time, the project has been rightly called ‘disintegration of families’ since the ones who were leaving Poland very often left close family members behind. The latter, in turn, applied for permission to leave for Germany some time later, justifying their plea by calling on the kinship with the ones who had already left. The process of expanding family links as well as connections outside the family with citizens of West Germany became more intensive especially in consequence of the emigration wave in the 1980s, that is at the time when the most popular form of leaving Poland was illegal emigration1.

Whatever the reasons for these departures: the improper policy of the communist authorities towards Silesians, purely economic motives, the status of German ‘displaced

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1 This related to all sorts of tourist visits to Germany, which resulted in a permanent or prolonged stay abroad extending over many years. Most of the emigrants of the 1980s kept Polish citizenship and passports, though. Thus, it happens very often nowadays that people who emigrated to Germany on a permanent basis are still registered in official statistics as residents of the Opole region.
population' who expressed a strong desire to live as 'Germans among Germans' or remain indifferent as regards their nationality, it is a fact that there were a great number of young and qualified Silesians who left their homes to settle abroad. Neither the radical transformations occurring in the social and political life in Poland later on nor the fact that society gained the rights of the true subject in the state, nor even the general free access to the German ethnic minority granted to people of Opole Silesia could change this state of things. The Opole Voivodship has still been a region noted for its people's very strong involvement in migration processes, although, at present, a new tendency might be observed as far as the nature of the departures is concerned. Since the beginning of the 1990s the permanent emigration (aimed at settling down abroad) has been getting weaker, while the short-term migration has been growing considerably\(^2\). It happens more and more often today that people living in Opole region leave for Germany in order to get employment there. By availing themselves of the double citizenship rights, they are allowed to work legally both in Germany and other countries which are members of the European Union.

In consequence, due to the continuity of emigration and also under the influence of factors conditioning this phenomenon, there followed a process of forming a network of family links between residents of Opole Silesia and Germany\(^3\). Now, they condition, on the one hand, migration behaviours of people living in the region, including going to work in Germany, which has become so much common in the recent years, on the other hand, they cause thousands of guests from Germany to come to Opole Silesia every year in order to visit their homeland, relatives and friends still living here. It must be stated precisely that the mobility between inhabitants of Opole Silesia and Germany, observed nowadays, is based, primarily, on the network of family connections formed in the wake of emigration processes and is one of the immanent results brought on, in the long run, by the *exodus* of Silesians into Germany.

The research carried out in the years 1995–1999\(^4\), which was concerned with family connections between inhabitants of Opole Silesia and Germany, proved that the connections have a mass character in relation to residents of the Opole Voivodship, particularly the ones who are native to the land. As many as two thirds of the examined

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\(^2\) Beside the official recognition of the existence of the German minority and granting it rights compliant with international standards, the factor which had a decisive influence in the 1990s on the size of the permanent emigration from Opole Silesia was the fact that Germany gave up the policy of active encouragement aimed at people of German origin to immigrate. *The Act on Termination of Effects of the War* implemented on 1 January, 1993, and the consequences resulting from it, limited the flow of emigrants from Poland in a marked way. The policy had indeed fuelled the emigration from Poland in the time preceding the introduction of the Act.

\(^3\) In Opole Silesia there is noted now a considerable share of incomplete families and ones split due to mass migrations, either permanent or short-term, to Germany. According to R. Rauziński (1999), currently, as regards Silesian population, per 100 people residing in Opole Silesia there are over 120 family members residing or staying in Germany.

\(^4\) The present work makes use of empirical materials contained in the research project *The influence of visits from Germany and taking up jobs in this country on the socio-economic situation in Opole Voivodship* (K. Heßner, M. Korzeniowski and B. Solga – 1998) carried out among a group of inhabitants representative of the Opole region. Earlier research is also used here, such as *Visits from Germany to Opole Silesia* (1998), carried out in communes of the Opole Voivodship, as well as the one called *The influence of visits from Germany on the economic situation in Opole Voivodship (in terms of certain selected elements of the economic structure)* (B. Solga, F. Jonderko and K. Heßner – 1995).
population (62.5%) confirmed that they had families in Germany. As regards the division between the autochthonous and non-native population it turned out that nearly nine in ten of the native respondents had some family links in Germany. Among the immigratory population the percentage of such cases is considerably lower, though still relatively high (over 40.0% confirmed the fact of possessing a family in Germany).

The spatial distribution of people maintaining family connections with citizens of Germany is not uniform. There is, however, a visible feature of more scattered family bonds among the native population. Such a spatial distribution, to a certain degree, may be explained by the inner policy adopted by the German state in relation to the immigrants possessing, according to the German legal regulations, the status of German nationals. The aim of this policy was to quickly include the newcomers into the structure of the German society in order to integrate them.

The character of contacts kept between family members living in Poland and the ones residing in Germany as well as the frequency of mutual visits may testify to the intensity of the family links. Over two thirds of the respondents with families in Germany maintain personal contacts with their relatives abroad. Here, the native respondents again appear to be more active (80%) than their non-native counterparts (51%).

Generally, visits paid by guests from Germany to Opole Silesia are more frequent than the ones paid by residents of the Opole region to their kinds living abroad. The ratio amounts to 3 to 1, which means that three visits to the family in Opole Silesia fall for one visit to the family in Germany. It is also members of native Silesian families who come more often to see their relatives (about three times a year on the average). The same holds for the number of native Silesians visiting their relatives in Germany (at least once a year).

2. VISITS PAID BY GERMANS TO OPOLE SILESIA

Very strong family and emotional bonds between residents of Silesia and ones living in Germany are connected with the post-war displacements of population as well as strong emigration movements of the native Silesian population to Germany, which have been in existence since the early 1950s. The displacements and also the subsequent departures very often entailed dramatic separation from the family. It is now this very separation that makes the personal contacts between residents of Silesia and Germany be so exceptionally intensive. Furthermore, the changes in the socio-political system, which occurred in Poland as a result of the communist system decline, brought about a marked intensification of these contacts. Both employment migrations and visits paid by Germans who still had a vast network of family connections and social contacts in Silesia appeared on a broader scale. The intensity of visits to some places is so high seasonally that it invests the life of the local community with a new kind of quality. As the research shows, today almost every adult resident of Opole Silesia meets visitors form Germany in their own or in the neighbouring area. This testifies to the unique intensity of bonds between Germans and residents of the Opole region. Such visits are treated as obvious events now and have become an element of everyday life routine. What is important – the naturalness of this phenomenon, that is frequent visits by Germans to their homeland, is
not only perceived by native Silesians, who have been familiar with them on the daily basis, but also appears to be accepted by the non-native population who live in the communes where the German mobility is not so intense. This fact testifies to the notion that visits paid by Germans have stamped a strong mark in the consciousness of all inhabitants of the Opole region.

Visits paid by the foreign guests have a particular social meaning both on the micro- and macro-scale. Owing to them, individuals and whole family as well as ethnic groups renew and strengthen their bonds, get to know one another, effectively overcome barriers and refute stereotypes, absorb cultural patterns and customs from each other, or they often help each other solve various life problems. The visits by Germans to their native places are perceived as a positive phenomenon by the regional community not only in terms of maintaining family bonds through personal contacts, but as bringing in certain material benefits to the family entertaining visitors and to the local economy as well.

It turns out that visits paid by German citizens influence an increase in the sales turnover of trading establishments, especially in the food sector. This influence is visible in services (mainly the ones connected with hairdressing, shoe repairs, tinsmith's work and varnishing at garages). Profits are also made by some sectors of manufacturing crafts, especially joiner's workshops.

A favourable impact of the Germans' visits on the local economy is reflected in the consciousness of inhabitants of communes. This concerns both people professionally connected with trading and relatives and acquaintances of the German guests.

On the other hand, the Germans' stay in their native places is relatively little varied. They spend most of the time enjoying leisure with their family, other relatives and acquaintances, or doing shopping for their own needs or for their family. The guests from Germany visit places of the local religious cult, particularly during the time of religious celebrations. Visits paid to the places of their former abode may also be connected with inspecting or keeping up of the property (an estate or house) still in their possession, or — eventually — with redecorating the former.

A factor to additionally confirm the stability and closeness of the social contacts between Germans visiting Opole Voivodship and the local communities is the common participation in social and cultural events successfully organised for years now in individual villages, communes, towns or even districts of towns (e.g. reunions of the current and former residents, feast days of particular towns or villages, church fairs or harvest festivals). It may be observed that these meetings slowly take on a character of regular cultural events during which both the hosts and their guests make their presentations of the best things they have at their disposal, that is bands, music groups or sports teams. Even though such forms of festive activity are not yet made greatly popular with the inhabitants, it is native Silesians who become more active in this field, especially the ones living in villages lying near Opole.

Among the number of motives behind the Germans' visits paid to Silesia are also ones associated with entering into a marriage. The fairly mass-like dimension of this phenomenon, to some degree, confirms the existing strong emotional and cultural bonds with the source region of migration. On the other hand, this may testify to a relatively hard assimilation reality affecting the latter waves of emigrants from Opole Silesia in relation with local communities in the host country. Visits, whose purpose is to find the
partner for marriage, pose a very interesting question not only form the sociological point of view. They also have a specific economic context, which is worth mentioning. There are a great number of weddings taking place in Silesia. They are very often connected with organizing huge wedding parties in restaurants or cafés, which comprise over 100 guests. Such a behaviour is motivated, first of all, by family and social reasons.

Opole Silesia seems to be one of Poland's regions, in which there might occur the most favourable conditions for taking decisions concerning re-emigration. The return migrations, statistically, are still a marginal occurrence here. If emigrants maintain close contacts with the country of their origin and visit it extensively, there are only a few of them that decide to come back.

The perception of the phenomenon of re-emigration by the local community of the Opole region is thus a reflection of the real situation, since almost a half of the questioned considered such an occurrence 'very rare' or 'rare' in our region. Over 30% of the respondents did not come across a case of emigrants' returning to their homes and only 3.7% of the respondents claimed that such returns happen 'rather often' in their neighbourhoods. The above-presented distribution of local communities' opinions on the problem of emigrants' returns testifies to the fact that re-emigration is a very rare occurrence in terms of social perception. On the other hand, it may be assumed, returns from Germany of the re-emigration character are not treated in migration categories by residents of the Opole region, who see the former merely as a form of translocation, shuttle movement, or, simply, as coming back home after a longer stay abroad. Moreover, it is difficult to assess whether the returns are indeed meant to be permanent or part of the re-emigrants intend leaving for Germany again later on. Moreover, as people possessing a double citizenship status do not encounter any formal obstacles. Nevertheless, it is possible to risk the statement that frequent visits by emigrants to places of their origin and their continuous moving between Germany and Silesia is a form of sustaining the possibility of coming back, which might be realised in some kind of indefinite future, for instance at the moment of Poland's integration with European Union.

Determining the most common causes of re-emigration from Germany is not an easy task. It follows from the research that a considerable share in taking such a decision falls to the great improvement of living conditions in Poland, which has come as a result of deep political and economic transformations in the country. This also includes the appearance of the possibility of Poles' taking employment in the West, without having to leave the mother country on the permanent basis. Undoubtedly, to some degree, this has been a factor to help take a decision to return, especially if the economic benefits from staying in Germany may be 'consumed' effectively in Upper Silesia. Moreover, another factor strengthening the decision to return may originate from strong emotional and sentimental bonds with the nearest family and the place of birth. This situation applies to those people who decided to return to Poland after accumulating certain capital. Now they can invest the money in constructing their own house or, which happens less frequent - in establishing their own private business in Silesia. It turns out that there are also re-emigrants who did not manage to fully, or even at all, achieve the goals of emigration and their decision to return stems from their failure to carry out their initial plans (Heffner and Soldra-Gwizdz, 1997).

*The data collected in the research were based on interviews with respondents from both urban and rural areas, as well as with representatives of local authorities.


The regional community, as was mentioned before, displays a poor knowledge of return emigration from Germany and their attitudes towards eventual re-emigration processes of former residents of Opole Voivodship on a mass scale varies, too. Slightly over a half of the questioned (57.4%) accepts the re-emigration as a positive occurrence, while almost 20% consider this in the negative. The fact that nearly one fourth of the respondents were not able to explicitly define their attitude toward the issue might be meaningful here. Generally, the eldest, above 65 years of age, display a certain unwillingness in reference to such returns. None of this group of respondents ranked re-emigration as a decisively positive act. At the same time, over one third of the age group indicated the former to be ‘rather positive’, and a further one third were not certain of their evaluation. As many as 23.1% of the eldest decided that the question of former emigrants returning from Germany to re-settle down in the region on the permanent basis is a negative phenomenon. There exists then a characteristic attitude of apprehension and reserve towards the perspective of a larger or smaller number of Germans coming to live in the Opole region.

Young people between 18 and 24 are the ones to comparatively rate such returns highest. Among the young there is the greatest conviction as to a beneficial value of re-emigration (over 70% of the answers). In this age group appear the lowest number of negative attitudes (12.5%) or the undecided ones (15.6%).

The former Sileans who were made to leave their homes after the end of the War are among those who visit Opole Silesia less often. They undertake the journey to their places of birth out of emotional motives. The participants in visits of this type are usually elderly (over 60 years of age), book their accommodation in hotels or guesthouses, sometimes stay at private houses. They take part in coach touring excursions, connecting their quest for reminiscences with visiting the country and region from which they come. This type of movement is referred to by the term ‘sentimental tourism’⁵, since each of those elderly people becomes moved by their memories (sometimes reaching as far as several decades back) while looking at places which now evoke a great deal of sentiment.

It seems, though, that in the long run, the ‘sentimental tourism’ does not offer sufficiently stable bases of development for a decisive percent of the tourists concerned are people of old age. Many of them will not be able to repeat such a journey after having come once or twice. The number of this group of foreign guests will thus be getting smaller with time⁶.

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¹ The equivalent terms used in American literature for this type of activity are ‘roots syndrome tourism’ or ‘ethnic tourism’ proposed by A. Maslow (1954) and recently repeated by L. Krec (1995). In the German literature of the subject a similar term has not yet taken shape; still the one of ‘Heimattouristik’ is used. Cf. Baranieccki (1997).

⁵ There may, however, appear a reverse trend if there is a shift made to make a group of emigrants or their descendants the subject of the ‘sentimental tourism’. They will visit places of their origin or, in a broader sense, the country of their own and their ancestors’ origin. Then, theoretically, the source of potential sentimental tourists who would want to stress their ethnic roots will expand in the long run. It is worth remarking that the inner differentiation existing within this group of people will certainly affect the degree of the sentimental attitude towards visiting ‘the old country’.

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In the opinion of the majority of inhabitants of the Opole region, visits of this type are a rare occurrence. There were quite a number of respondents who claimed that ‘sentimental tourists’ do not come to visit our region at all. It can be expected, however, that such opinions do not reflect the existing reality. The fact is the circumstances of German tourists’ visits have changed and they remain anonymous in the places where they stay, thus becoming less noticeable.

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An attempt at assessing the size of the arrivals from Germany in Opole Silesia is a significant element of the analysis. In the case of the values obtained in the conducted research, it is necessary to realise the relativity of opinions on the quantitative dimension of the movement directed at Opole Silesia. Very often the evaluation was made in the context of the movement observed in the place of abode. Anyway, a picture and confirmation of both the considerable quantitative dimension of arrivals, their stability as well as the scale of the arrivals changing over the year were obtained. Let us study a few of the results.

According to the respondents, in the spring there come from several tens to several hundred guests from Germany to various places in Opole Silesia. Such values were indicated by the greatest number of the questionned, that is 34.7%, who chose the option ‘several tens’, whereas 22.7% – chose ‘several hundred’. In the opinion of the majority of the people asked, in the summer, like in the preceding season, there come similar numbers of visitors from Germany (38.9% and 27.3%, respectively). Another value which was indicated most frequently by the respondents, was the number of ‘several thousand’, which may suggest appearance of a certain intensification of arrivals in this period. In the autumn there are slightly fewer Germans coming to Opole Silesia as, according to the people questioned, this is a movement comprising the range of ‘several tens’ to ‘several’ individuals. The quantitative dimension of the arrivals movement increases again towards the end of calendar year (from several to several tens of guests from Germany in reference to particular places).

3. INHABITANTS OF OPOLE SILESIA LEAVING FOR GERMANY IN ORDER TO FIND PAID WORK

Leaving Poland in order to work in Germany has been an element of a considerable importance to the Opole labour market and regional economy. Labour migration is becoming currently a vital alternative of the economic stability and security and also a reaction to the growing rates of the quantitative and structural unemployment in Poland. Still, the most significant factor in the development of the process is the existing disproportion in the level of the socio-economic development and affluence of societies found in emigrants’ mother countries and the target ones. A particularity of such departures from the Opole region lies in the fact that the emigrants are able to take a legal employment in Germany, availing themselves of their German passports, and they do not have to depend on Polish go-betweens.

Foreign shuttle migrations to work have a mass character in Opole Silesia. They play a key role in the process but do not predominate.

In the opinion of inhabitants of Opole, the most significant factor in the development of the process is the existing disproportion in the level of the socio-economic development and affluence of societies found in emigrants’ mother countries and the target ones. A particularity of such departures from the Opole region lies in the fact that the emigrants are able to take a legal employment in Germany, availing themselves of their German passports, and they do not have to depend on Polish go-betweens.
a key role for the local labour markets by decreasing the unemployment rate decisively, but creating certain problems at the same time.\(^7\)

Leaving to find employment is undertaken by both the native population and other inhabitants of the region. However, a much greater scale of labour migration to Germany is present among people of the Silesian origin (71.6% of this group of respondents) than among non-native people (31.4% of the respondents). Irrespective of the territorial origins of the residents of the Opole region, leaving to find employment is rated fairly positively, especially in the light of the economic benefits it brings in. Additionally, there is a general social approval of this kind of enterprise. Interestingly enough, a negative evaluation of the labour migration is more common among the respondents of autochthonous origin.\(^8\)

The most common pattern of going abroad to find work assumes staying there for three months, though there also occur numerous very long stays extending over a few years. The latter are more often recorded among the native population, which seems fully understandable, especially in the context of the legal form of the migration by these individuals. The non-native individuals, by contrast, display a tendency for shorter labour stays.

The traditional directions of migration play a significant role in the flow of workers from the Opole region into the German labour market. For native Silesians their family connections and new opportunities of penetration which derive from the opening of the labour market in former East Germany have the most important meaning. Non-native workers, on the other hand, value factors resulting from the network of informal contacts and acquaintance in the German labour market most.

Workers from Opole Silesia find employment, first of all, in Nordrhein-Westfalen (over 1/4 of all the workforce), every fifth visit to Germany is Bavaria-bound (19.6%), and every seventh one is destined for Hessen (13.5%). Also, a fairly numerous share falls to visits paid to the area of former East Germany and West Berlin (21%). A thesis may be ventured that labour visits to the latter places compete with the directions of traditional connections, and due to the geographical proximity, easy access by conventional means of transport from the Opole region as well as because of a shortage of workforce in the professions in which Silesians specialise, their importance will be on increase.

An exact determination of the size of the labour migration from Opole Silesia to Germany after 1990 is not easy. This is connected, among others, with possessing the status of double citizenship by part of the inhabitants of the Opole region, which, in turn

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\(^7\) Whole groups of professionals in particular fields were reported to disappear from some local labour markets. Labour emigration (the temporary type) has, to a great extent, a whole-family and neighbour-related character. It is very often a lasting kind of emigration, and the period of stay in Germany extends over a few years. The permanent and temporary emigration frequently turned out to absorb over 20% of the labour sources in some local labour markets. Permanent migration of employees with positions in various establishments comprised 870 people, while the temporary one – 2034 people, which amounts to 12.6% of all the employed with higher education (Rauziński, 1999:31).

\(^8\) Various drawbacks and strenuous aspects felt by families of the ones who take up work in Germany (such as separation from the spouse or from other family members, the necessity of taking on extra duties at home, increasing stress and unrest) are particularly accentuated by people from the autochthonous group. It is this group that comprises people leaving for Germany on the long-term basis, whose stay often extends to several years.
allows the bearers of such passports to move freely within Germany and to take legal work there. It is assessed that in 1995 there were over 77 thousand residents of the Opole region staying abroad, including 30–40 thousand who took employment there (Rauziński and Jończy, 1999)\(^9\).

Nearly half of all the respondents altogether (49%) came from families in which either the questioned person himself or at least one of his closest or distant relations had taken a paid job in Germany. In the case of 17.1% families who were included in the survey, at least one family member was actually working in Germany at that time. Moreover, nearly one third of the respondents declared that they had taken such a job themselves in the past. The period the questioned referred to varied from the years 1998–1994 (15.3%), through 1993–1989 (8.0%) back into the years before 1989 (3.7%). There is a feature of certain lability as regards the intensification of the phenomenon visible in the progress, which is typical of labour migration in this region.

4. CONCLUSION

The results of the research conducted in the Opole region in the 1990s justify the thesis that processes of continuous translocations of people, which occur here in contemporary times, may serve as an example of the phenomenon of forming a ‘shuttle society’\(^10\) (to use the term coined by contemporary Polish researchers into migration processes), observed also in other parts of the country. Very numerous temporary departures from Silesia, mainly to find paid work abroad, and regular frequent visits paid to the region from abroad, seem to influence the “consolidation of the shuttle-like construction of the social world – a society that, as though, could not find its own point of balance and finds itself trapped in a constant movement between two attractive points of reference, which are, furthermore, important as seen from different perspectives” (Jaźwińska, et al., 1997). On the one hand, they become unique patterns, ways of behaving, acts rooted in the native tradition and emotional bonds with the homeland, on the other one – they are patterns located in the Western World. The force of attraction exerted by the first and the other appears to be great. Translocating between the two dominant poles causes a constant mobility of the contemporary society. The latter statement seems to be a reasonable conclusion resulting from an analysis of the above-presented problems.

\(^9\) The authors furnish the above-quoted numbers as assessments, basing on data obtained from several places inhabited solely by the Silesian ethnic population. According to the findings, it is every 6–25th resident of these places that leaves for Germany on the seasonal or permanent basis on the average. The largest group (about half of the whole) includes people ranging from 18–30 years of age. This would indicate the overall number of 15–70 thousand people in the region.

\(^10\) The hypothesis of formation of the so-called ‘shuttle society’ was put forward by E. Jaźwińska, W. Łukowski and M. Okólski. Cf. Jaźwińska, et al., 1997: 75.
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PERCEPTION OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN AND POLISH-RUSSIAN TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION BY THE INHABITANTS OF BORDER VOIVODSHIPS

1. RESEARCH GOAL AND METHODS

The purpose of the present paper is to examine how the inhabitants of Polish borderlands perceive the co-operation between Polish local authorities and their partners in Russia (the Kaliningrad District) and Ukraine. The investigation was conducted in 1998–1999.

Methodology used to carry out the study included a questionnaire survey among adult inhabitants of the regions. A special questionnaire was also submitted to the so-called elite – a group composed of municipal officials, school head masters, village administrators and parish priests.

The study attempted to explore to what degree local communities are cognisant of Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian co-operation and how they rate its consequences and effectiveness. Included in the survey were questions pertaining to the people’s expectations, fears, and personal involvement in such activity. The questionnaire also probed the impact of the co-operation on social ties and reciprocal links between communities separated by a boundary. Finally, it sought to evaluate future perspective for transborder co-operation having in view prospective integration of Poland with the European Union.

In Polish-Russian borderland (Euroregion Baltic) a sample of 100 inhabitants (including 30 elite’s members) were taken from 3 former voivodships Elblag, Olsztyn and Suwałki (according to the ancient administrative division into 49 voivodships valid until the 1st of January 1999) (Fig. 1).

In Polish-Ukrainian borderland (Euroregion Bug) a sample of 112 inhabitants (including 32 elite’s members) were taken from 4 former voivodships. It was Chelm, Lublin, Tarnobrzeg and Zamość Voivodships.

Taken the two borderlands as a whole the survey involved 212 respondents (including 62 elite’s members) from 34 localities in 7 voivodships. The structure of the sample is shown in the figure 2 and 3. A random sample closely represented the total population.
Fig. 1. Regions and places of field researches

Fig. 2. Age structure of the sample
2. RANGE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE BORDER VOIVODSHIPS INHABITANTS ABOUT THE TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION

2.1. Comprehension of the notion of 'transborder co-operation'

The survey has shown a considerable variation in understanding the notion of 'transborder co-operation' (Fig. 4). The elite can definitely give the characteristics of the transborder co-operation. So far as the other respondents are concerned, 67% posses a poor knowledge of the notion with 19% having no idea of it. Only 13% of them is able to properly define the term.
According to the respondents from both groups the transborder co-operation consists chiefly in commerce, cultural and tourist exchange. Range of the respondent's knowledge on the transborder co-operation shows strong association with their level of education. It was found that almost all respondents cognizant of the issue were highly educated.

2.2. Evaluation of transborder co-operation

The sample was asked to comment on pros and cons of transborder co-operation. Both groups of respondents shared concern over its negative consequences such as expansion of mafia (67.5%), smuggling (35.4%), black work, flood of cheap and low-quality merchandise.

Nevertheless, a plurality of the sample rated the transborder co-operation as advantageous. The elite gave special attention to the economic profits possible through transborder co-operation: ‘access to absorptive markets in neighbouring countries’, ‘reduction in inequalities’. Some respondents mentioned prospective development of international joint-stock companies, transportation infrastructure and border crossings. On the other hand, some social implications of transborder co-operation are considered important too. According to the respondents it ‘brings people separated by a boundary closer together’ and ‘fosters neighbourly relations’.

3. PERCEPTION OF POLISH-RUSSIAN AND POLISH-UKRAINIAN TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION

3.1. Personal involvement of respondents in transborder co-operation

Only less than a quarter of the sample claimed any kind of participation in transborder co-operation (Fig. 5). As much as 76% are not concerned whatsoever by this activity. Even among the elite respondents only slightly more than a half admitted a commitment to that cause, in spite of the fact that many of them are employed in the Civil Service thus being susceptible to get involved.

Fig. 5. Personal involvement of respondents in transborder co-operation
Most of those claiming personal involvement participated in the co-operation by virtue of their office, for instance in the Department of Economic Development and Regional Policy. Some were charged with forging partnerships between Polish, Ukrainian and Russian entrepreneurs, consultation and co-ordination of actions at the voivodship level, and implementing programs such as ‘Youth for Europe’, ‘PHARE CREDO’, Ecos-Ouverture”.

The other respondents showed place of residence to be a strong factor determining personal involvement in transborder co-operation. The survey showed that a majority of those engaged in cross-border trade (sale of food, craft products, footwear; buying cotton thread) came from localities in the proximity of the boundary. Others had to do with the co-operation by reason of their professional duties (e.g. organising a stay and work for youth from a neighbouring country).

The results suggest that only a very small proportion of the region’s population (13%) are involved in the transborder co-operation. It can result not only from the passiveness of respondents but also from inability to judge whether or not their activities have to do with the co-operation.

### 3.2. Perception of effectiveness of transborder co-operation

A majority of respondents (61%) indicate that they have perceived some activities pertaining to the co-operation, 25% have not noticed any co-operation and 15% are undecided (Fig. 6).

![Fig. 6. Perception of effectiveness of transborder co-operation](image)

Among the elite barely 16% have not noticed any transborder co-operation while 84% have. The other respondents have perceived such activities to a smaller extent, nevertheless more than a half claim to have observed some manifestations of the co-operation. Unfortunately, due to a poor discernment of the essence of the matter as much as 20% can not decide whether such co-operation exists.
The elite perceives the co-operation in such aspects as regional economy, technical infrastructure, transportation and institutional co-operation. The activities aiming at development and mutual co-operation are rated less effective than those concerning culture, education and tourism.

According to the other respondents the effects of the transborder co-operation are apparent mostly in the fields of tourism, culture and education and in a less degree in development of infrastructure and economy.

It appears highly likely that the respondents representing average region's inhabitants who have a poor access to information on the co-operation indicated only those spheres of activity which involve them directly (tourist and commercial trips, cultural and educational events).

### 3.3. Assessment of prospective development of the transborder co-operation in the region

In anticipation of future integration of Poland with the European Union, assuming the it will not be very soon the case of our eastern neighbours, it is very important to examine how the respondents assess chances for further development of the transborder co-operation (Fig. 7).

![Fig. 7. Assessment of prospectives of transborder co-operation after integration of Poland with the EU](image)

As much as three quarters of respondents believe that the integration of Poland with the EU will encourage the co-operation with our eastern neighbours. Barely 6% claim the converse to be true and 19% have no fixed opinion on the subject. The elite is even more optimistic with 93% expecting a good co-operation with Russia and Ukraine after the enlargement of the EU. Only 1.6% of elite and 8% of other respondents foresee some difficulties in co-operation in new circumstances.

The elite emphasise the need for increase in range of co-operation and more frequent mutual contacts in view of reciprocal exchange of experiences and closer integration of communities concerned. There were also calls for improvement in preservation of nature.
For the other respondents a large part of them felt that the Euroregion would be profitable to the region and country. However, very few were able to indicate what direction the co-operation should follow.

The survey shows that a bulk of respondents believe that the integration of Poland with the EU will encourage the co-operation over Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian border. Almost all stress the fact that Polish eastern boundaries will become confines of the EU. Poland will become a more attractive partner which may incite Ukraine and possibly also Russia to make the co-operation with Poland closer thus tightening their bonds with the EU. Besides, if Ukraine proves to be able to co-operate with Poland it would be a supporting argument for its future integration with the EU.

3.4. Perception of neighbouring nations by the inhabitants of Polish parts of Baltic and Bug Euroregions

It may be safely asserted, that the assessment of transborder co-operation given by the inhabitants of Polish border voivodships is affected by their views on people living beyond the boundary (that is in the Kaliningrad District and in Ukraine) (Fig. 8).

The sample predominantly declared neutral (48%) or positive (42%) attitude toward population of bordering countries. Only 5% of respondents are prejudiced against them with 5% undecided. Geographic distribution of hostile attitudes is rather significant: only 3% of respondents from the region bordering on the Kaliningrad District are unfavourable to Russians whereas twice as many inhabitants of the euroregion Bug show ill will to Ukrainians.

The elite exhibited serious concern about the so-called political correctness. None of 62 respondents from this group spoke ill of neighbours with just one undecided. Merely one of five respondents claimed neutral attitude toward neighbouring nations while over three quarters are well-disposed.

The other respondents were much less concerned about their image in the eyes of Ukrainian...
researcher and more freely expressed their feelings. Only 27% were well-disposed, 59% were indifferent but as much as 7% voiced prejudices against neighbouring nations.

The motives lying behind the respondents attitudes were different in the two borderlands. In the Polish-Ukrainian borderland the elite was influenced mainly by motives of economic nature.

Unlike the elite, the other respondents showed sometimes prejudices against Ukrainians. 99% of them were elderly people having painful recollections of war and ‘ruthless and cruel Ukrainians hostile to Poland and Poles’.

The attitude toward Ukrainians was reflected by the answers to the question about the nature of contacts between Polish inhabitants and Ukrainians. It was found that a majority of elite respondents (62%), despite declared approval of Ukrainians, confine themselves to frequent official contacts. Only 6% keep up informal social contacts, 3% have family in Volhynia while 28% have no contacts whatsoever with the Ukrainian population.

In Polish-Russian borderland almost a half of respondents show a positive attitude toward inhabitants of the Kaliningrad District and just slightly smaller percent are indifferent. There are considerable differences between both groups in this respect. Among the elite as much as 83% of respondents regard Russians with favour while only 7% are indifferent.

The sample finds the neighbouring people open-hearted, sociable, co-operative, friendly and willing to assimilate our experiences.

Although a plurality of the elite show a favourable attitude, nevertheless as much as 70% have no other than official contacts with the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad District. Only 10% have maintain informal contacts while 13% have no contacts of any kind.

Among the other respondents 33% are well-disposed toward Russians, as much as 58% are indifferent and 4% are prejudiced or undecided.

4. CONCLUSION

People are a much more important factor in the transborder co-operation and development of euroregion than economic matters. The purpose of euroregion is to stimulate progress and improve the standard of living of the inhabitants who are its heart and essence.

The results of the questionnaire survey suggests that the inhabitants of the regions concerned posses a rather poor knowledge of euroregions and their functioning. It refers chiefly to common citizens, as the elite is relatively well-informed. In order to involve the inhabitants in the development of transborder structures, the authorities should divulge the plans of undertakings among the entire society. Otherwise only a narrow group of officials, professionals and entrepreneurs can get engaged. It is necessary to disseminate the idea of euroregion, its goals and targets, as well as the desirable course of further development. Of particular importance here is the media which was hitherto rather inactive in this domain.

It is also very important to encourage more frequent and more diversified contacts between Polish, Russian and Ukrainian inhabitants of the euroregions.
A special role is to be played by regional academic centres both in Polish parts of the euroregions (Olsztyn, Białystok, Lublin, Elblag, Siedlce, Rzeszów, Przemyśl) and in the Kaliningrad District, Lvov, Luck and Uzhgorod.

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THE ROLE OF BORDERLAND IN THE EURO-REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

1. INTRODUCTION

Linear borders, which delimit administrative and political divisions in geographical space, are the derivatives of territory instinct of all living organisms, especially the humans (Sack, 1989). But if this border artificially divides local communities, they start looking for methods of co-operation because they are often more attached to each other then to a country where they belong. Need of neighbourly contacts is a natural phenomena and its beginnings date from the prime of humanity.

The end of the ‘cold war’ created new international situation with objective necessity to build new order by European community, which would secure stabilisation, security and development of transborder and international co-operation.

Moreover, political changes in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1980s opened new possibilities of close relations and co-ordination of economic, social and cultural development. Fast reconstruction of inter-regional links, especially in borderland (transborder) areas plays a particular role in these processes.

Borderland is understood as an area of ethnic and cultural differentiation and is located on both sides of the border. Thus understood, borderland is visible in cultural, social and economic life as a contact area showing individual features of the both areas and, on the other hand, showing mutual contacts across the border. This causes that borderland is a transitional area – kind of a bridge linking two countries (Euroregiony..., 1999).

2. TRANSBORDER CO-OPERATION: FROM IDEA TO NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The conception of Maurice Schumann was based on the post-war integration policy in Western Europe. It concerned multidirectional activities, which aimed to suppress potential conflicts between countries belonging to European Union. This was carried out in the following spheres: political, economic, social, cultural and on many planes: local, regional, national, subcontinental, global.
Integration is a creation of the whole from ‘tiny particles’. This process is based on formation of mutual links between individual elements which should create a construction ready to build a certain whole on it. This whole is the European Union. There is no answer to the question if these elements should be independent countries or co-operating regions. Surely, future Europe will not be a ‘structural unit’. Two main conceptions of future Europe are based on principles of federalism and functionalism. The former assumes the development of supranational organism with weak role of national countries. The latter propagates necessity to create functional links between countries in different fields. This conception is supported by smaller countries (Janicki and Kwilecki, 1992).

It took over 2,000 years for Europe to develop and therefore the identity of European nations is so significant that there is no fear of losing it. Each nation enters the integrated Europe with its own culture and heritage and this is why unification of nations and their co-operation mean their mutual enrichment.

Different ideas associated with European unification created the need to establish organisations which would link the countries in order to accomplish certain tasks. This caused institutionalisation of relations between the countries. Regional organisations developed on both sides of the ‘iron curtain’, but the sides were represented by national countries, not by local or regional associations.

New regional co-operation represents unions of regional or local communities or communities of other areas beyond the territory of one country. The primary aim of regional associations is to suppress the hitherto divisions in Europe. All similarities are used to reach this aim: historical, political, cultural, social, economic and, what is most important, natural geographical neighbourhood. Such co-operation is an indirect stage of European integration process which fills the emptiness left after the break-up of the hitherto unions and bilateral links. Then it develops into transborder co-operation. The structures established as a result of such processes are called Euro-regions. These are agreements of regional character established to solve certain problems concerning communes of borderland.

The integrating Europe had to find a way to bring the borderlands closer together. In some European countries, the areas showing borderland features occupy a considerable part of the country territory, therefore it is so important to integrate these areas (Malendowski and Ratajczak, 1998).

Transborder co-operation takes place on hierarchic horizons. In terms of institutionalised and interpersonal categories, it is fully discussed by M. Sobczyński (1996). Euro-regional co-operation concerning definite enterprises requires common institution, which would co-ordinate local borderland communities. Such co-operation is institutionalised by Euro-regions, which represent first steps in European integration.

European Union considers Euro-regions as the formation and the most important canon of regional policy in Europe and method of ‘unionisation’ (i.e. process of adaptation to European Union) of new countries – so-called ‘laboratories of borderlands’. The following aspects are verified there:

1) invention and abilities of international co-operation at the lowest level of organisational structures,
2) relations between partners in small areas.
This shows that harmonious co-operation requires the co-ordination of local, regional and central authorities. Then, the realised idea is confirmed by effective co-operation towards the European Union. It is also important that it is possible to compare the co-operation advancement.

Transborder relations change from international correlation into regional co-operation. These changes are caused by:
- acceleration of civilisation development rate,
- compensation for its unfulfilled tasks,
- political transformations,
- administration reform.

These changes form new directions and forms of world’s common interests and cultural benefits, i.e. a turn from policy (pacification of conflicts) to institutionalisation of new forms and models of transborder co-operation, including:
- international agreements in all spheres of human activity,
- verification of standards of European activities,
- adjustment of internal law and territorial structure to models verified in international practice.

The level of institutionalisation of influence interdependencies also changes. Side by side with intensive Euro-regional activities, new lines of conduct and rules of co-operations, conditioned by different political, economic, cultural and organisational interests, develop. They will show considerable ‘segmentation’ of the borderland zone. It is not homogenous in parallel pattern to the border and distinctively different from its subsidiaries in terms of its population, economy and technical infrastructure (Heffner, 1996).

Intensification of civilisation development (electronic revolution) accelerates and facilitates international collaboration. It is a typical feature of modern times. Intensification and development of influences of world’s international system is a primary necessity, in spite of many differences and contradictory interests, which are, actually, suppressed by Euro-regions.

Euro-regions obtain new tasks. Apart from centuries-old need of co-operation of direct neighbours in local and regional scale, they co-ordinate global collaboration. Common globalisation of political and economic structures and increasing internalisation of basic life spheres generate development of national co-operation on incredible scale. Moreover, it becomes a basic source of interdependence. In such conditions the lots of individual nations and countries are more and more linked with each other (Kamiński and Okliski, 1978).

Main sources of international interdependence are:
- global character of modern international relations,
- different levels of co-operation between nations,
- ecological hazard,
- shortage of fuel resources,
- nuclear hazard,
- technological unification of industrialised countries,
- world’s merchandise, credit and currency market and price system.
Any of these problems can not be solved separately from others and their mutual penetration influences development of international dependencies, especially in borderlands.

This fact was underlined in the Budapest Document (1994) entitled *Towards the real partnership in new era*. In Europe, more clearly that in other parts of the world, the link between regional and global interdependencies is visible. Therefore, regional co-operation in Europe is a necessary condition of development of multilateral co-operation at the scale of the whole continent. It is very important for new democratic countries, which have to elaborate a co-ordination practice, i.e. abilities of reconciliation of national interests with interests of European international community (Malendowski and Ratajczak, 1998).

Moreover, transformations, of the so-called ‘third civilisation wave’ lead to resignation from part of the independence and to acceptance of economic and cultural external influences. Mass media exclude the possibility of hermetic isolation of some countries from external influences. Information revolution transforms world into a ‘global village’.

In the process of ‘border transparency’ and even its gradual decay a new form of transborder co-operation develops. Of course, mass flow of information through ‘transparent borders’ is a positive phenomenon because it favours cultural exchange in the condition of equality of rights. On the other hand, however, if this influence is not mutual, it may confine national sovereignty and identity, especially in case of less developed countries. Therefore borderlands play a double role in globalisation process: they stimulate cultural diffusion and control its one-way flow and unwanted influences.

This creates new quality of the role of borderland co-operation. New methods and techniques of border penetration create new effects of the laxity of the sovereign control of a country concerning its territory and population. ‘Sovereignty erosion’ is an important problem of Euro-regional policy. Equality of rights and voluntary character of obligations do not threaten sovereignty.

Formation of new Europe should be based on model of social, natural and economic development. Countries have to overcome the fear of identity and sovereignty loss and this is a considerable task for institutionalised Euro-regional policy. Euro-regions, solving the problems of the adjustment to the standards of European Union, elaborate common rules and principles of proper conduct according to European Charter of Territorial Autonomy. This specific constitution of regions sets certain standards and imposes obligations, which are ratified in this document. It specifies the meaning of a region and sets up regional policy of borderlands: co-operation of the regions of federal country with the regions of unitary country.

In the report *Outline of the strategy of regional development of Poland* it is stated that it is necessary to start activities of new generation and new forms of transborder and international co-operation basing on the programmes of European Union.

This is why transborder co-operation varies in different parts of Polish borders. Some of the borders are ‘soft’, internal borders of European Union and others may become ‘hard’ for a long time.
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THE ROLE OF BORDER CROSSINGS IN THE HUNGARIAN CROSSBORDER CO-OPERATION

1. INTRODUCTION

There are 7 neighbouring countries around Hungary: Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Some crossborder co-operation exist with all of them, but, of course, the quality of these relations depends on their social and economic state of development. The number of frontier stations at the Hungarian borders is high (Hungary has always been a transit country) and is increasing at the moment, because all international initiatives and tendencies are present to underline the ‘permeable’ function of the border.

The aim of all border co-operation is clear: to create a good personal, economic, social contact between the two sides of the border area. To have or not to have a strong border guards at the frontier – that is the question. Is there really a big role of the frontier stations in cross-border co-operations in the Eastern part of Europe nowadays?

2. THE HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN BORDER CROSSINGS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The present boundaries of the Hungarian Republic were formed in 1920 based on the Treaty of Trianon. The country has lost 2/3 part of its former territory. Due to this treaty the central part became periphery of the country, and the marginally situated territories got more central position in a neighbouring country. Between the two World Wars the boundaries did not constitute a strong division of the neighbouring countries because it was impossible to interrupt immediately the familiar and economic relations. During this period there were numerous frontier stations in the country, the Hungarian farmers crossed the border daily and cultivated their lands in the neighbouring country.

After 1945 the boundary line of the state was not modified significantly (3 villages were taken over by Czechoslovakia), but this line became a real obstacle, and furthermore the number of border points decreased. During the period of 1945–1960 (the Cold War) Hungary – like all socialist countries – reduced its international relations with the neighbouring countries. As the border areas were tightly closed they became soon
The role of border crossings in the Hungarian crossborder co-operation

Peripheral zone. The industrial investments and developments were concentrated in the central part of the country, in the so-called industrial axe.

The opening of the frontiers which occurred in the 1960s revitalized human relations and the commerce. The number of the border crossings turned out to be too small in relation to the increasing local border traffic. The settlements at the frontier sections began to realize the advantages and the disadvantages due to their geographical situation. The change of the political system in 1989 has given the opportunity to extend again the relations with all the neighbouring countries. More liberal cross-border traffic regulations and agreements on visa-free travelling contributed to the increase in the traveller's traffic to the country.

2.1. The influence of the Treaty of Trianon on the spatial distribution of settlements in Hungary

The spatial distribution of the Hungarian settlements was basically changed by the Treaty of Trianon. Hungary has lost 71% of its territory and 64% of its population (Volter, 1996) and acquired a new borderline with new border crossings. In some cases the new border was situated near important towns which had got a central position in the spatial structure of settlement. These cities like Komárom, Sopron, Esztergom, lost one part of their agglomeration, consequently relatively big areas, both in Hungary and the neighbouring countries, were deprived of real centres (Bihar, Szatmár, Zemplén counties). In the case of Komárom, Sátoraljaújhely, Szabadka, the borderline divided into two parts these cities. Some other Hungarian cities, like Balassagyarmat, Gyula, Szeged have lost also an important part of their agglomeration which visibly affected their development: the rate of the population growth fell behind the national average.

After the change of the frontier some cities, for example Mosonmagyaróvár, Baja, were able to develop more dynamically, because they got out of the influence of a main city.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT FRONTIER RELATIONS

Austrian frontier relation. The development of the settlements along Austrian border was not really important during the 1950s. In that time the cross-border situation of a settlement was only a disadvantage because of the establishment of the so-called 'strict border area' in 1950. It covered 15 km broad zone along the borderline. In this area it was not possible to enter nor to leave without a permission. The settlements situated in this area were pressed on a closed development with each other.

This situation existed till 1969. After this year this area became more accessible. Instead of the 'strict border area', the definition changed to 'border zone'. This border zone covered all the Austrian border section, 2 km broad.

This border zone was fully opened in 1989. On the 2nd of May 1989 the Iron Curtain broke down and from the 1st June the definition of the 'border zone' is not used anymore. The Austrian border part became 'open' to 1990 which facilitated illegal
commerce at illegal border crossings the number of which has grown. The Hungarian and Austrian border guards were not enough prepared for such personal and commercial traffic at the Austrian frontier section.

Slovak frontier relation. The Danube flows on the western part of the Slovak frontier section, and forms a real natural obstacle for crossing the frontier. There is a long borderline between Hungary and Slovakia where the Danube bifurcates in the region called: Szigetköz. The Slovak part of this region is strongly connected with Hungary through its population. The private relations have a positive effect on the crossborder traffic. Some temporary frontier stations exist on this part of the borderline. These frontier stations were opened by the support of the Slovak local authorities.

Croatian frontier relation. Before the proclamation of the Croatian Republic in 1991 Hungary and Croatia were in good economic relation: the Hungarian tourism passed through the Croatian member states to the Dalmatian seaside. Croatia and Slovenia – the two most developed member states of Yugoslavia developed lively relations with the Western part of Europe, and some of this effect concerned Hungary too. The war in Yugoslavia in 1995 interrupted all this good co-operation. Some events passed through the Drava River to Hungary. Therefore some border crossings were closed; thus the war influenced Hungarian tourism. The resorts of Pecs and Harkany lost many German tourists. After the war, the economic commercial relation between the two countries became lively: there was a new border crossing opening in Udvardi. Through the Croatian frontier passes the so-called ‘economic tourism’ to Hungary where the Croats could buy foodstuff and building materials after the war. There was also some building company to extend their centre on the frontier area.

Serb frontier relation. The south part of the Hungarian borderline is not yet the main destination for the Hungarian tourists. Most travellers are transit visitors. At the Roszke border crossing more than 3/4 of travellers are Hungarian and Yugoslav. (1996 – National Border Guards data). However, this is not really the case of the ‘economic tourism’. After the European Union imposed an embargo against Yugoslavia the transit and personal traffic was not launched. The reason can be the need of money, and the political change. One example: in 1996, at Roszke frontier station 56,000 lorries passed throughout the year, that is on average 150–250 lorries a day. This number is not too big compared to 900–1,000 lorries that earlier crossed the border every day. The vehicle traffic in 1996 diminished by 27% compared to 1995, and the personal traffic by 13% (1996 – National Border guards data).

Romanian frontier relation. There are three Hungarian counties along the borderline: Hajdu-Bihar, Békés, and Csongrad. In the last 5 years a need of co-operation has arisen on both sides of the frontier. It was not easy after the political change in Romania in 1990. After the change in Romania the central governing has not disappeared and almost all local initiatives have to submit a report. Therefore it is not easy to move the local authorities to co-operate, for example in the framework of the European Union cross-border support programme. After 1996, some concrete projects were launched along this side of the border and the commercial relation began to develop. More jointventures were created in Romania, especially in the departments of Bihor, Oradea, Timisoara, than in Hungary. In 1995, there were 1,708 joint-ventures. (Volter, 1996) The peculiarity of these economic relations is the fact that they are based on personal contact.
or they continue old relations where just one side needed a new partner. Unfortunately, these joint-ventures cannot exert a big positive influence on the cross-border settlements because their capital is not strong enough, nevertheless some positive tendencies can be observed.

4. TYPOLOGY OF BORDER CROSSINGS

There are two types of border crossings: permanent and temporary. The frontier station can be examined by his function (international or not), by the geographical situation and by the means of transport (main road, railway, water, air) (Tab. 1).

Table 1. The main road frontier stations in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frontier section</th>
<th>Number of main road station</th>
<th>Share %</th>
<th>Length of frontier per stations (km)</th>
<th>Length of the frontier (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovak/ Czech</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* After 1993: Slovenia – 102 km, Croatia – 355 km, Serbia – 163 km total borderline.

In comparison with 1990, in 1997 the number of the main road frontier stations increased by 40%, on all frontier sections was a new station opened (with the exception of Ukraine). It is impossible to make a grade between the frontier sections on the base of their frontiers points. The solution can be if we compare the length of each borderline with the number of its frontier points. The best situation is on the Ukrainian frontier section: on the 1st of March 1989 there were four new frontier stations opened and the traffic increased 6 times. The greatest number of frontier station opening was counted on the Austrian frontier section. (It’s has doubled from 1990-1997). On the south part of the Hungarian frontier the number of frontier station is sufficient, only the Croatian part must be developed in the next years (Tab. 2).

The most numerous frontier stations are to be found on the Slovak border. At the same time, this is the longest (678.5 km) borderline. The possibility to pass the frontier by bicycle or on foot shows the real communication between the two border regions like with Austria, Ukraine, Slovenia. As concerns the traffic it is noticeable that the main road traffic has gained in importance since 1994. It is an international tendency that the railway lost his position because the transport of goods can be quick, and as direct as possible.
Table 2. The generality and speciality of the frontier stations in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frontier section</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
<th>Main road</th>
<th>Train</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Bicycle</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Strict open hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The worst situation knows the Romanian borderline, because there is just 11 frontier stations on this section, but in the last three years 4 frontier stations were opened. Nowadays there are several developing programmes to open other frontier stations, some of them in the framework of the PHARE CBC programme.

5. PASSENGER AND VEHICLE TRAFFIC AT FRONTIER SECTIONS

To know better the situation of the frontier stations, it is necessary to examine the volume of person and vehicle traffic and to check if they are well prepared to receive such a number of persons. The table 3 shows the number of arriving tourists to Hungary in the years 1988–1997 when the political system changes occurred.

Table 3. Number of tourists arriving to Hungary, 1988–1997 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Tourists</th>
<th>Excursionists</th>
<th>Transit visitors</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>10,766</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td>3,577</td>
<td>17,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>14,491</td>
<td>5,641</td>
<td>4,788</td>
<td>24,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>20,510</td>
<td>10,670</td>
<td>6,452</td>
<td>37,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>21,860</td>
<td>7,075</td>
<td>4,331</td>
<td>33,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>20,188</td>
<td>8,155</td>
<td>5,148</td>
<td>33,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>22,804</td>
<td>11,719</td>
<td>6,076</td>
<td>40,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>21,425</td>
<td>13,026</td>
<td>5,385</td>
<td>39,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>20,690</td>
<td>13,790</td>
<td>4,760</td>
<td>39,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>20,674</td>
<td>14,305</td>
<td>4,854</td>
<td>39,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17,248</td>
<td>15,607</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>37,315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1989–1990 the number of arriving tourists increased from 24.9 millions to 37.6 millions. In these years the number of tourists, transit visitors and excursionists grows or remain steady. In 1988 the rate of the excursionists was only 20% of the total international arrivals to Hungary. In 1997 this proportion increased to 42% (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. International arrivals to Hungary: A – in 1,000 persons, B, C – in percent

If we continue the examination of foreign and Hungarian travellers at different frontier sections (Tab. 4), we can find the following result: the changes on the Soviet/Ukrainian frontier section are striking: it was totally 3 million travellers in 1991, five years later this number increased to 14 millions. On the Romanian frontier section the tendency is changed: around the 1990–1991 revolution in Romania, the number of travellers was high: 23.4 millions in 1990 and 18.1 million in 1991, but nowadays this number is only 12 millions. On the other frontiers sections there was no really big changes, the most tourist are present on the Austrian frontier section. In spite of the war in Yugoslavia the number of tourists did not drop drastically. It must be mentioned the special role of Budapest with two international airports.
Table 4. Foreign and Hungarian travellers at frontier sections, 1989–1996 (in 1,000 persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>28,032</td>
<td>30,016</td>
<td>38,300</td>
<td>33,896</td>
<td>35,872</td>
<td>35,434</td>
<td>31,530</td>
<td>32,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav***</td>
<td>18,257</td>
<td>22,493</td>
<td>16,491</td>
<td>21,313</td>
<td>29,540</td>
<td>31,234</td>
<td>29,219</td>
<td>26,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>4,875</td>
<td>23,421</td>
<td>18,135</td>
<td>16,514</td>
<td>16,436</td>
<td>13,190</td>
<td>12,118</td>
<td>12,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet**</td>
<td>11,299</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>4,201</td>
<td>9,475</td>
<td>12,026</td>
<td>15,265</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak*</td>
<td>26,038</td>
<td>27,937</td>
<td>23,796</td>
<td>19,950</td>
<td>18,591</td>
<td>19,175</td>
<td>20,922</td>
<td>20,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>3,094</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>3,479</td>
<td>4,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90,947</td>
<td>112,027</td>
<td>102,005</td>
<td>98,532</td>
<td>113,008</td>
<td>114,418</td>
<td>112,534</td>
<td>110,861</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From 1993 Czechoslovak = Slovak.
** From 1993 Soviet = Ukrainian.
*** From 1994 Yugoslav = Slovenian + Croatian + Yugoslavian.


Two other factors were examined in the framework of travellers on the frontier sections: the arriving foreigners and the leaving Hungarians.

As to the arriving foreigners, the most important frontier section is the Austrian one. The Ukrainian and Yugoslav frontier sections begin to be more significant, but on the Slovak frontier the number of foreigners stagnate (Tab. 5).

Table 5. Arriving foreigners at frontier sections, 1991–1996 (in 1,000 persons)

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>12,121</td>
<td>11,075</td>
<td>12,342</td>
<td>12,241</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>12,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav***</td>
<td>6,140</td>
<td>8,609</td>
<td>13,542</td>
<td>12,011</td>
<td>12,080</td>
<td>11,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>8,793</td>
<td>7,537</td>
<td>7,521</td>
<td>6,107</td>
<td>5,510</td>
<td>5,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet**</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>2,568</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>5,172</td>
<td>5,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak*</td>
<td>8,343</td>
<td>7,108</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>6,813</td>
<td>7,398</td>
<td>7,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,297</td>
<td>36,076</td>
<td>43,725</td>
<td>41,901</td>
<td>41,996</td>
<td>43,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* , ** , *** as in table 4.


Between the leaving Hungarians, the Austrian border section is the first leaving point of the country, but there is a strong tendency to leave Hungary from Budapest, it means the number of international flights is growing well. The traffic on the Romanian border section is increasing, but the Yugoslav and Ukrainian frontier sections are not too much visited by the Hungarians (Fig. 2).

To summarize: Hungary receives tourists from all over the world, but the western frontier station (Austrian) is more in use than the eastern frontier section with Ukraine. On the Ukrainian frontier section, the role of the frontier stations is the same, but the economic situation differs from that in Austria, therefore a big number of tourist arrivals on the Ukrainian frontier due to the fuel business too, and the normally tourism
tendencies are not really present there. On the Eastern part of the Hungarian frontier the work conditions at the frontier stations are more difficult (need of staff and information system).

Fig. 2. Leaving Hungarians at frontier sections 1991–1996

The vehicle traffic. The intensity of vehicle traffic was the highest on the Austrian frontier section till 1994. On the Slovak frontier section it remained steady, but on the Romanian frontier the traffic developed well in 1990. When the political system changes were finished in Romania, the traffic to Romania began to stagnate. Now, the Ukrainian frontier section is in development (Tab. 6).

Table 6. Vehicle traffic at frontier sectors, 1989–1996 (in 1000 numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>8,576</td>
<td>9,221</td>
<td>11,674</td>
<td>10,311</td>
<td>12,051</td>
<td>12,206</td>
<td>10,966</td>
<td>11,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav**</td>
<td>5,668</td>
<td>7,299</td>
<td>5,085</td>
<td>6,564</td>
<td>8,799</td>
<td>11,317</td>
<td>10,901</td>
<td>8,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>1,423</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>4,335</td>
<td>3,615</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>3,088</td>
<td>3,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet**</td>
<td>3,455</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>2,193</td>
<td>4,026</td>
<td>4,861</td>
<td>5,751</td>
<td>5,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak*</td>
<td>6,309</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>6,210</td>
<td>5,576</td>
<td>5,488</td>
<td>5,901</td>
<td>6,247</td>
<td>6,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,467</td>
<td>31,328</td>
<td>28,733</td>
<td>28,306</td>
<td>33,332</td>
<td>37,182</td>
<td>37,008</td>
<td>35,206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*, **, *** as in table 4.

It is interesting to compare the public road, and the railway traffic at frontier sections. At first, it is evident, that the public road traffic became more important than the railway
traffic. In the case of the public road traffic, the biggest traffic is observed on the Austrian frontier section. On the Southern part of the frontier with Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia the traffic is strong, and there is a growth of the public road traffic on the Ukrainian frontier section (Tab. 7).

Table 7. Public road traffic at frontier sectors (in 1000 numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>11,173</td>
<td>9,775</td>
<td>11,499</td>
<td>11,659</td>
<td>10,560</td>
<td>11,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav***</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>5,944</td>
<td>8,399</td>
<td>10,944</td>
<td>10,484</td>
<td>8,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>4,046</td>
<td>3,389</td>
<td>2,663</td>
<td>2,583</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>3,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet**</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>4,571</td>
<td>5,461</td>
<td>4,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak*</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>4,984</td>
<td>5,402</td>
<td>5,721</td>
<td>5,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,824</td>
<td>25,781</td>
<td>31,250</td>
<td>35,159</td>
<td>35,026</td>
<td>33,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*; **; *** as in table 4.

The railway traffic loses its importance from year to year. This is an international tendency and in the case of the Hungarian frontier sections, the connection with Slovakia is more based on railway traffic. During the socialist period, the railway traffic was the most important at the Ukrainian frontier, but after 1992, this tendency diminishes.

6. THE EUROPEAN UNION PRESENCE IN CROSSBORDER CO-OPERATIONS

The European Union realizes that the question of the security policy, the free flow of the products, goods and persons inside and around the European Union countries is one of the most important aims. Therefore in the framework of the PHARE CBC programme there is a possibility to support the development of the old frontier stations or create new ones.

In Hungary, on the Austrian border the development of the frontier station in Zsira can be a good example. The European Union supported the reconstruction by 8,000 ECU.

In Slovenia, there were three frontier stations: Kobilje, Prosenjakovci, and Martinje in the same programme in 1995.

In 1996 at the Romanian frontier section the border station Csengersima received 1,295,250 ECU from the European Union for the modernization.

In the near future, the Hungarian Government wants to open three frontier stations on the Romanian frontier section at: Vallalj-Csalanos (Urzineci), Letaveres-Székelyhid (Sacueni) and Kiszombor-Nagycsanad (Cenad).
7. CONCLUSION

In this paper the aim was to show the function of the frontier stations in the cross-border co-operation in Hungary.

Hungary has got two different functions on the two sides of its frontiers: on the Western part, there is a ‘gate’ function: from the ‘West’ Hungary receives innovations, new ideas, and equipment. Our country receives them on the western side, utilises them and makes a transfer to the eastern part of the country and through its borderline. The second function is the ‘transfer’ function towards the borders.

The frontier stations can have the same function on all borderlines, but there is some specialisation of their task according to their localisation. These conditions depend on the development level of the neighbouring country.

The frontier stations can have two roles: they can really divide the unity of a territory with their presence and with their strong control, or they can have a ‘bridge’ function, and evoke concern of the other side of the frontier. In Hungary the frontier stations search their identity in the new regional policy. There are some experts who make them ‘only’ a part of the security policy, or a part of the regional development, but their role can not really determinate. Hungary is concerned with its borderlines for numerous reasons given in this paper. The frontier stations can be the means of a good regional policy or of the co-operation.

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SECTION II

PROBLEMS OF POLISH-GERMAN BORDERLANDS

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GENERAL PROSPECTS AND SPECIAL EXAMPLES
OF TRANSBORDER CITIES CO-OPERATION IN THE EURO-
-REGION NEISSE ON THE POLISH-GERMAN BORDER

1. SCIENTIFIC INTEGRATION OF THE PROBLEM – SPECIFIC RESEARCH ASSIGNMENT

This problem was investigated within the frame of a research project of the INTERREG-II-C programme of the European Union entitled: “Co-operative networks among medium-sized cities in Central and Southeastern Europe, respectively in the CADSES (Central, Adriatic, Danubian and South-Eastern Europe Space)”. The researches were concentrated on five different case studies:
- in the German-Polish-Czech borderland region in the territory of the Euroregion Neisse and the southern part of the federal state of Brandenburg;
- in the Czech-Polish borderland region in the territory of Northern Moravia and Upper Silesia;
- in the Hungarian-Slovak border in the Danubian borderland region;
- in the Hungarian-Romanian borderland region;
- in the Romanian-Bulgarian Danubian borderland region.

The specific research region for the Institute of Regional Geography in Leipzig was the German-Polish-Czech borderland region. Our specific theoretical starting point is the theory of the city networks. With the researches we want to show:
- possibilities and prospects for transborder/transnational city networks in the region of the CADSES;
- starting points and obstacles for transborder city co-operation within the frame of such networks;
- measures and instruments proving to be necessary for the setting up and operating of such networks.

Finally we want to answer the question if the ‘city networks’ approach is suitable for the development of transborder city co-operation in the CADSES or not.
From the point of view of the geographical site of the cities in our research region we can differentiate three formal constellations of transborder city co-operations:

- pairs of cities or twin cities (Guben/Gubin, Görlitz/Zgorzelec);
- neighbouring cities (Zittau, Bogatynia, Hrádek n.Nízou);
- potential transborder/transnational city network (Bautzen, Görlitz, Zittau, Liberec, Jelenia Góra).

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The historical background is very important for the understanding of the actual conditions of the development of the transborder city co-operation in the Euro-Region Neisse – especially on the German-Polish border.

The state border between Germany and Poland is a ‘young’ border. This border – called the Oder-Neisse-border – was fixed in 1945 as a result of the Agreement of Potsdam between the four Allied States and represents since then a new situation for this region. Beforehand was not here a border of any kind. The border separated historically and structurally connected regions and cities, for example Frankfurt on the Oder, Guben or Görlitz. With the delineation of this border and the displacement of the German population out of the areas east of the Oder and the Neisse River and the settlement of Polish population from the former eastern Polish regions new and crucial facts for the further development in the post-war period were created in this area.

3. ACTUAL CRUCIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE POLISH-GERMAN BORDERLAND REGION

As a result of the political, social and economic development in the last half-century the actual conditions for the establishment of transborder city co-operations in this region were dominated by the different factors. The most important of them are:

- the state border between Germany and Poland is an outer border of the European Union (more restrictive rules compared with the situation within the European Union);
- the aftermath of the Second World War and the Third Empire (new state border on the Oder and Neisse River, displacement and new settlement of population),
- differently marked regional consciousness of the people (stronger among the former German population from Silesia on the present German side and weaker among the former eastern Polish people on the recent western Polish side);
- mental distance and partly mutual lack of interest (decade long dominating border system between the ‘brother’ states has limited narrow relations between the people on both sides. Only from 1972 till 1980 the border was open);
- language barriers (different willingness to learn the language of the neighbour – Germans are very reserved, the Poles are more ready to do it);
- great differences in the level of incomes and standard of living (results of this social situation are border markets, border criminality, prostitution, illegal working on the German side, etc.);
– great differences in the demographic development between German and Polish side (migration and increase of elderly people in the percentage of population on German side – immigration and increase of younger people in the percentage of population on Polish side);
– differences in the political, administrative and legal systems (different decision competencies of the local and regional authorities (federal principle in Germany – more centralist principle in Poland).

4. SELECTED SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF TRANSBORDER CITY CO-OPERATION ON THE POLISH-GERMAN BORDER – PROSPECTS AND RISKS, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The following remarks concern some examples of transborder co-operations in Gubin/Gübin, Görlitz/Zgorzelec, Zittau/Bogatynia/Hrádek n. Nisou and the potentials of transborder city networks in the Euro-Region Neisse.

4.1. The example of Guben – Gubin

4.1.1. Foundations of the co-operation

From the point of view of local politics the contract of twinning between both towns from January 1991 is the foundation of the co-operations. Since then the mutual co-operation are co-ordinated by annual supporting programmes.

In 1996 a supplementary agreement was concluded with the aim to elaborate a common concept of the city development. As a result of this agreement a committee for the optimisation of the structure of both cities was installed. This committee co-ordinates the activities in the frame of the realisation of the city development concept.

Finally the co-operation was accelerated by the taking part of both cities in the EXPO 2000 as model-project “Euro-City Guben – Gubin” with 6 exhibitions.

4.1.2. Main fields of co-operation

Up to now 15 co-operation projects are designed, most of them are in the process of realisation or already finished.

From the point of view of spatial effectiveness the main fields of action are city planning and development and environmental protection. From the point of view of the number of co-operation projects the spheres of education and culture dominate.

4.1.3. Selected co-operation projects

Common concept of the city development. It is the leading project of the mutual co-operation which represents the base for the working of the joint committee for the structural optimisation and puts the conceptional and planning framework for the
structural growing into one city. It defines 17 initial projects which have been realized step by step since 1996. The priority is the co-ordinated development of both city centres.

**Common sewage purification plant.** This project is a particular example of a successful transborder co-operation and has model character for the whole German-Polish borderland. The concept of a common plant was created in 1991. By reason of several difficulties a separate new plant in Guben was favoured in the meantime and the reconstruction of the old plant in Gubin on the Polish side. The beginning of the planning and construction of the common plant in Gubin was in 1995. The enterprise started in May 1998. It is the first commonly founded enterprise which is realized by Polish law.

**German-Polish school project in Guben.** The idea of this project started to develop in the years 1992/93 as the “Europe School M. & P. Curie” in Guben. Since 1993/94 there is the possibility to learn the Polish language as the second foreign language from the 7th class. Since 1995 Polish students can take the school-leaving examination at this school in Guben. The examination is recognized in Poland, because the students pass a supplementary examination in Polish language/literature and Polish history. The middle-term aim is to realize the running bilingual instruction from the primary school until the examination.

In case of further development and protection this project can become a model for transborder school projects on the Polish-German border.

### 4.1.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the co-operation

For the situation of the transborder co-operation in the case of the twin-town Guben/Gubin following strengths and weaknesses can be deduced:

**Strengths:**
- contract for co-operation;
- Common Spatial Structural Concept Guben-Gubin – co-ordinated main projects (model for the whole German-Polish border space);
- Common Committee for structural optimisation of the city development;
- special representatives for transborder co-operation in the administrations of the towns;
- direct spatial proximity, unity in urban development of both towns (twin towns);
- experiences in the planning, financing and management of a common enterprise.

**Weaknesses:**
- differences in the decision-making powers of the administrations of towns with respect to the establishment of bilateral relations;
- great differences in the level of incomes and on the level of standard of living;
- restricted permeability of the inner-city border crossing;
- lack of public transborder transport connection;
- lack of common city marketing;
- lack of co-operation relations between the enterprises on both sides (despite consultation centre);
- resolved rejection of the co-operation idea and of co-operation projects by a part of population in Guben.
4.2. The case of Görlitz – Zgorzelec

4.2.1. Foundations of the co-operation

The political foundation for the mutual relations is the co-operation contract from April 1991 which was signed on the first common session of the both municipal councils. This contract was soon insufficient for the further development of the transborder city co-operations. In December 1993 a new co-operation contract was signed. As a result of this new agreement several special working groups and a standing co-ordination committee were installed. This committee turned out to be the most important institution for the development of the transborder co-operation between both towns.

The proclamation to the “Europe-City Görlitz/Zgorzelec” from the 5th of May 1998 is up to now the local political highlight of the mutual collaboration.

4.2.2. Main fields of co-operation

Since 1991 on the base of the good local political atmosphere more than 20 co-operation projects were prepared, more than the half of which are going or already are realized. The main fields of actions are city planning and development and the sphere of culture.

4.2.3. Selected co-operation projects

Common structure and development concept “Europe-City Görlitz/Zgorzelec”. It is the working and orientation frame for the standing co-ordination committee and the special working groups. As primary leading project the concept include 20 individual projects for the common city development. Since 1998 the concept is realized step by step by an annual working programme.

Common transborder city bus line and taxi line. In collaboration of the both city administrations and after difficult bilateral negotiations in 1992 the transborder bus line was opened as the first on the German-Polish border. The line is run by a German traffic company and a Polish traffic company share and share alike. The line connects the city centre of Görlitz with the centre of Zgorzelec. Since March of this year on the Polish side the line was extended and leads now to the new “Real” supermarket. The buses run every 30 minutes in both directions. They enjoy special privileges at the border crossing.

Since 1993 the institution called “Intertaxi” operates in the town which assures the transborder taxi service between both towns.

Rebuilding of the Old City Bridge. This project has been under discussion since 1991. The bridge would be the most important contribution for the revival of the historical central axe of development between the old city centres of both sides. The reconstruction is involved in some difficulties in the financing. Up to now the retardation of the rebuilding of the bridge restrains the development of the German and Polish old city area, because the bridge should have great importance for the sphere of the city tourism.

The project Old City Bridge is a crucial trial for the further transborder co-operation between both towns.
4.2.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the co-operation

Strengths:
- contract for co-operation;
- Common Committee for co-ordination of the co-operation relations and projects;
- common main focus by structural concept (annual work schedule);
- good personal contacts between the administrations;
- spatial proximity, unity in urban development of both towns (twin towns);
- public traffic connection (bus and taxi);
- Silesian identity of both towns as an increasingly connecting element.

Weaknesses:
- differences in the decision-making powers of the administrations of towns with respect to the establishment of bilateral relations (explicit centralism on the Polish side in spite of the administration reform 01.01.1999);
- great differences on the level of incomes and prosperity support illegal actions and border crime;
- still strong position of the border as a consequence of the limited permeability of the only inner-city border crossing-point;
- weak or lacking economic co-operation relations;
- insufficient information in Polish language in Görlitz.

4.3. The case of Zittau – Bogatynia – Hradek n. Nisou

4.3.1. Foundations of the co-operation

There are not general frame contracts of twinning or co-operation contract between the three towns near the “Three Countries Corner”. Up to now the projects of the mutual co-operation were organized by separate bilateral or trilateral contracts between the officials responsible for the projects or the departments of city administrations.

4.3.2. Main fields of co-operation

Most of the co-operation projects accomplished by now are in the fields of culture, education and sports. In the future the three towns plan as the main focus the city and regional development, the traffic infrastructure and the economy with the aim of compensation of the disadvantages in structure and site.

4.3.3. Selected co-operation projects

Common regional development and actions concept “Small Triangle”. The three neighbour towns have agreed that the region of the so-called “Small Triangle” and the towns on their part have chances for development only in a co-operative action alliance. With this aim the responsible officials in the administrations want to improve the efficiency of the current co-operation projects.
As a middle-term frame of orientation, a common regional development and actions concept was elaborated. It is to show the prerequisites, possibilities and starting points for the development of a new transborder cities network between these three towns as durable organisational form and instrument of the realization of the prospective co-operations. The elaboration of the concept is planned in the period from August 2000 till March 2001.

This concept can get model character for the transborder co-operation on the outside borders of the European Union.

**Common transborder business area Zittau/Bogatynia.** Since March 2000 this project is under conceptional preparation by both towns. The plan envisages expansion of the present business area in the northeastern part of Zittau – near the border of Poland – by 63 ha. The development, the management and marketing will be assured by a common company. The schedule intends the step-by-step area development and settlement until 2004.

Up to now the crucial problems and questions of the commercial and business law and the economical and financial promotion are not solved.

**The ecumenical circle of the Euro-Region Neisse.** The circle has existed since 1998. The initiators were church congregations of the region of the “Small Triangle” which have combined the loose collaboration between the congregations and have put the collaboration to a higher level. The aim of this co-operation project is the meeting and mutual understanding of people of the region with different politic and religious convictions. The highlight was the euro-regional ecumenical church convention in June 2000 in Hrádek n.Nísou with more than 5,000 participants.

The project is one of the rare co-operation examples in the Euroregion Neisse which are actually working trilaterally.

### 4.3.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the co-operations

For the situation of the transborder co-operation in the case of the “Small Triangle” Zittau/Bogatynia/Hradek n. Nisou the following strengths and weaknesses can be deduced:

**Strengths:**
- spatial proximity of the co-operation partners;
- good informal and personal relations between the persons responsible of the town-administrations;
- increasing understanding as ‘region of the little triangle’;
- knowledge of the necessity of mutual co-operation;
- common transborder concept for development and activity “Small Triangle” at the stage of design.

**Weaknesses:**
- great differences in the level of incomes and in the level of the standard of living support illegal actions and border crime;
- lacking frame contract for establishment and development of transborder co-operation;
- extremely peripheral position of the three towns in the national context of each country;
bad traffic and infrastructural connection of the region to the national and international traffic lines;
- no starting-points in economic co-operation;
- no legal principles for the establishment and the functioning of transborder business areas.

4.4. Chances and risks for co-operation creating networks among towns

Up to now a transborder network among the towns Bautzen, Görlitz, Zittau, Jelenia Góra and Liberec in the Euroregion Neisse has not been created.

The most intensive transborder co-operation relations exist among the towns situated directly on the border, that is the neighbour – towns of Görlitz-Zgorzelec, Guben-Gübín and Zittau/Bogatynia /Hrádek n. Nisou.

Liberec and Jelenia Góra are towns in the indirect border space which do not see the existential necessity and possibility for the forced establishment of transborder co-operation. Here is obvious the effect of ‘border distance’. Bautzen has most small starting-points with respect to transborder co-operation and creation of a transborder network among towns.

Up to the present, the only field of action having some network-starting points worth to be followed is the co-operation in research. It is imperious in this context that there be connections from the time before 1989/90 which only were to revive, that there be good personal relation between the decision makers and an organisational structure within the centre for co-ordination of research in the colleges.

The co-operation related to economy and especially to enterprises is now at its initial stage. As a consequence of objective difficulties, its development is still very restricted (different legal and tax systems). The most viable fields of action of enterprises are the plastics-processing industry, the textile industry and the related to economy co-operation between the research institutes and the enterprise-oriented service industry. There is a need to use the structures of the research institutes and the potentials for development of a network among the towns Zittau-Görlitz-Liberec-Jelenia Góra. Further alliances in a sense of transborder networks among towns can be build only hardly on the basis of the current potentials of action.

Even the Superior Central Alliance of the towns Bautzen-Görlitz-Hoyerswerda as construction for the functional superior central development of the three towns offers up to now only modest starting points for a transborder expansion. It is to be expected that the twin town Görlitz/Zgorzelec will be the first among the towns in question to develop as a transborder co-operative site.

Prerequisites, possibilities and starting points for development of a regional limited transborder network of towns are to be examined in the space of the direct three cities triangle Zittau-Bogatynia – Hrádek n. Nisou on the base of a regional developmental and action concept. There are prospects for success for their own and for the regional development in future only within the mutual co-operative alliance of action. At the same time there should be created a strong functional transborder centre in addition to the Superior Central Alliance among Towns in Eastern Saxony and to the Superior Centre Liberec in Northern Bohemia.
SILESIAN-LUSATIAN (POLISH-GERMAN) BORDERLAND VERSUS REGIONAL IDENTITY OF ITS PRESENT INHABITANTS

Poland's western boundary on the Neisse and the Oder has been presented during many decades as historical in the sense of restoring the medieval presence of Polish state in that place. The authorities wanted Polish society to believe this obvious falseness for the reasons of State in the face of an uncertain political situation in Europe, and to create a feeling of safety within a new society. Polish settlers have come from different regions of pre-war Poland as well as from different European countries and even overseas. With a view to create a homogeneous society official efforts have been made to make them assume new regional identity of Lower-Silesians and people of the Lubusz Land. However, it implied stretching facts concerning the history of the region.

Nearly a half of the present Poland's western borderland covers eastern parts of Lower and Upper Lusatia, named by the author in 1975 'East Lusatia', the boundary of which runs along the Kwisa and the Bóbr Rivers to the Oder. During many centuries it was a borderland not only for different states, but different nations and cultures as well (Mazurski, 1994). Its reminiscences sound till now in local names of ethnic Lusatian (Sorbian) origin, like the Czerna River (Černá), the villages of Dobrzyń (Debrno) and Łęknica (Łuknica), the town of Leśna (Lesna) or Zgorzelec (Zhorjelc).

In spite of centralistic efforts, the society occupying the western Polish borderland gradually became interested in their own location and region. It has happened thanks to not numerous Sorbs, who survived here German times, and the Polish Tourist Country-Lover's Association (PTTK), an organization governed by the principle of developing among people the curiosity of their own 'little homeland' (Mazurski, 1987). Original input was given by regional and local societies established much later (Mazurski, 1992). In 1975, for example, a folk group ‘Łużycanie’ (the Sorbs) was established at Działoszyn, south of Zgorzelec (Mazurski, 1983, 1984; Wojekci, 1985). Its peculiarity consists in being formed by Polish women coming from eastern Poland's borderland, influenced by a local Sorbian woman. With her help they have begun to learn and sing Sorbian songs. They have also prepared regional costumes modelled after post stamps published in the German Democratic Republic. This group has given many performances in East Lusatia. In this way the culture of former Polish eastern borderland has been fusing together with the tradition of former population living in the past in the land.
discussed. Thus a cultural conglomerate comes into being, which – based on Slavonic elements – is not only something new in a cultural aspect, but joins new inhabitants with their new ‘little homeland’, in fact – with their new adoptive country. This is leading towards a formation of territorial ties and, eventually, towards a patriotism. The PTTK branch in Zgorzelec has taken the name of ‘Lusatian Land’, inhabitants of Lubsko and Žary were striving to develop a consciousness of living in Lusatia. Finally, an open-air museum of Sorbian buildings and traditions was established at Buczyny, a monthly Przegląd Wschodnio-Lużycki (East Lusatian Review) is published in Žary. The mentioned journal presents the history and the tradition of this region, describes interesting places and persons from the past (Mazurski, 1988). In that way a fragile link between the immigrant population and – till not long ago – unfamiliar, mysterious habitat is being formed.

This is essential, that such presentation of the region does not neglect German elements if they testify to the history of surroundings. Slavonic ties are not used for a formation of a false ethnic past nor a reluctance to German nation. On the contrary – a knowledge of a complicated history of the border region serves for a better understanding with inhabitants from the western side of the state boundary.

A regional identification is here still long way off. The oldest generation defines itself as Poles, and nearly immediately next as ‘border people’: people come from surroundings of Tarnopol, Wilno, Wołyń. A middle generation classifies itself, although with some hesitation, as inhabitants of Lower Silesia, the Lubusz Land. Next generation, identifying itself with Poles, explains more and more frequently: ‘we are from Lusatia (or East Lusatia)’, but not ‘we are Lusatians’, what has clear ethnic, not regional undertone in Polish. Undoubtedly, next difficulty within the process of forming a territorial awareness was the administrative reform, which in 1998 renamed the new Voivodship of Zielona Góra as the Lubusz Voivodship. It is hard to say at the moment, what effect will be made by efforts and attitudes of a local awareness versus an all-voivodship activity, organized in Zielona Góra. These intermingling circles are additionally overlapped by a process of a universalization of culture and attitudes, especially advanced in Europe. It is necessary to underline here a specific Polish relation towards Sorbs as a dying out Slavonic nation, what makes a forming of an emotional tie to the discussed borderland easier, and a high responsibility for the Polish nation.

This presented overview bespeaks a cultural vitality of Poland’s western borderland. We observe here a multiple process:
1) creation of a new Polish society,
2) absorption of German output by Poles,
3) identification with Sorbian regional tradition and past,
4) improvement in neighbourly relationships with the German side.

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THE MULTICULTURAL CHARACTER OF EAST LUSATIA AND ITS ROLE IN CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION

East Lusatia is the name used for the region between the rivers Nysa Łużycka (the Lausitzer Neisse) Kwisa and Bóbr, since 1945 situated within the borders of Poland. Culturally and linguistically, the area around Zgorzelec, Bogatynia and Lubań belongs to Upper Lusatia, while the region of Żary, Gubin, Lubsko and Łęknica should be categorized as a part of Lower Lusatia. As early as in the 16th century, the whole of Lusatia came under a strong influence of Lutheran reformation, and until World War II, 90% of the population were Lutherans. Small Roman Catholic parishes existed only in larger towns and in those Upper Lusatia’s villages that remained the property of Catholic monasteries Marijiny Dól (Germ. Marienthal) and Marijina Hwézda (Germ. Marienstern). In the eastern part of Lusatia, the only place inhabited by Catholics was Henryków Lubański. As for the traditional culture and the Upper- and Lower-Lusatian language, they disappeared from this area almost completely as early as in the 19th century, because the germanization policy of the Kulturkampf period was, owing to the closeness of Silesia and Wielkopolska, much more intensive here than in the western part of the region.

As a result of the state border shifts after World War II, the years 1945–1949 brought an almost total replacement of the population. What is characteristic is that it started here already before the Potsdam conference. All the German inhabitants were displaced, except the few people who had proved their ‘indispensability to the functioning of the economy’ (chiefly men with high professional qualifications) or had married Poles (mostly young women). In these cases, the closest families of the aforementioned also managed to stay on. However, only the women with Polish husbands obtained Polish citizenship, the rest stayed in Poland with the status of statelessness. Although no grave pogroms of the original inhabitants were recorded in Lusatia, the autochthones often faced acts of antipathy or even hostility of the new settlers. Therefore, most of them strictly secluded themselves from the rest of the community, e.g. nonworking women often did not even try to learn Polish, and the working tried to stress their loyalty to the new government on every occasion. Almost all the autochthones were Lutherans. Until 1956, they were under the pastoral care of several German pastors who had stayed with their faithful; later, when the number of the faithful decreased as a result of emigration, the service was taken over by Polish clergymen fluent in German. However, until as late
as 1993, the 'non-Polish congregations', as they were euphemistically called, existed unofficially. Nowadays, the German-speaking Lutherans from East Lusatia meet for religious services in Lubań. The congregation numbers 50 people, 90% of whom are elderly women. The group of Lutheran autochthones also includes people who do not maintain any contact with the Lutheran Church, but it is very hard to estimate their number. Like in the rest of Poland, associations of German minorities have been established since 1990, and a local magazine 'Sorauer Heimatblatt' is issued in Żary, but the members of this society are rather unwilling to engage in any 'external' activities. It is understandable, however, not only in view of their over 40-year-long past experience, but also with regard to their old age.

In 1945, the first Polish settlers in East Lusatia were soldiers of Polish Armies I and II coming back from the front of World War II. They were welcomed by banners saying: 'Soldiers! Settle in the Regained Lands'. Until mid-1946, the basically entire 35 km zone east of the western border of Poland was reserved exclusively for military settlement. The soldiers were soon joined by Poles returning after compulsory employment in Germany, often accompanied by their families, started in exile. The scale of repatriation from the East was smaller in Lusatia than in other parts of the Western and Northern Territories – this group of settlers made 30–40% of the population. Most Polish settlers came from Central Poland, chiefly from Wielkopolska. The area of Żary also housed several tens re-emigrants from Zaolzie (Polish Lutherans). The Lutheran community of the region grew in number significantly in the following years, when Lutherans from Ciesyn Silesia and Central Poland studying in Wrocław obtained orders to work in the industrial plants in Żary, Turoszów (in 1956–1962, during the construction of the lignite mine and the power station, over ten thousand people from all over Poland settled there), or Zgorzelec. However, this group usually concealed their religious denomination for fear of being 'regarded a German', which stereotype has been (and still is) quite common in Poland, even among educated people. Today, the Polish Lutheran community of East Lusatia numbers ca 200 people. The congregations of 20–30 people in Lubań, Zgorzelec and Bogatynia administratively belong to the parish in Jelenia Góra, while the northern part of the region is served by the parish in Żary, which since 1989 has had its own pastor. Since 1990s, the Lutheran diocese of Wrocław has maintained regular, partner-like contacts with the Lutheran Church of Upper Lusatia (with the see in Görlitz), but because of the large numerical disparity between the dioceses, and the incomparable financial resources of both sides, common activities are organized on the German side.

The discussed region is also the area of fairly energetic activity of free Protestant churches, especially the Pentecostal Church (congregations in Żary, Łękniczka, Lubań and Gryfów Śląski), the Baptist Church (a congregation in Zgorzelec) and the New Apostolic Church (a congregation in Gubin). Their members include both repatriates from the former Eastern Borderland (especially from Volhynia), where free churches were very popular in the period between the wars, and people who joined them by choice. The followers have predominantly vocational or secondary education, more rarely college or university degrees. These churches often organize charitable actions (e.g. helping people with addictions or prisoners), often with the help of partner communities in USA or Canada. Considering the cross-border cooperation, it is difficult to talk about it in this case, because the free churches have very little followers in the former German
Democratic Republic. Like in the rest of Poland, there are several congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Lusatia, but in accordance to their doctrinal foundations, they keep themselves isolated from the society and do not take part in any national or local initiatives. In Zary, there is also a small, numbering several ten people, Polish Catholic parish, but it is not particularly conspicuous either in the city or in the region.

Another group that settled in the discussed region in 1946–1947 was composed of over 1000 Polish re-emigrants from Bukovina, known as Cadca highlanders. Most of them settled in the village Zlotnik near Zary. They were not particularly warmly welcomed by other inhabitants of the region. They were scornfully referred to as ‘Romanians’ and mocked in public for their poverty and the dialect they spoke. The Cadca highlanders offset their isolation from the local society by very strong bonds within their own ethnic community, also settled in the Sudetic Foreland and Central Pomerania. For instance, exogenous (mixed) marriages were rare in this group for quite a long time. The situation did not start to normalize until 1970s, when the inhabitants of the Żary area were often astonished to learn that ‘Romanians’ spoke Polish and were Catholics (usually very devoted). In 1984, a song-and-dance group ‘Dolina Nowego Solonca’ was formed in Zlotnik. The name refers to the village where most of the re-emigrants had come from. The group has won a lot of success in numerous home and foreign folklore festivals, e.g. of Bukovina culture or of highland folklore. It has also become firmly integrated with the culture of its new homeland, and often performs in home and international events organized by local authorities.

Among various national minorities, one group is missing from Lusatia: there are no agglomerations of Ukrainian or Lemk people, who were compulsorily displaced and distributed over large parts of the western and northern territories of Poland during the ‘Wisła’ operation.

Another very large group of settlers, who made their home in Żary in 1946–1947, were Jews: survivors of the holocaust or repatriates from the USSR. Their number was estimated at ca 3,500, which made ca 30% of the city inhabitants. Most of them soon left Żary and emigrated to Israel or moved elsewhere in the region. Those who stayed on played an important role in the city until 1968, when after the March emigration wave only few members of this community remained in the city, most of them embittered and intimidated. They were removed from public functions, or resigned themselves. Currently, the Żary division of the Socio-cultural Association of Jews in Poland (a lay organization), extending its activity over all East Lusatia, numbers hardly more than 100 persons, mostly of very old age, while the religious congregation, uniting religious Jews, reaches several tens of people. Their activity is limited to direct assistance (e.g. economic) to the needy coreligionists. Although in the last few years we have witnessed an evident revival of Judaism in Poland (to a large extent thanks to the animated activities of Ronald Lauder Foundation operating in Central and Eastern Europe), in the Żary community this process is not so discernible, which is due to lack of young people of the Judaic faith in this area.

A group with clearly distinct ethnic character are numerous Greeks and Macedonians settled in the discussed region in 1948–1950. They were political refugees, chiefly communist guerrillas, who were granted the right of abode in Poland (but no Polish citizenship). In the early 1950s, the largest concentration of this group in Poland was in
Zgorzelec, which housed over 12,000 Greeks, including over 3,000 children in the orphanage. This group constituted 64% of the city population. As 80% of them were poorly educated (peasants, shepherds, etc.), in the next few years most of them were directed to work in sparsely populated state-owned farms, e.g. in Bogatynia, near Zgorzelec, Żary and Lubsko. Thanks to their openness, sociability and cheerful disposition, in towns Greeks were regarded with appreciation, but in rural communities it was quite different. The reason, apart from the traditional enmity to anything ‘strange’ or ‘different’ common in Polish farming communities, is the fact that the Greek population quite openly manifested their enthusiasm for communism and demonstratively declared themselves irreligious, which obviously was not well seen in this ultra-Catholic society. The vast majority of more than 10,000 Greeks living in Lusatia went back to their country in the late 1970s, after the fall of the dictatorship that had driven them to emigration. Those who decided to stay in Poland are usually closely integrated with their local communities. They have been educated in Poland, often have a Polish spouse, and are regarded approvingly by the society. Nowadays, the only major Greek community (ca 500 people) in the described area lives in Zgorzelec and its surroundings. In other places, there are only a few Greek people, also on the other side of the border. They are usually members of the local intelligentsia (engineers, doctors) or entrepreneurs.

In the region’s major cities, especially Zgorzelec and Żary, there are also groups of Romany (gypsy) people. They belong to the group of the so-called Carpathian gypsies (Bergitka Roma), who have led a settled life for a long time. They are much poorer than other gypsy tribes in Poland, and their mutual relationships are not very friendly. This population causes a lot of problems to the local authorities, as its members live almost exclusively on social service benefits, but also on begging or petty crime. The birth rate is high among them, and they have little chance to find employment, as they are uneducated and have no job qualifications. Fortunately, no major hostilities between the Romanies and other inhabitants have occurred in this region for a long time, although we cannot speak of any cordiality in their relationships.

For many years, there have been also attempts to revive the completely extinct culture of Lusatian Sorbs in this area. The first initiative of this kind was taken by a …village housewives’ club in Działoszyn near Bogatynia in the late 1970s. The ladies established a small choir, which performed locally, singing Upper-Lusatian folk songs (their consultant was a member of the club, an autochthon of Sorbian-Lusatian birth). Unfortunately, the attempts to establish wider contacts with Lusatians were frustrated by the marshal law, and it was not possible to renew them until early 1990s. At the moment, the most vigorous activities in this field are connected with a private open-air Lusatian museum at Buczyny near Łeknica. The owner runs a large agro-tourist farm and allocates the income for the expansion of the museum and sponsoring cultural events. Therefore, the Spree-Nysa-Bóbr euro-region (with the centre in Gubin) is often visited by Lusatian folk groups from beyond the Nysa and by other members of the Sorbian-Lusatian minority. In the Nysa euro-region, the cultural cooperation is developing a bit more slowly, although there are also noteworthy initiatives, e.g. of the Roman Catholic deanery in Zgorzelec, which organizes common Easter or Corpus Christi celebrations, together with Catholics from Upper Lusatia.
During all the ‘real socialism’ period, establishing true cross-border contacts was virtually impossible, despite spectacular declarations of ‘eternal friendship’ proclaimed by politicians on both sides of the border. The multicultural society of East Lusatia was internally antagonized, and the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland were not interested in solving this problem. The settlers, who often had arrived here against their will, did not feel at home and considered the region a temporary abode, which often resulted in economic negligence of towns and villages in this area. On the other hand, the Lusatian Sorbs inhabiting the near-border zone in Germany were treated as a kind of live museum by the GDR government. Their culture was supposed to prove that the state institutions took care of national minorities and did not exert germanisation policies on them. However, in practice their culture was systematically restricted e.g. through building lignite mines and huge power stations, and bringing indigenous Germans to this area. The socio-political transformations of 1989/90 on both sides of the border coincided with the beginning of adulthood for the first generation with no psychological burden of difficult historical past, who identify with the region of their birth. Building regional awareness, which treats East Lusatia as the homeland, is an important issue for various initiative groups in Żary, which are consistently promoting the city as the capital of the region. However, it is difficult to expect that the major change in the public awareness will take place within just a few years. Therefore, both newly created euro-regions will have to build their communities persistently, with a thought about the distant future. Patience, consistency and time will surely act to their advantage.

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THE INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS OF POLISH MUNICIPALITIES – THE EXAMPLE OF LOWER SILESIA

The establishment of individual international contacts by local authorities in the framework of so-called partnership relations (twin, sister relations) is one of the facets of the ongoing globalisation, as well as European integration. In the case of the former Eastern block, these contacts have supported the transformation processes, which seek to build a market and decentralised economy. According to Gruchman (1999), bilateral co-operation with towns in highly developed countries allows to make up for the delays in managing urban fabric, which arose in the period of centrally controlled economy, by the transfer of experience and innovation in the field of self-governing and managing municipal economy, as well as to face the competition which grows due to the elimination of national barriers and the ongoing globalisation. These benefits can be achieved particularly through direct contacts of local authority members and officials involving co-operation in the field of city planning, environmental protection, implementation of new technologies, promotion of business, industrial and agricultural activity, etc. Exchange of experience in social problems solving, such as drug addiction, unemployment, children care service development, integration of the disabled and immigrants into the society, is also of major importance. However, to facilitate social acceptance of globalisation, including European integration, it is of particular significance to develop the traditional areas of co-operation such as education, culture and sports (Lücke and Bellocci, 1997).

Contemporary forms of contacts between towns and municipalities have started to develop after 1945. Just after the Second World War had finished, inhabitants of Montbeliard, France and Ludwigsburg, Germany established the first formal partnership. In 1951, the Council of Municipalities of Europe was set up to support the idea of twinning relationships. A strong development of this form of co-operation in Western Europe has been noted since the 1950s. In 1995, the European Union had more than 14 thousand bilateral relations involving almost 10 thousand municipalities, mainly French (2837) and German (2485). Relatively most active were municipalities in Scandinavia – partnership relations were established by 93% of municipalities in Sweden, 84% in Denmark and 81% in Finland (Lücke and Bellocci, 1997). These ideas are also reflected in Poland, although all the contacts were under control and restricted for
ideological reasons for many years. In practice, it is the political transformation between the 1980s and 1990s that has facilitated the spontaneous and voluntary development of co-operation between local authorities.

In Poland, partnership relations are not officially registered. In 1996, the Voivodship Statistics Office (WUS) in Jelenia Góra conducted an inquiry in the former border voivodships about partnership relationships (Gminy przygraniczne, 1997). Some data appeared also in few regional reports (e.g. Kozierski, 1996). In January 1998, the Association of Polish Cities conducted a research of the status of development of international co-operation of towns and municipalities across Poland, the findings however were not processed in respect of their geographical distribution (Kręc, 1998).

The objective of this paper is to present the historical development and current status of individual international co-operation of municipalities in Lower Silesia versus the country in respect of their geographical links and features. To this end, between January to February 2000, the author conducted telephone interviews regarding the current status of individual co-operation of all the 169 separate local self-government units in Lower Silesia (165 municipalities and 4 towns with a district /powiat/ status). Included in the interview were questions about their partners (administrative units or unions of municipalities), the year of establishing of informal relationship and signing a partnership agreement if any, the way of finding a partner, the scope of co-operation and the use (if any) of funding from programmes designed to support this type of international co-operation. In processing data concerning the number and nature of partnerships, those were omitted where contacts have expired at least 1 year ago, even if a formal agreement was formerly signed. The answers regarding the year of the establishing of co-operation were frequently approximate, therefore we need to take a cautious approach considering them (there is often lack of formal agreements or these were executed after several years of informal co-operation). To make comparisons, the data on partnership relations of towns and municipalities in Poland as per the status in January 1998, published by the Association of Polish Cities were used (Miasta partnerskie ..., 1998). These data, due to the dynamic growth in the number of partnerships, can be obsolete, these however represent the only data that are available in respect of the entire territory of Poland.

1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS (1945–2000)

Since the mid-1950s, the largest Polish towns have started to establish first contacts with towns in the ‘people’s democracy’ countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR or the USSR. These contacts were restricted to the communist states political block (with a number of exemptions at the end of the 1960s), co-operation focused mainly on ideological goals, with contacts being appointed top-down and controlled by state authorities through Voivodship Offices (Koćwin, 1993; Kaczmarek, 2000). In Lower Silesia, mainly Wrocław initially developed co-operation links. Its partners under ‘friendship arrangements’ were the town of Gorki in the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic in the former USSR (1958) and Dresden in GDR (1958). They also established a co-operation relationship with Zaporozhye in the Ukrainian SSR and temporarily with
Hradec Kralove in Czechoslovakia (Kaczmarek, 1999). In many cases these contacts involved only meetings of officials and communist parties’ activists (Koćwin, 1993; Markowiak, 1997).

In the 1970s, the policy of openness provided opportunities for a limited networking with towns in the democratic (‘capitalist’) countries of Western Europe, mainly in Finland, Great Britain and Western Germany (data from the Association of Polish Cities). In that period, Wrocław liaised with Lyon in France (1973), Jelenia Góra with Valkeakoski in Finland (1979). In general such contacts were still under control and there were also cases of lack of co-operation of ‘appointed’ regions and towns (Koćwin, 1993). The closure of borders due to the political crisis early in the 1980s, including the introduction of martial law, caused all the contacts to vanish. A number of new appointments for cross-border co-operation with GDR were made in the mid-1980s: Jelenia Góra – Dresden, Kowary – Schönau-Berzdorf, Nowogrodziec – Pirna and Zittau, Bogatynia – Zittau, Gryfów Śląski – Bischofswerda, Lubań Śląski – Nieszky, Zgorzelec – Görlitz, Wleń – Hoyerswerda. It is characteristic that even medium-sized urban centres could officially establish contacts. The official organisations (e.g. skouts) were able to establish contacts with partners from socialist countries, too. Apart from this, the town of Wałbrych was developing co-operation with Tula (Russian SSR, USSR). Some local communities were establishing informal contacts with local authorities of Western Europe: the Municipality of Kłodzko – Georg-Marien-Hütte, Kłodzko (town) – Carvin in France.

As a result of political transformations in the years 1989–1990, municipalities have become more self-determining, May 1990 saw the first democratic local authority elections. Since that time, international contacts could develop in a formal way, without restrictions, with the wide participation of common citizens. Some of them were new relations, in some cases the previous contacts were renewed, however new principles were applied in signing agreements (Markowiak, 1997, Kaczmarek, 1999). Within the area of Lower Silesia of today, in the former Voivodship of Jelenia Góra, they carried out a co-operation programme with Denmark in 1990 which focused on the transfer of knowledge regarding the functioning of local authorities in the democratic countries in Western Europe. That programme involved a 2-week study tour to Denmark by a delegation composed of 120 councillors, mayors and chief executives from newly established local authorities in the former Jelenia Góra Voivodship. After a weekly training, a number of 2-person teams were delegated to different municipalities to see how Danish local authorities work (Pawlowski – verbal information). Following that programme many municipalities have established co-operation links with Danish partners: Bolesławiec – Hobro, Kamienna Góra (both commune and municipality) – Ikast, Lubań – Skjern, Wojcieszów – Trudholm, Mysłakowice – Lenvig, Janowice Wielkie – Rosenholm, Szklarska Poręba – Aulum Haaderup, Jelenia Góra – Randers. In the other cases, most contacts were established freely following initiatives of Polish or foreign local authorities who were looking for partners through embassies and other organisations or through private relationships. There were cases where local authorities have established contacts through liaison with organisations of the former German inhabitants of the current Polish towns, who have frequently attended joint municipal holidays and official celebrations (e.g. Łądek Zdrój – Bad Schandau, Radków –
Anröchte, Strzelin – Herne, Bolesławiec – Sigburg). Polish communities settled in other countries following the First and Second World Wars emigration facilitated the establishment of co-operation in less number of cases (Duszniki – Audun Le-Tiche, France, Kłodzko (town) – Flerom, Belgium). The possibility of raising funds from the Polish-German Co-operation Foundation was of major importance in encouraging municipalities to look for partners (at least 21 municipalities used that opportunity). Less local authorities (at least 6) take advantage of the European Union programmes such as Ecos-Ouverture, Phare-Partnership, Town-Twinning. The end of the 1990s in Lower Silesia saw a spontaneous growth in the number of contacts, mainly of a cross-border nature. This arises from the financial support for cross-border co-operation through such facilities as the Phare-Crossborder Small Grant Scheme use of which was declared by 19 municipalities and Phare CREDO (2 municipalities), as well as the offerings and organisational support through the existing Euroregions ‘Nysa’ and ‘Glacensis’ which have encouraged municipalities to seek partners.

As per the data provided by the Association of Polish Cities in January 1998, at least 576 municipalities (i.e. 23% of 2456 at that time) across Poland established partnership schemes which involved more than 1300 bilateral relationships. A schematic of bilateral co-operation development in the framework of partnership relations shows table 1.

Nowadays the co-operation usually develops in education, culture, sport events (mainly young people exchange programmes) and exchange of know-how about municipal economy management. A lot of attention is given to economic and tourist promotion, too (Kręc, 1998; Trzcielińska-Polus, 1999).

2. THE CURRENT STATUS AND STRUCTURE OF BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LOWER SILESIA

In January 2000, 92 municipalities (54%) out of 169 in Lower Silesia stated that they were involved in bilateral or multilateral co-operation with local authority units abroad. Most of them had 1 partner (35 municipalities) or two partners (23 municipalities). The regional capital city, Wrocław, had the highest number of formal partners – 9 bilateral relations (Kaczmarek, 1999) and Jelenia Góra (7 partnerships). In all, 218 international partnerships were declared across Lower Silesia with local authorities abroad, of which several collaborated with more than 1 municipality in Lower Silesia. Geographically, German municipalities are most frequent partners (81 relations, i.e. 37.2%) and Czech ones (63 relations, i.e. 28.9%). As compared to the national data we can see a strong domination of contacts with Germany and the Czech Republic (more than 66% of relations altogether) which relates to the development of cross-border co-operation. The domination of typically cross-border contacts is particularly strong in the case of Czech partners. This is reflected by the distance between local authority partners, which does not exceed 25 km in 38% and 50 km in 54% of cases. With few exceptions, there is lack of partners from the south or east of the Czech Republic. Cross-border co-operation is of less significance in the case of contacts with Germany where the distance between only 12% of partners is up to 50 km.
Table 1. Schematic of development of bilateral international contacts of Poland’s towns and municipalities in the years 1955–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Spatial schematic*</th>
<th>Basic co-operation features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955–1971</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Capitalist countries" /> <img src="image2" alt="Socialist countries" /></td>
<td>Limited co-operation is conducted by the largest urban centres only. In practice, partners are appointed and restricted to involve towns in the communist block ('socialist') countries. Contacts are under central governments’ control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–1980, 1983–1989</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Capitalist countries" /> <img src="image4" alt="Socialist countries" /></td>
<td>The largest urban centres may establish contacts with cities in the &quot;capitalist&quot; countries. Co-operation is also developed by medium-sized towns. Co-operation is under the control of regional (voivodship) authorities, in some cases partners are appointed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1990</td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="No formal barriers to co-operation" /></td>
<td>The remaining small towns (urban-rural municipalities) and fewer communes (rural municipalities) develops contacts. However, large urban centres still lead the way of co-operation. The number of contacts between local authorities in democratic countries, mainly in Western Europe, grows spontaneously and rapidly. Areas of contacts are stimulated by foreign co-operation support programmes (international and from a given country).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not real connections, schematic only.

Of typical international nature are partnership relations with municipalities in Denmark (16 relations, i.e. 7.3%), France (15 relations, 6.9%) and Holland (10 relations, 4.6%). It is characteristic that if Czech municipalities are excluded, the said countries will be ranked similarly high as in the rest of Poland, although in the exactly reversed
order. A relatively higher share of Denmark is caused by the abovementioned experience exchange programme that was carried out by municipalities from the Jelenia Góra region and Denmark.

As compared to entire Poland, co-operation between Lower Silesia and countries of the former eastern block is weaker (excluding in both cases the relations with Czech local governments), including the states that have emerged after the disintegration of the USSR (5% of relations with majority of Lithuanian local authorities, while 16.1% in Poland with majority of Slovak municipalities). Considering partners on other continents, most local authorities across Poland as well as in Lower Silesia co-operate with local governments in the U.S.A. It should be added that 11 local authorities in Lower Silesia stated that they co-operate with other towns and municipalities in the country (not included in table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin of partners</th>
<th>A. Lower Silesia (January 2000)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Germany</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Czech Republic</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Denmark</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. France</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Holland</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Great Britain</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Italy</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Lithuania</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other in the former Eastern block</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin of partners</th>
<th>B. Poland (January 1998)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Germany</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Holland</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. France</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Denmark</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sweden</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Slovakia</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Great Britain</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other in the former Eastern block</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A. Own research. B. Own calculations based on data of the Association of Polish Cities (Miasta partnerskie..., 1998).

As well as the bilateral contacts, there are 4 multilateral partnership relations in Lower Silesia (as per 2000):

1. Association of Towns and Municipalities of Friedland. The Association was established in 1996 following the initiative of the Mayor of Friedland, Mecklemburg-West Pomerania (Germany) and brings together towns that currently have or had in the past the name of Friedland. Eight towns from 4 countries are members of the Association: Mierszów in Lower Silesia and Korfántów in Upper Silesia (Poland), the said Friedland in Mecklemburg-West Pomerania, Friedland in Lower Saxony and Friedland in Brandenburg (Germany), Frydliant n. Liberec and Frydliant on Ostrava (Czech Republic), and Prawdinsk n. Kaliningrad (Russia). Member towns work together to organise, first of all, joint cultural and sports events (Związek Miast i Gmin..., 2000).

2. Union of Golden Cities. Its members are Zlaté Hory and Nový Knín (Czech
Republic), Goldkronach (Germany), Homatonbetsu (Japan), Złoty Stok and Złotoryja (Poland, Lower Silesia). The Union brings together towns, which used to be gold extracting centres in the past. The Union was established in 1995. Its major objective is to promote each other and support tourist initiatives, but it has not been very active so far.

3. Association of Six Cities. This refers to a historical association that was established on 21 August, 1346, originally to protect merchants’ caravans against knights-robbers. It operated up to 1815. The Association members are: Bautzen, Zittau, Kamenz, Löbau, Görlitz (Germany) and Zgorzelec (formerly one town) and Luban (formerly Lauban) in Poland. The Association was reactivated in 1991. Today their main area of co-operation is culture, arts, sports and tourism. The Association undertakes joint tourist promotion by publishing folders (Skowroński, 1994; Lehman, 1998).

4. Agreement of Cities. This Association was established in 1991, its main goal was to start up so called Izerska Railway that had been closed for economic reasons. In 1997, they expanded the scope of co-operation by adding sports, tourist, cultural and business activities. Currently its members are the following towns: Jabłonec n. Nisou, Desná v Jizerských horách, Kořenov, Smržovka, Tanvald (Czech Republic) and Karpacz, Piechowice, Szkarska Poręba, Świeradów Zdrój and Jelenia Góra in Poland (Jakubiec and Grzybowski, 1998; Grzybowski, 1999).

Association No. 1 and 2 are examples of typical multilateral co-operation of a ‘twin town’ nature, where a prosaic common feature (e.g. name, similar history, similar element of the coat of arms) can often be a pretext to set up regular contacts. The two last associations are more of cross-border nature, particularly the Agreement of Cities.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The development of individual co-operation in the framework of partnership relations (twin, sister relations) in Lower Silesia ran similarly like in Poland. Large cities (in Lower Silesia – its capital, Wrocław) are unquestioned leaders of co-operation schemes, these are followed by medium and small towns. Sometimes smaller communities, which have proactive local governments, are able to develop their co-operation links more dynamically than large cities. However we need to remember that this may be misleading. Governments in smaller towns and municipalities consider co-operation schemes of local schools and organisations as their own. Local authorities in large cities may have their own international co-operation policies, therefore they often do not record international co-operation activities of educational or cultural institutions. Therefore the domination of large centres in the field of individual international co-operation is much stronger than it could be judged from the number of formal partnerships.

Most towns in Lower Silesia (75%) have already established bilateral international contacts, majority of the remaining are looking for partners. The level of co-operation is considerably lower in rural communities (30%) which are involved in individual international co-operation to a lower degree. This can be the grounds for a conclusion that a network of urban centres stimulates this type of co-operation – there are 89 towns in Lower Silesia inhabited by 71.6% of the population (31.12.1998). This is mainly due to the fact that urban local governments have bigger human resources and capacities to fund joint events, urban communities are considered to be more open to innovations and
interpersonal contacts. It is clear from the 1996 research conducted by the Jelenia Góra Regional Statistics Office in border regions (voivodships) across Poland that the former voivodships of Jelenia Góra and Wałbrzych, which had many towns and now are part of Lower Silesia, represented the highest number of partnership contacts as compared to other border areas in Poland (*Gminy przygraniczne*, 1997).

In terms of geographical distribution of co-operation schemes, the municipalities in Lower Silesia are mainly affected by the border position of the region (German and Czech borders) and the availability of cross-border area support programmes. As the distance to the border grows, the number of municipalities involved in co-operation drops (Fig. 1).

![Map of Lower Silesia showing partnership contacts with other countries](image)

**Fig. 1.** Individual international partnership relations of towns and municipalities in Lower Silesia (January 2000)
This is due to worse access to funds designed to support co-operation schemes as these municipalities can access only generally accessible programmes where competition is considerably stronger.

Local nature of co-operation is particularly visible in the case of contacts with Czech local authorities. Relations with German local governments have a more international nature and predominate in Lower Silesia. The reasons of this situation are:

- the possibility to receive grants for events and infrastructure projects from the Polish-German Co-operation Foundation, subject to having a partner in Germany;
- a high number of contacts with Germans arising from their high tourist mobility, Polish citizens undertaking jobs in Germany and business links between both countries;
- a high number of potential partners – there are more than 14 thousand municipalities in Germany, of which only 17% established contacts in 1995 (Lücke and Bilocchi, 1997);
- the historical background – German local authorities are keen to establish contacts with towns in the areas that belonged to Germany before the Second World War.

The partnership relations confirm the growing importance of links with Western Europe – the European Union countries represent 64% of international relations in Lower Silesia (74% in Poland in 1998). The U.S.A. dominate in respect of contacts with other continents. These links are reflected also in the origin of foreign investment, as well as general tendencies of Poland’s foreign policy.

As yet, multilateral partnership relations are developing slower, they can be, however, a good starting point in respect of participating in European programmes which currently are not generally known but require at least three partners. In Lower Silesia, such relationships have a cross-border nature – similarly as in bilateral relations they involve mainly Czech and German local authorities. Laurent (1991) indicated that the weaker participation of Polish municipalities in multilateral partnership relations with Western Europe might arise from the necessity to pay fees, which the Polish local authorities might consider too high.

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POLISH AND GERMAN DEGRADED TOWNS IN LUSATIAN SILESIA – SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

This paper is an attempt at presenting a specific group of settlements in one of the regions of Polish-German borderland – in Lusatian Silesia. It is formed by the so-called degraded towns, i.e. localities that in the past were formally given municipal status, which they lost later on.

1. THE SUBJECT OF RESEARCH AND A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The results of Napoleonic wars and resolutions of treaties made after their end influenced, among others, spatial range of Silesia. The Congress of Vienna (1815) awarded Prussia with a considerable part of Saxony (the districts of Lubań, Rothenburg, Görlitz), which Prussian authorities annexed to Silesian Legnica regency. After ten years (in 1825) another Lusatian district – Hoyerswerda was annexed to its territory (see Historia..., 1970; Weczerka, 1978; Šolta, 1984).

In this way the so called Lusatian Silesia was formed. A third of its territory belongs now to Poland (the Dolnośląskie and Lubuskie Voivodships); however its major part constitutes a section overlapping the south-eastern Germany, namely in eastern Saxony and southern Brandenburg.

Like in other parts of historic region of Silesia, the formation of urban settlement network in Lusatian Silesia began in the first half of the 13th century. Görlitz is considered to be the oldest town of this region. It received the full municipal rights (Magdeburg rights) in 1304 (see Irgang, 1995).

One can distinguish a few stages of development of the settlement network. The first is related to the charters granted in the 13th and 14th centuries. Out of ten appointed towns then, (Görlitz, Hoyerswerda, Leśna, Lubań, Reichenbach, Rothenburg, Sulików, Wittichenau, Zawidów) nine (excluding Sulików) have preserved their municipal status till now. The second phase covers the period from the 15th and to the 20th century. A number of locations was noticed out of which the majority constituted inexcisive locations from the 17th and 18th centuries. These generally form a group of degraded towns in Lusatian Silesia nowadays. Another period of quantitative changes in urban network has to do with the processes of industrialisation that took place in the 20th
century, which contributed to the obtainment of full municipal status by five towns (Bernsdorf, Niesky, Pienisk, Weisswasser, Węglinieck). Only the second town out of these mentioned had the quasi-municipal character – being a market centre in the 19th century (see Weczerzka, 1978). The newest town of Lusatian Silesia is Bernsdorf – it acquired the municipal status in 1968 (Lexicon..., 1984). The case of Zgorzelec is very special. It was a suburb of Görlitz, which became an independent town after the new state boundary was established.

The urban settings of Lusatian Silesia can be divided into two groups (see table 1):

- 16 towns (Bad Muskaŭ, Bernsdorf, Görlitz, Hoyerswerda, Leśna, Lubań, Niesky, Pienisk, Reichenbach, Rothenburg, Ruhland, Weisswasser, Węglinieck, Wittichenau, Zawidów, Zgorzelec);
- 18 ex-towns (degraded towns), present villages, being the subject of my interest: Czerwona Woda (Zgorzelec District), Daubitz (Niederschlesischer Oberlausitz Kreis) Gross Särchen (Kamenz Kreis), Grünewald (Senftenberg Kreis), Kreba (Niederschlesischer Oberlausitz Kreis), Kunów (Zgorzelec District), Lipna (ary District), Lohsa (Kamenz Kreis), Niwica (Żary District), Pobiedna (Lubań District), Podrosche (Niederschlesischer Oberlausitz Kreis), Radomierzycze (Zgorzelec District), Reichwalde (Niederschlesischer Oberlausitz Kreis), Sulików (Zgorzelec District), Wrociszów Dolny (Zgorzelec District), Zebrzydowa (Bolesławiec District), Złotniki Lubańskie (Lubań District).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Degraded towns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13th – 14th century</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th – 19th century</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th century</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s elaboration (see Drobek 1999).

The urban network in Lusatian Silesia can be considered – in comparison to other areas in Silesia – as relatively stable. Out of the sixteen towns, nine have been existing continuously since the 13th or 14th century; the tenth one (Bad Muskaŭ) received the municipal status in the first half of the 15th century. Out of eighteen market centres founded in the 15th–18th century, only one (Niesky) was transformed into a town. The remaining were reduced to the village status – both from administrative and functional point of view (see Musiat, 1964). In one case, that of Lohsa, granting charter turned out to be unsuccessful. The colonisation processes going on in the 20th century have created four new municipal centres (leaving Zgorzelec out of account). Chronologically, these are: Weisswasser, Pienisk, Węglinieck, Bernsdorf.
2. FEATURES OF DEGRADED TOWNS IN LUSATIAN SILESIA

There are no dynamical changes in population of degraded towns in Lusatian Silesia. It is clearly seen when we compare the population of these centres in the period directly preceding World War II and in the first half of the 1990s – the differences are relatively small. Demographic tendencies (negative birth-rate), observed for a longer time in Germany, and recently in Poland are of great importance in this case (Obrębalski and Strahl, 1995).

We can suppose that the stagnation in population number was influenced, among others, by planning strategy realised for small towns and villages in the period of the German Democratic Republic. It assumed a multilevel hierarchical colonisation network, taking into consideration the necessity of the existence of small towns (recall that the smallest towns in the ex-GDR had less than one thousand inhabitants) and – also hierarchical – rural centres, out of which the largest were to function as local centres (Ostwald, 1975; Weiß, 1990). In Poland similar attempts at implementing the idea of the so-called key villages have been made. This function was assigned to larger villages (Kalisch, 1977; Känel, 1981) both in agricultural and urban areas (Zsilincsár, 1985). It was a stabilising as well as consolidating premise for rural units; we may think that this was carried out in relation to degraded towns in Lusatian Silesia as they were relatively large centres with the population of 0.5–1.0 thousand inhabitants.

From the functional point of view Lusatian Silesia till not long ago was treated (on the German side) as industrial-agricultural area, with agricultural-industrial complexes and significant, though few, urban-industrial centres located in purely agricultural area (Heizmann and Karrasch, 1990).

The unification of Germany has caused a far-reaching transformation of the economy (Kalka, 1996). In Lusatia it is visible particularly in relation to the two so-called complexes: fuel-energetic (based on was the large-scale coal exploitation) as well as agricultural-alimentary, functioning on the basis of state farms. The idea of cultural and landscape re-cultivation of Lusatia assumes the gradual limiting of coal exploitation and repairing the ecological and cultural damages caused it caused (Cygański and Leszczyński, 1997). These operations as well as the difficulties in accommodation of agricultural complexes to the new economic situation cause, in turn, the rise of unemployment and – consequently – social tensions (Stürmer, 1993; Budnikowski, 1996). Similar situation can be noticed in Polish part of Lusatian Silesia – the collapse of co-operative and state farming has caused the dramatic pauperisation of inhabitants of many towns (Psyk-Piotrowska, 1998; Kurzępa, 1996) including the analysed degraded towns: e.g. Lipna, Czerwona Woda, Kunów, Radomierzycze.

The German part of Lusatian Silesia lies almost entirely in Saxony. Thanks to its large population, relatively modern industry, cultural traditions and transit location this region has the best opportunities for economic development among all the so-called new German lands. It creates potential opportunities also for Lusatian Silesia (Heinrich, 1995), particularly in relation to benefits resulting from transborder co-operation – directly with Poland (Raumordnische..., 1995), and indirectly with the Czech Republic (Przybyła, 1995). On a local scale, as an example of activating ex-towns in Lusatian Silesia we can indicate the opening of a border crossing (in 1995) in Podrosche/Przewóz, which caused economic boom in these both Silesian ex-towns (degraded).
Ex-towns of Lusatian Silesia do not perform any significant economic functions, being merely – partially – local centres. They are supply centres of local hinterland; this refers mainly to the following seven towns: Gross Särchen, Kreba, Lohsa, Pobiedna, Reichwalde, Sulików, and Zebrzydowa. These towns perform the function of administrative centres both in the state (the seat of commune or gmina) and ecclesiastic system (Kirche..., 1997), as well as other non-agricultural functions (e.g. Pobiedna, Reichwalde and Zebrzydowa are centres of local industry). Eight ex-towns of Lusatian Silesia – Grünewald, Lipna, Pobiedna, Podrosche, Radomierzyce, Wrocławów Dolny, Złotniki Lubanskie do not perform any administrative functions even on the local level.

It is hard to find any urban features in the morphological structure of the analysed towns in the German part of Lusatian Silesia. As they obtained the status of market centre very long ago and lost it very quickly, no building structures typical of 'little town' could develop. Apart from Podrosche which is characterised by a simple, rural building system (it is a colony surrounded by forest) the remaining towns can be considered as the type of colonies characterised by a complex, rural morphological structure. These are place villages, of many roads – typical for the region of cultural border (Krenzlin, 1980; Kötzsche, 1953). There are not any architectural objects (monuments) which may individualise and distinguish urban structure (Adamik and Pillep, 1989). However, on the Polish side, the situation is different. Out of ten degraded towns, three represent significantly municipal morphological structure of building – with market-square and preserved market-square frontages (successively, from the most complex system: Sulików, Pobiedna, Złotniki Lubanskie). And in Radomierzyce the morphological dominant is a monumental palace complex of (Drobeń, 1999).

Evaluating the degree of complexity of morphological structure in towns of Lusatian Silesia, we have to take into consideration the fact, that some of these towns have limited possibilities of spatial development. It was due to either the closeness to coal excavations (e.g. Lohsa, Reichwalde) or the closeness to the river functioning as the state border (Podrosche, Radomierzyce).

3. CLOSING REMARKS

Comparison of degraded towns in Lusatian Silesia situated on the German side and those situated on the Polish side from the point of view of population, function and morphology leads to some interesting conclusions.

Firstly, as far as population is concerned, none of these towns have more than 2000 inhabitants. The largest degraded town in Lusatian Silesia is Sulików with nearly 2000 inhabitants, the smallest is Podrosche – about 200. In other regions of historic Silesia (in Poland as well as in the Czech Republic) there are some degraded towns with population exceeding as much as 5000 inhabitants (e.g. Olszyna). Changes in population of the analysed towns can be seen as a demographic stagnation or even a recession.

Secondly, agriculture performs an important function in the functional structure of degraded towns in Lusatian Silesia. A similar situation is observed in many Silesian degraded towns in the Czech Republic and in Poland, however many centres have non-agricultural functions. Relatively small differences exist in relation to administrative
functions: in Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany alike, Silesian degraded towns do not perform the role of administrative centres on a supralocal level.

The factor which significantly differentiates Polish and German degraded towns in Lusatian Silesia is the morphological structure (building system). Towns on the German side do not exhibit urban building features. In the history they have not enjoyed a higher status than that of a market centre. Therefore the urban building structure has not been formed (well-formed market-square, frontages, road network, etc.) and their layout is of rural character. On the other hand, some of the analysed centres on the Polish side are (from the architectonic point of view) little towns.

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The boundary of Russia is more than 20,000 km long and transborder belt passes from European North (70° n. l. and 30° e. l.) to the Asian Far East (42° n. l. and 131° e. l.). The boundary of China is longer (about 22,000 km), but the transborder zone has a form of horseshoe, not a belt (between 73° – 35° e. l.).

The very fact of immediate neighbourhood is objectively a favourable condition for the development of transborder co-operation and the effects of such co-operation often overlap the narrow regional frame and influence cultural and political relations as a whole between neighbouring countries. Generally speaking, we can apply all this to Russia as well. In the case of Russia, however, the strictly regional frame can be overlapped by conflicts in border regions and can have negative influence on overall Russian domestic and foreign policy – for example the two Chechen wars. So, the situation in border regions can have both positive and negative impact on Russian foreign policy.

In general, the growing influence of regional subjects on foreign policy principally conditioned by the fact that in the course of past ten years the Russian regions have evolved into actual centres of political and economic power. These regions have started to act independently of Moscow as the federal centre not only in their domestic affairs but also in the foreign affairs. Many of them now behave like independent centres especially as far as the international trade affairs are concerned. This is quite unique in the world federative practice. Especially the ‘rich’ regions have been developing their own foreign economy and above all foreign trade activities (mostly at variance with the federal constitution) and they set up their own economic and commercial representations abroad as well as in international trade organisations. The republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (non-border regions) are typical examples of this process. Tatarstan has its own representations in more than 15 countries and is closely followed by another 10 Russian regions. It is typical for Russian regions to try to gain profit from their proximity to foreign markets and to impose their own customs in trade with border regions of
neighbouring countries. In order to attract foreign investments they often ask for tax and other privileges that go beyond federal laws – many a time referring to their status of ‘independent economic zones’. The scope of Russian regions’ foreign activities can be best demonstrated by the fact that in 1998 each Russian region signed on average some 20 trade agreements with foreign countries. The goal of these economic activities is to reinforce their independence within the Russian federation.

Specific status of border regions was symptomatic in the Soviet period of Russia, resp. the U.S.S.R., because the Russian state’s interests was confronted with interests of neighbours and world powers in these regions. Disintegration of Russian soviet empire and secession of 14 independent states from Russian Federation brought about quite a new situation for many Russian regions. Until dezintegration only four European (Karelia, regions of Murmansk, Leningrad and Kaliningrad) and eight Asian regions (Altay, Tuva, Buryatia, regions of Chita and Amur, prefectures of Khabarovsk and Primorye and Jewish Autonomous Region) had the status of borderland. But with decreasing of Russian territory the number of border regions paradoxically increased three times – to present 36 units of Russian Federation (see Fig. 1).

![Map of Russia](image)

**Fig. 1. Trans-border belt of Russian federation**
Fig. 1a. Trans-border belt of Russian federation Baltic region

Fig. 1b. Trans-border belt of Russian federation Caucasian region
Border regions of Russian neighbours:

Poland (2)
1. Pomorze (Pomerania)
2. Warmia-Mazury (Warmia-Mazurland)

Lithuania (3)
3. Marijampolė
4. Taurage
5. Klaipėda

Norway (1)
6. Finnmark

Finland (3)
7. Lappi (Lappland)
8. Oulu
9. Itä-Suomi (East Finland)

Estonia (5)
10. Narva (city of)
11. Ida-Kirumaa
12. Jõgevamaa
13. Polvamaa
14. Võrumaa

Latvia (3)
15. Alūksna
16. Balvi
17. Ludza

Belorussia (3)
18. Vitebsk
19. Mohileu (Mogilev)
20. Homielj (Gomel)

Ukraine (5)
21. Černigov (Chernigov)
22. Sumy
23. Charkiv (Kharkov)
24. Lugansk
25. Doneck

Georgia (6)
26. Abkhasëti/Apsny (Abkhazia)
27. Svaneeti (Svanetia)
28. Rachà-Þelekhumi
29. Shida Kartli (Central Kartlia)

30. T'ienetí (Tianetia)
31. Kakhetí (Kakhetia)

Azerbaijan (8)
32. Beläken (Belokany)
33. Zakatala (Zakataly)
34. Qax (Gakh)
35. Şeki (Sheki)
36. Oqüz (Oguz)
37. Qebele (Gabala)
38. Qusar (Kusary)
39. Khachmaz (Khachmas)

Kazakhstan (7)
40. Atýrau
41. Batýs Qazaqstan (West Kazakhstan)
42. Aqtëbe (Aktubinsk)
43. Qostanay (Kustanay)
44. Soltustik Qazaqstan (North Kazakhstan)
45. Pavlodar
46. Shyghys Qazaqstan (East Kazakhstan)

Mongolia (8)
47. Bajan-Ölgij
48. Uvs
49. Zavhan
50. Hövsgöl
51. Čördënet
52. Sühêmege
53. Hentij
54. Dornod

China (4)
55. Xinjiang, autonomous region (border province of Altay)
56. Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia, aut. region – border khusun of Hailar)
57. Helongjiang (Amur)
58. Jilin

Korea, PDR (1)
59. Hamgyong-pukto (North Hamgyong)

Border regions in territorial waters:

A. Mangghystav (Mangyshlak) – Kazakhstan
B. Hokkaido, prefecture of – Japan

C. Alaska, state of – the U.S.A.
D. Krym (Crimea, rep. of) – Ukraine

Russian border regions:
1. Kaliningrad
2. Murmansk
3. Karelia/Karjala (Karelia, rep. of)
4. Leningrad
5. Pskov
6. Smolensk
7. Bryansk (Bryansk)
8. Kursk
9. Belgorod
10. Voronež (Voronezh)
11. Rostov na Don (Rostov on Don)
12. Krasnodar (prefecture of)
13. Karačajevo-Cherkesija (Karachay-Cherkessia, rep. of)
14. Astrachan (Astrakhan)
15. Volgograd
16. Saratov
17. Orenburg
18. Čeljabinsk (Chelyabinsk)
19. Kurgan
20. Tjumen (Tyumen)
21. Omsk
22. Novosibirsk
23. Altaj (Altay, prefecture of)
24. Altaj (Altay, rep. of)
25. Tuva/Tyva (Tuva, rep. of)
26. Burjatiya/Burjaadaj (Buryatia, rep. of)
27. Chita (Chita)
But still exist another three units with state boundary in territorial waters:
- Kalmykia, republic on Caspian Sea coast (neighbour on the opposite side in Kazakhstan is Mangystal region – in Kazakh language Mangghystav oblasy);
- Sakhalin in the Sea of Okhotsk (opposite in Japan is prefecture Hokkaido);
- Chukchi region, autonomous district in far Northeast (neighbour on the opposite side of the Bering Straits is Alaska).

The number of opposite border regions is higher. Russian 36 (resp. 39) units have 59 potential partners here, but we can add to them 3 above mentioned regions in territorial waters and Ukrainian autonomous Republic of Crimea, separated only by narrow Kerch Channel from prefecture of Krasnodar. But one of the Polish border region (Pomerania Province) is also only formally border region – it has a very short land boundary (0.5 km) with the Kaliningrad Region.

Transborder co-operation is complicated in many cases by very different sizes of regions in Russia and its neighbours. For instance the average area of Caucasian republics is only 1,500 km², while Russian Dagestan has more than 50,000 km². Average dimension of Georgian regions (about 7,000 km²) is comparable with that of North Caucasian republics, but a co-operation is limited by geographical barrier and political factor (e.g. the membership of illegal governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russian Association for co-operation of North Caucasian subjects). The regions of Latvia and Estonia are also very small (2,500–3,000 km²). Another obstacles for transborder co-operation were also administrative reforms in the last decade (in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Georgia). Administrative reforms have been discussed in Ukraine and Azerbaijan for many years. Administrative system of Kazakhstan is continuously modified – small regions are integrated and the number of border regions changes.

The mass migration of the Russians from the Central Asian and Transcaucasian countries to Russian border regions is one of the major obstacles to the transborder collaboration, their attitude is influenced above all by their bad experience with coexistence with neighbouring nations after the break-down of the USSR.

The transregional co-operation is very much determined by the natural conditions that have the principal impact on the population density in the border regions and thus create two types of frontier: a barrier frontier or a contact one. This is of course coupled with ethnic and economic factors in the border zone. Thus we can find on the one hand contact border regions, and virtually impermeable, scarcely inhabited borders in Altay or Kazakhstan on the other hand. For example, prefecture of Krasnodar hardly collaborates with Transcaucasian countries – only 1% of its export and 2% of its import.

Due to all these factors the transborder co-operation between Russian regions is very limited and cannot be compared to what we call Euroregions in Europe. The unsolved
problem of Abkhazia is an obstacle to the Black Sea transborder co-operation. The same is true for the two Ossetian areas in Georgia and Russia as the status of the South-Ossetian region within Georgia has not yet been fixed. The Caspian Sea collaboration is complicated by the problem of the divided Lezgian nation. The rest of the Asian border regions is more or less scarcely populated, nevertheless the transborder co-operation reassumes the former links with Kazakhstan and starts developing also with other Asian neighbours.

Geopolitical transformation of Russia to a smaller state brought about quite a new position for 24 subjects. Many inland regions (some of them were situated more than thousand km from the state boundary) were all at once changed to border regions with new problems: political, economic and also cultural, and, in many cases, especially national and religious.

The region of Orenburg is a typical example of a new border region. Orenburg was founded in 1743 on the frontier with the Kazakh khanate, resp. its Younger Horde, (the original fortress was situated at the confluence of the Or – hence its name – and the Ural (in this time the river named Yaik was a Russian-Kazakh boundary) and was later moved to its current locality. It was built not only in order to defend the empire against nomads, but also to become a flourishing trade centre on the boundary of Europe and Asia. In 1991, Orenburg officials said that their town and region were to resume their historical mission. Indeed, the geographical position of Orenburg is quite unique within Russia as this Russian-speaking area is a barrier between Kazakhstan and ethnic states of Russian federation which form an almost compact chain up to the Arctic Ocean (Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Komi-Perm, Komi, Nenetsia) and to middle-Volga region (Tatarstan, Marij-El, Mordovia, Chuvashia). But in the first phase of national delimitation of Russian empire to soviet autonomous subjects Orenburg region was the part of Kirghiz ASSR (later renamed to Kazakh ASSR) and Orenburg was a capital of this ASSR. But Orenburg region was separated from Kazakh ASSR in 1925, because the share of Kazakh was very low (only about 10%, now less than 5%). Economic development (especially mining of natural gas) attracted thousands immigrants from all part of the Soviet Union (Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.) and now only 70% of Orenburg population are Russians. Therefore Orenburg obtained the nickname ‘Little Russia’. For official representatives of Orenburg is very important to retain harmony and stabilization of multiethnic and multicultural population. They accepted special conception of national policy.

The region does not consider itself as a peripheral border zone of the Russian federation, but it wants to resume actively the tasks that were assigned to it in 1743 – it wants to become a gate between Europe and Asia, the junction between Russia and the Central Asia and it intends to create the ‘Orenburg nation’ as a model example of multinational collaboration of the whole post-Soviet Eurasian area. Orenburg officials argue that the original Orenburg governorate (gubernia) used to occupy a large steppe and forest-steppe area stretching from the Volga to Siberia, from Kama to the Caspian Sea and included the whole territory of present Bashkortostan and Chelyabinsk region, almost the whole present Tatarstan, parts of Samara, Sverdlovsk and Perm regions and present northwestern territories of Kazakhstan. It is in the area that the ‘Eurasian mentality’ was formed and which should become the foundation-stone of the above mentioned ‘Orenburg nation’.
The project of rebirth of great Orenburg prefecture (kрай) was presented by Orenburg citizen professor Chibilev in 1994. The representatives of Kazakhstan’s border regions refused this project, but the idea of co-operation was not rejected. On the 26th of June 1997 representatives of Orenburg region and three neighbouring Kazakh ones (Western Kazakhstan, Aktyubinsk and Kustanay) met in Orenburg and signed agreement about transborder co-operation, especially in using natural resources, environmental protection and preservation of ecological stability, protection of citizens and territories, activisation of contacts in science, culture, sport, etc.

Ethnic structure of Russian border belt is highly diversified. The most homogenous (more than 90% of Russians) are only six regions along the Belorussian and Ukrainian boundaries (Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh) and two Siberian regions (Kurgan and Novosibirsk). On the other side seven regions (all North Caucasian republics and Tuva) have less than 50% of Russians (Fig. 2). The situation on the opposite side of border belt is similar. All Estonian, Latvian, Kazakh and some Ukrainian border regions are ethnically heterogenous with high share of Russians (more than 10%, in some regions of Kazakhstan exceptionally more than 50%). The similar situation is in Abkhazia (about 20% of Russians). Border regions of Belorussia have 5–10% of Russians. But also border regions of Azerbaijan and Georgia are multiethnic with numerous minorities of North Caucasian nations (Avars, Lezgians, Tsakhurs, Ossetians). Some of border regions of Lithuania, Norway, Finland and China are heterogenous as well.

![Fig. 2. Share of Russians in the trans-border belt](image)
Border belt is very important for Russia as transport corridor between European and Asian parts of Russia (Trans-Siberian railroad, partly on territory of Kazakhstan), but majority of Russian border regions has great economic problems. Some of them belong to the poorest regions (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushia, Kalmykia, Tuva) of federation with gross regional product under 50% of average Russian GDP (Fig. 3). These southern poor regions traditionally vote for Communist Party in the parliamentary elections (so called ‘Red Belt’). Borderland co-operation between Russia and the former Soviet Union’s republics it borders with was much weakened. The principal reason for this is the economic crisis and the quest for new international trade contacts which would allow to export products and to buy cheaper and better quality products than those available within the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).

![Index of Russian GDP per head (Russia = 100)](image)

more than 125  125-106  105-95  94-60  less than 60

Fig. 3. GDP per head of Russian border regions (1997)

The crisis in the international transborder co-operation can be also seen in the drop of collaboration and creation of borderline integration regions. Transborder collaboration remains very weak in the whole European part. The only trace of such co-operation can be found on the Finnish frontier. On the contrary, it is best developed on the Eurasian boundary between Orenburg and the north Kazakhstan regions. Also the Russian-Chinese-Korean frontier zone seems to be very active or no visa obligation between border regions of Russia and China. New ‘Asiaregion’ is formed on ‘transborder’ co-operation between Sakhalin and Hokkaido.

Border regions have also become the centres of criminal activities (smuggling, drug traffic, money laundering) which have turned out to be so lucrative that they have upset
the traditional trade relations which had lost their profitability for both parts. As a reaction to this development the Russian federation intends to impose visa obligation for all CIS member states.

The technological links – regardless of economic sectors – that have survived the crisis seem to be the right base for the new integration. The role of the financial sector in the transborder collaboration development has been marginal and the centre of collaboration has been based on informal development of regional activities of all sorts – trade, tourism, services, migration of workforce.

There is no other region in Russia where the specific foreign policy role of the borderland could be defined as clearly as in the Kaliningrad region. It reflects the strategic objectives of Russia in the Baltic region – to realize the potential of good neighbourhood and to create a constructive model of relations with the local states, based on the support of regional economic integration and bilateral economic co-operation, on the indivisibility of state defence, on the respect of human and ethnic minorities rights. Russia has become a member of CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States) and Kaliningrad region is active in Euroregions Baltic (with Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Danish and Swedish regions) and Niemen/Nimusas (with Lithuanian, Polish, Latvian and Belorussian regions). As Poland and Lithuania are potential EU members, Russia has already proposed to EU a ‘special relations treaty’ which would guarantee the interests of the Kaliningrad region in the perspective of the EU enlargement. But also other western border regions are active in transborder co-operation. Now there are three Euroregions: one with Norwegian (Nordkalotten-Murmansk) and two with Finnish partners (Karjal-Karelija and Kym-Sankt Peterburg).

Border regions on the Finnish border – the only Russia’s neighbour being a EU member-state – are active as well. The collaboration with Finland allows them to take active part in the EU financial aid to the Finnish border regions. Participation of some of the Russian regions in the Northern Forum, concerned with the development of the Arctic zone, is another form of co-operation (11 Russian regions out of 23 member regions from the USA, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, but also from Mongolia, China, Japan and Korea).

The latest administrative reform from May 2000 which had placed 7 federal districts over the 89 existing ones, will only have a marginal impact on the transborder co-operation – they are already all border regions if nothing else (Fig. 4). And it is to be seen in future if they do not become an obstacle of transborder co-operation.
REFERENCES


EXTERNAL MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE BORDERING REGIONS OF RUSSIA

After the collapse of the USSR a part of the internal, interregional movement of people between various republics of the USSR became interstate migration. Despite the general reduction in external migration it still remains quite an intensive process in the bordering regions of Russia. The significant change in the migration situation in Russia is very important for functioning of territorial communities.

Interstate migration processes in the bordering regions are significantly influenced by two major factors: the internal one having to do with the socioeconomic changes in the country, and the external one, connected with the bordering location. Geographical proximity has a considerable influence on the specific character of interstate migration. Due to such factors as the proximity of the source country, similarities in natural and climatic conditions, bordering regions are more attractive for migrants, including forced migrants, than the more remote regions of the country. For the countries which do not border on the Russian Federation, relatively nearer regions are attractive.

Another attracting factor of these regions is the fact that a lot of current forced migrants left Russia earlier from exactly these bordering regions. In particular, this is proved by the survey of Russian forced migrants in the Pskov Oblast, carried out by E. Philippova. Thus, for a part of Russian forced migrants who resettle in the Russian regions bordering on the sending countries it is the return migration, what facilitates their adaptation.

It should be stated here that the southern and eastern regions of Russia differ significantly from the western regions: the former are territories mainly receiving population, mostly from the CIS countries, while the latter are mainly losing population because of the external migration.

* * * * *

Special features of economic-geographical location, significant similarity of historic-cultural development and ethnic closeness are the motives that drive the migration of Karelian population into Finland. A major difference in socioeconomic development of the two countries, instability of the political situation in Russia, inadequate standard of living and fear for the future of the children are main emigration incentives – more than 80% leave for personal and family reasons. The presence of relatives and friends abroad is an important incentive for emigration.
Inhabitants of Karelian towns show higher mobility than rural inhabitants. This is explicable in terms of general inertness of rural dwellers but also by the fact that Karelian agriculture receives financial and technical support from Finland, which helps to reduce the outflow from the rural areas of the bordering regions. Besides, the development of the collaboration between bordering regions in different spheres influences migration directly, increasing the migration potential of the region.

The Kaliningrad Oblast\(^1\), the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast also appear to be territories losing population because of external migration to ‘remote’ foreign countries (Tab. 1).

### Table 1. Immigration to Russian Federation (in persons)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>926,020</td>
<td>1,146,735</td>
<td>842,050</td>
<td>631,592</td>
<td>583,260</td>
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<td>582,829</td>
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<td>40,310</td>
<td>29,878</td>
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<td>23,903</td>
<td>17,575</td>
<td>13,760</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>54,247</td>
<td>66,847</td>
<td>51,412</td>
<td>38,551</td>
<td>24,517</td>
<td>21,059</td>
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<td>183,891</td>
<td>346,363</td>
<td>241,427</td>
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<td>235,903</td>
<td>209,880</td>
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<td>213</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>225</td>
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\(^1\) Province.
At the same time bordering regions in the north-west, including the Pskov Oblast, the Leningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg, the Novgorod Oblast and the Kaliningrad Oblast received migrants from the Baltic states. The largest number of the Russian migrants from Estonia (39%) moved to the nearest bordering oblasts. From Latvia there came 30% of Russian migrants. And only 13% of the migrants having arrived to these territories are from Lithuania.

External migration in the territories of Russia bordering on Belorussia and Ukraine is insignificant. Despite a certain gap in socioeconomic situation of these countries, the ethno-cultural closeness of these Slavic nations is the key factor preventing the emergence of significant flows of forced migrants. A small percentage of migrants arrive to the bordering regions of Russia. The majority, from these republics, go to the Ural mountains and further to Siberia and the Far East.

The North Caucasian region, which includes the Rostov Oblast, the Krasnodar and Stavropol' Krays\(^2\), and a number of autonomous formations, traditionally is a powerful pole of attraction for migrants, including forced migrants, from Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Migration here is decreasing which has no analogy in the past. In 1998 only the North Caucasian region received more than 47,000 people, and the most attractive regions were not national republics bordering directly with Transcaucasian states, but Russian oblasts. Three oblasts belonging to this region throughout the year 1998 received 41,779 people, i.e. over 85% of the people having arrived in this region. The only exception is Northern Ossetia which has been receiving a considerable migrant inflow from Georgia for many years. In the space of the year 1998 over 3,000 people (72.7%) moved there.

Nearest bordering regions are not preferable for the forced migrants of Russian nationality from Transcaucasian states. From Georgia only 28% went to the nearest bordering Russian regions. In 1998 the Krasnodar Kray and the Stavropol' Kray received 12.7% and 13.5% respectively, and the Rostov Oblast – 10.1%. The inflow of Russians to these regions from Azerbaijan and Armenia was significantly smaller, 4% and 4.7% respectively. At the same time, on the whole, about one third of Russian forced migrants from each Transcaucasian state arrived to the bordering and neighbouring to them Russian territories.

A characteristic example of the receiving territory in this region appears to be the Krasnodar Kray. For instance, Kuban (the Krasnodar Kray) has received over 1 million people in the last 10 years, i.e. nearly one of five residents is a migrant. There is no such situation in any other region of the Russian Federation.

A specific feature of migration in this region is its multinational structure. Today representatives of 87 nationalities live in the region (in 1995 there were 50). An uncontrolled migration has already lead to an obvious ethnic imbalance. In recent years the number of such ethnic groups as the Turkish people, Armenians, Kurds, Assirians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis has been growing quickly. The Armenians are the second largest ethnic group after Russians. Taking into account high birth-rate of these ethnic groups and unfavourable demographic indicators of the local inhabitants (low birth-rate and high mortality), it is possible that already within the next 10–15 years there will be a shift in the ethnic structure of the population and Russians will become a minority.

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\(^2\) Region which includes one or few national autonomous territorial units.
Another important special feature of the arriving migrants is their compact settlement which adds to sociopolitical tensions. One of the most complicated problems in the region is the presence of the Turkish-Meskhettin people. After the events in Fergana in 1989 a significant part of them arrived not in the regions assigned by the Government, but especially in the Krasnodar and Stavropol’ Kray. In the Krasnodar Kray currently more than 20,000 people of this nationality live on a temporary basis. It is intended that all or most of them would leave for their historical homeland in the nearest future. The local authorities aspire to assist them to return to their homeland. But the Turkish-Meskhettin people not only demand permanent registration in the kray and are not eager to go to their homeland, but, moreover, there are some cases when those people, who had earlier gone to Turkey, returned (Tab. 2).

Table 2. Emigration from Russian Federation (in persons)

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Significant sociocultural and behavioural differences, infringement of the law, crimes, and negative attitude of the local population to the Turkish-Meskhetin people and migrants in general, create the ground for interethnic conflicts and destabilisation of sociopolitical situation in the region.

The Ural-Volga region and Western Siberia are centres of migrants’ attraction from Central Asian states. The number of migrants in the bordering districts of these regions can be compared with the number of migrants in the North Caucasus. In 1998 the Chelyabinsk Oblast received 18,795 people from abroad, the Altay Kray – 17,459, the Omsk Oblast – 17,709, the Orenburg Oblast – 15,545, the Sverdlovsk Oblast – 14,309, the Altay Kray – 9,218 people.

The region which receives the largest number of migrants is the Orenburg Oblast, 14 administrative-territorial districts of which (out of 35) border on Kazakhstan. The largest inflow of migrants was recorded in 1994, when nearly 16,000 people arrived to the oblast. Only the officially registered migrants and refugees were about 60,000.

The number of forced migrants from Kazakhstan grows especially fast. More than two thirds of Russians living in Central Asia are concentrated in Kazakhstan. The dynamics of this process is characterized by the constant and rapid growth of the percentage of migrants from Kazakhstan in the total number of forced migrants having arrived in the Orenburg Oblast. In 1993 they made up only 8%, and in 1998 – 65.5% (Tab. 3).

**Table 3. Forced migrants and refugees (in persons)**

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*a Data from January 1, 2000. b Data from July 1, 1992. c Data from March 20, 1993.*
The influx of people from Kazakhstan can hardly be considered a voluntary migration. The existing combination and interaction of socioeconomic and political circumstances are powerful push factors. A law ‘About pension guarantees’ passed in Kazakhstan, according to which the pension age has been increased to 65 for men and to 60 – for women, will undoubtedly cause a new wave of emigration.

On average, migrants constitute a demographically younger group than the local population. Migrants who arrived to the Orenburg Oblast have 3–7% less pensioners but 5–7% more children than local population. Besides, the migrants are healthier and better educated. Hence, migrants are prospective resources which can positively affect the socioeconomic development of the oblast.

At the same time the Orenburg Oblast, as well as other Russian regions, experiences a long period of decline. Industrial production is falling; even raw-material industries, primarily oil and gas industries, have been suffering difficulties in recent years. There are not enough resources to create an infrastructure to serve farmers. A weak intercommunication in the internal market is also important (Tab. 4).

Table 4. Number of migrants arrived to Russia from the CIS countries (some territories) in 1998

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</tbody>
</table>
For the above-mentioned reasons a considerable number of migrants do not see any possibility to settle in the Orenburg Oblast. According to the sociological poll carried out in 1997, nearly 40% of the people who arrived, do not plan to stay here permanently – notwithstanding that each third migrant, who has decided to move, was born in this region.

Socioeconomic difficulties in settling down the migrants, inadequacy of many laws, negative attitude of local population to migrants increase probability of return migration. Although not so many migrants wish to return to the country they came from, it is interesting that 40–60% of them are Russian and Russian-speaking citizens. The results of the sociological poll carried out among expert teachers at Russian schools in states of Central Asia highlight how critical the situation is. The poll shows that the probability of return of Russian migrants is estimated to be high by informants from Kirghizia and Uzbekistan, and much lower – by those from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Experts from Tajikistan definitely deny such a possibility, what can be explained by constant civil confrontation among indigenous population. Besides, nearly in all republics Russian and Russian-speaking population have heard of numerous returns of people who did not manage to settle down in Russia. Thus, the results of the poll show that quite a large number of migrants in Russia do not adapt properly.

The situation in Russian regions bordering on China is quite complicated. Russia has one of the longest borders with China – the Primor’ye and Khabarovsk Krays, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and the Amur Oblast border on it (Tab. 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Border and nearest territories for the CIS countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For the Central Asia states: Altay region, Republic Altay, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tyumen, Kurgan, Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, Samara, Saratov, Volgograd, Astrakhan provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Caucasian states: Dagestan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardin-Balkariya; Stavropol and Krasnodar region, Rostov province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Baltic states: Pskov, Leningrad province, St.-Petersburg, Novgorod, Kaliningrad provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Moldova and Ukraine: Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov provinces, Krasnodar region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Byelorussia: Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk provinces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case the density of settlement of the bordering territories in both countries is a very important factor. The density of population in the bordering regions of China and Russian Far East differs dramatically. For example, the population density in the south of Primor’ye Kray and in districts of Khabarovsk and Blagoveshensk reaches 10–20 persons per square kilometre, and in the rest of the territory along the eastern border it does not exceed 5 persons per square kilometre. In the neighbouring North-Eastern China population density amounts to 130 people per square kilometre. At the same time the number of the unemployed in this region only is estimated to be 7–8 million people which is nearly as many as the total population of the Far East.

Putting into effect the open policy in Russia and China, differences in socioeconomic development and standards of life appeared to be very important factors intensifying migration in the bordering regions. Development of different forms of employment in
Russia, strategic policy in China aimed at an increase in export of labour force on the background of the unemployed population inside the country, defined the structure and directions of migration flows (Tab. 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>‘Far’ foreign countries</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karelia</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg and Province</td>
<td>9,573</td>
<td>5,465</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgorod Province</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh Province</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk Province</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd Province</td>
<td>4,535</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adygheia</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar Region</td>
<td>7,863</td>
<td>3,826</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>2,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol Region</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov Province</td>
<td>7,185</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Province</td>
<td>4,959</td>
<td>2,453</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk Province</td>
<td>6,144</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altay Region</td>
<td>12,164</td>
<td>7,675</td>
<td>2,967</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk Province</td>
<td>12,008</td>
<td>8,679</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Region</td>
<td>5,393</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irkutsk Province</td>
<td>3,555</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primor’ye</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk Region</td>
<td>3,277</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad Province</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to some estimations, currently in the Far East there are 0.3–1 million of the Chinese. In 1998 only there came 231,000 of Chinese citizens to the Amur Oblast and the Primor’ye Kray. According to the official data, only in the Primor’ye Kray there are about 300,000 people from China and North Korea, and hundreds of migrants from other countries. According to unofficial data and expert estimates, the number of migrants – chiefly Chinese – is several times higher.

At the present time in some districts the number of Chinese immigrants exceeds the number of Russian citizens. For instance, in the Primor’ye Kray the number of Chinese immigrants exceeded the number of Russian citizens by 1.5–2 times. Along with the continuous outflow of the Russian population from this region this can lead to unfavourable changes in ethno-demographic structure of population. The consequence of the fast growth of the Asian community is increasing competition for working places between Russians and migrants from China and North Korea who offer their labour much cheaper.

Trying to limit the uncontrollable growth of the Asian population and ease the competition in the local labour market, the administration of the Primor’ye and the Khabarovsk Krayes and the Chita Oblast made an unprecedented decision to introduce
special immigration cards to control the movement of foreign workers in the Russian Federation. But it is difficult to say now how much it will ease the situation in the region.

* * * *

Bordering Russian regions – ‘filters’ of migration flows from nearby foreign countries – have all the main features characteristic to all-Russian processes of forced migration. These processes appear here in the sharpest form and, hence, demand a special approach in studies and actions aiming at solving the problems they create.

The current situation in some bordering regions demands a significant change in methods of government and self-government. Otherwise, ethnic, religious, economic and social conflicts are inevitable. The reason of such necessity is the significant growth of the percentage of the migrant population in the majority of regions of the country, especially in its bordering territories. Besides, possessing better qualification than the local population, migrants are more active on the labour market, more easily adapt to new market conditions and achieve greater economic and social success. It sharpens the situation in the regional labour markets, already aggravated by growing unemployment resulting from the crisis (according to some estimates, in general in the country the unemployment rate was 14% of the working-age population in the mid-1999) (Tab. 7).

**Table 7.** Estimations on probability of reverse migration from Russian to the Central Asia states (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Is it a great probability, what Russian migrants, who has gone away from Central Asia countries, will return?</th>
<th>Do you know any case when Russians migrated to Russia retained back?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>favourable estimation</td>
<td>negative estimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>62,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>90,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>35,0</td>
<td>65,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>90,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>80,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>80,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The solution of many problems of the bordering regions caused by large-scale and illegal migration presents itself in the concept of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation and of the Law ‘About legal status of bordering regions’ (adopted by the Duma and the Federation Council). It will allow to solve the accumulated problems and receive as many migrants as a given administrative-territorial formation can really absorb. Besides, Russia’s cancelling of the Bishkek agreement (1992) on the visa-free travel of the CIS citizens will allow to reduce a threat of international terrorism, organised criminality, to stop drug-trade and illegal international migration. In the future the Russian relationship with the CIS states will be built on the basis of the bilateral agreements. The exception will be made, most likely, for the member-states of the Customs Union (Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan) and Armenia.

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CO-OPERATION AND EFFECTS ON BORDERLANDS ROMANIA-HUNGARY AT TEN YEARS AFTER COMMUNISM FALL

An important issue for the future internal development of Romania is the one referring to the complementary functional regional structures. This internal geopolitical problem differs from unit to unit, from a certain form of organization to another, as the practical realization of each form of organization of this kind requires different ways of achieving it. All of these may have a territorial specificity that manifests itself under an economical and political aspect. In order to outline such regional systems one has to take into consideration a number of geographical and social factors such as: demographic characteristics (density of population, number of inhabitants, specific structures, natural and migratory movement, etc.), level of culture and information, professions, the force and national feeling, the making of some territorial planning or the implementation of some industries and their political effects.

1. THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN CROSS-BORDER REGION

The Romanian-Hungarian cross-border region stretches along a 442 km long frontier 98% of which is a land border (Fig. 1).

From the administrative point of view eight counties can be found on both sides of the borderline: four in Romania (Satu Mare, Bihor, Arad and Timis) and four in Hungary (Szatmar-Szabolcs, Hajdu-Bihar, Bekes and Csongrad). From the above-mentioned districts only the ones situated in the central area are entirely in direct contact, the only connection being with Hungary, namely Hajdu-Bihar and Bekes with Romania. The other four counties situated at the extremities of the contact area between Romania and Hungary have a direct contact with three countries, Ukraine to the north and Yugoslavia to the south.

At the same time, the distribution of the counties, as ‘pairs’ facilitates the creation of the some functional structures among them. These pairs are: Satu Mare – Szatmar-Szabolcs, Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar and Arad – Bekes. The approximately equal dimension of these counties, either the area or the population also gives another important aspect (Tab. 1).
Fig. 1. Romanian-Hungarian cross-border region

In direct contact with the borderline there are 58 towns and villages on Hungarian territory and 37 on Romanian territory (including 5 small towns under 20,000 inhabitants), representing the periphery of the national space for each of the two countries, outlining two strips of varying thickness but not exceeding 20 km in width.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>No. population</th>
<th>Surface (km²)</th>
<th>Density (inhab/km²)</th>
<th>No. towns</th>
<th>No. communes</th>
<th>No. villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>479,575</td>
<td>7,754</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihor</td>
<td>631,095</td>
<td>7,544</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satu Mare</td>
<td>395,696</td>
<td>4,418</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,506,366</td>
<td>19,716</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The geographical conditions favour this co-operation. The relief dominated by a plane of 90–100 m of altitude does not hamper the development of a modern functional system of communication. Complementary to this low strip, on the eastern side, namely on the territory of the districts in Romania, the altitudinal succession of the relief creates a variety of the landscape as well as a different way of using the space (Fig. 2). This aspect is important because of the diversity of economical and leisure activities eliminates the monotony specific to a plane zone.

The demographic aspects create also favourable premises for a good co-operation. In this sense the ethnic structure of the border space of the two states favours the realization of some functional structures favourable to the development of the entire area. Thus, because of a Romanian majority in the Romanian borderline region and of a Hungarian majority in the Hungarian borderline region there can be found on the territory of each region with minority status, Hungarian communities (Calvin and
Romano-catholic) in Romania and the Romanian minority (Orthodox and Greek-Catholic) in Hungary.

In this way, the present-day shape of the space is the result of profound modifications in the political life, especially in the last century, that have put a decisive touch on all the categories of inhabitants.

These ethnic structures really change the role of the boundary, from being a separation line into a front of co-operation with excellent results in the realization of some economic, social and cultural structures in the border space.

**Socio-Ethnic Particularities of the Romanian Borderline Space during the Communist Period.** The communist administration in Romania obviously affected the borderline space. The economic development took place mainly in the centre while the peripheral regions were underdeveloped. The borderlines had in this period a strict role of political confines of the state with no possibility of realising borderline region structures.

Thus, the role of the borderline was to close towards exterior the two collaboration between the two being realised only under a very strict control, and from the economic point of view mainly within the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, economic structure holding together the communist countries in Europe. After the Second World War the role of military political economic separation being more and more consolidated.

**The post-communist period** (after December 1989) brought about major changes in the social political life of Romania and Hungary. Favourable premises for to the development of borderline co-operation were gradually crated. Thus the democratic principles were re-established in the political life by the coming back of the political pluralism; the possibility of legal emigration of a part of the population, realised especially by the German, Slovak and Hungarian minorities towards the origin countries; the acknowledgement of more than 22 churches and religions association; minority

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1 It must be mentioned that there are differences as regard the registration of the population from the ethical point of view. For example in Romania every inhabitant, inespective of this ethnic affiliation are Romanian citizens, to which can be added the nationality: Romanian, Hungarian etc. Unlike the Romanian situation, where in this way is admitted the existence of a different ethnical population, in Hungary, inespective of their ethnical status, all inhabitants are Hungarian citizens, the difference being given by the language they speak, there is a Hungarian citizen of Romanian language. Between these two ways of recording there are major differences regarding the real number of the ethnical minorities especially when the official language of the state differs from the ethnical one and so a major part of a minority acquires voluntary or not, in time, the official language of the country it lives in.
rights; political option, using the native language in schools, administration, culture, mass media etc; the possibility of moving within the territory.

2. PERCEPTION OF THE BORDERLINE SPACE

The perception of borderline has changed from a linear closed border specific to the communist period to a permeable zone of contact.

Also, in addition to prosperous areas characterising cities and urban spaces, dynamic rural spaces characterised as support nuclei of this borderline space, there are spaces not so developed, sometimes in regress from a social and economic point of view. Generally, such spaces found in remote areas far from main points of customs and also have a rural characteristic.

One thing is for sure, that the border position of a region does not necessarily imply any more, in the modern sense, its peripheral character.

Also, the perception of the borderline space differs according to the age of the population; generally, old population perceives with difficulty the recent changes, especially its permeable aspect and the possibility of crossing it.

Of great importance are the differences of scenery expressing disparities along the borderline. Thus, on the country level the structure of the border space (or inter-borderline) differentiates from the neighbouring country become clear through break in the scenery: transport network, settlements, agricultural characteristic, etc.

The border space has, as a rule, its own characteristic and the main concern in the realisation of a functional borderline region is harmonising the functionality of the two interposed border spaces. As a rule each border space has its own characteristic, to mention here the situation of the customs points where there are: customs duty and frontier police, agencies and exchange offices, travel agencies, confectioneries, restaurant, etc, small trade and smuggling, migration of the frontier workers stimulating the exchange and stimulating the relations by becoming a contract exchange zone, etc.

Placed in the peripheral region of the national space, the frontier areas have often economic difficulties, this meaning an increased unemployment rate; negative migratory balance, etc. Regarded as a contract zone of development of relations, this space can become an attraction to industry or to trade development. In order to realise this aspect, a regional policy is needed to take into account the possibility of creating new jobs and of improving the infrastructure and the transport, arranging the territory, protection of the environment, energy supply, etc. In this sense the modern aspect of the borderline consists of junction points between different economic structures.

Premises favourable to borderline collaboration result from the fact that the majority of economic and executive factors accept the perspective of cross-border region development. The following aspects determine the complexities of the borderline development in the region:

1. The multi-ethnic structure of the population and the long traditions of living together.
2. The existence of some important natural resources and ofanthropic edifices.
3. The preservation of the local element in the borderline development.
4. The potential human resources which trough the existence of some universities (Oradea, Arad and Timisoara in Romania; Szeged, Debrecen and Niyregyhaza) is characterised by a high level of specialisation.
5. The presence of some passages of transport and means of communications of European importance.

![Map of cross-border passages between Romania and Hungary](image)

Fig. 3. Roads cross-border passages between Romania and Hungary

6. A great number of customs points, of which only few are operational (Fig. 3). Thus there are 29 link roads between the settlements situated from one side to another of the border of which only 6 are operational for the traffic: Petea-Csenge-sima, Bors-Artand, Salonta-Mikereki, Várşand-Gyula, Turnu-Battonya, and Ndlac-Magyarcsand. These customs points are placed on important European routes that cross the two countries from West to East. In addition to these 4 there are another 23 linking possibilities, of different importance, from busy customs points to points of local interest.

7. Along the railway, these are 7 customs points. These are: Pecica-Battonya, Curtici-Zokosha, Salonta-Kotegyan, Cheresig-Koroszkal, Episcopia Bihor-Artand, Valea lui Mihai-Nyirabrany and Carei-Tiborszallas.

8. The airports of Satu Mare, Oradea and Arad, which provides international routes linking - the air transport in the Romanian space.

The differences between the two spaces are the result of some structural differences:

1. In the politico-administrative field: the fiscal system, social settlements-prices, salaries, social contributions, technique standards, currencies.

2. In the socio-cultural field: language, traditional holidays, the products tender, private property, etc.

3. Economic field: creating offices, etc. A powerful stream of labour from Romania to Hungary has been noticed, especially for agricultural work.

4. As regards trade, there are some differences i.e. a great amount of goods going one way. Thus, up to 1992 there was a small trade of food especially from Romania to Hungary and after that year and in the last years the direction has changed. A great amount of products, from food to electronic appliances, has latter become an important market for the former. This situation is the result of the fiscal policy different for the two countries, this meaning huge price difference. This exchange is realised by frontier small traffic; a great majority of population on the Romanian side buys food from Hungary weekly.
5. The absence of informative background as regards the potential of collaboration between Romanian and Hungarian partners;

6. There is little experience on the Romanian side as opposed to Hungarian experience as regards the field of border collaboration policy.

7. Population, especially in rural areas, is decreasing in number and shows an increasing degree of demographic ageing.

Also, a series of disadvantages are due to:

- the road network: well developed but the alternative roads are missing, over 90% being village and district roads;
- the lack of electrified railways and double-track railways;
- the central budget interests and that national economical strategy and the implementation of complementarity.

3. PRESENT-DAY CROSS-BORDER COLLABORATION

During the decade after the communist collapse, the development of the border relations between Romania and Hungary has taken different shapes, from the creation of the regional structures involving several states (such as Euroregions) to bilateral collaborations between towns situated on opposite sides of the frontier or even clusters of towns. In this paper we try to emphasize different ways of real border co-operation such as: Euroregions, regional co-operation conventions and bilateral friendship agreements.

Euroregions. In the case of the cross-border space of Romania and Hungary are now active two Euroregions that divide this area into two parts. In the north there is the Carpathian Euroregion, first created in 1994 situated in the districts Bihor and Satu Mare from in Romania, Szabolcs-Szatmar and Hajdu-Bihar in Hungary which on their turn integrated in the regional structure that counts 5 countries. In order to sustain these structures there is the Carpathian Euroregion Found, to which every district gives its contribution and finances projects and economical cultural programs on the Euroregion territory of those 5 countries. In the south there is the Euroregion Danube-Mureș-Tisa-Criș that contains the counties Arad and Timis in Romania and in Hungary the county Bekes and Csongrad which on their turn are associated to other districts in Yugoslavia creating the above-mentioned regional structure but on a smaller scale than the first one.

The cultural exchanges between partner towns – the economical and cultural dimension occupies the first place as regards the borderline co-operation.

The bilateral relations between towns situated on the opposite sides of the frontier and until the present-day were the only way of cultural exchanges. For example, concerning the Bihor counties there are 22 towns and village that have this kind of relations (Fig. 4) with towns and villages in Hungary.

Town Partnership with Common Objectives. Concerning Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties two associations of the frontier towns have been created. These are The Association of the Bihor frontier towns regarding the development of the Romanian territories and The Associations of the frontier towns regarding the development of the territories in the Hajdu-Bihar County (Fig. 5).
The two associations have concluded an agreement in 1997. This Association includes 17 villages in the territory of Romania: Săcuieni, Diosig, Sălard, Biharea, Boroș, Sântandrei, Girișu de Criș, Cefa, Mădărăș, Tulca, Ciumeghiu, Batăr, Avram Iancu, Săcădat, Budureasa and towns Salonta and Valea lui Mihai; and 22 in Hungary: Artánd, Bedo, Bereköszörmény, Biharkeresztes, Bojt, Esztar, Gaborjan, Hencida, Kismarja, Koroszkal, Koroszegapató, Magyarhomorog, Mezőpeterd, Mezosas, Nagykereki, Pocsaj, Szentpeterszeg, Told and Vancsod. The purpose of this association is the collaboration on the structural advantage between partners respecting the laws old each country and the European laws.
The agreement fields are:
- the foundation of a commercial-economical zone near the frontier line, with internal and international relations as a second objective;
- the bilateral agreement between the two districts in the ‘partnership’ program;
- the promotions of touristic activities, especially the water tourism and the rural tourism;
- the development of the small and the middle trade through the participation and the common organisation of fairs, commune exhibition the creation of joint firms, mutual foreign investments;
- cultural collaboration through the organisation of creative camps, camps for students; the creations of several links between artistic groups, etc;
This way of collaborations was first initiated in 1997, at the meeting of the representatives of the two associations in Bors.

In conclusion it can be stated that there are some favourable premises to intensify the cultural and economic exchanges especially in this frontier space. One of basic conditions is, however, the harmonisation of the legislation of both states.
EUROREGIONS IN SLOVAKIA WITH SPECIFIC FEATURES TO EUROREGION POMORAVIE-WEINVIERTEL-JIŽNÍ MORAVA

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this contribution is to provide basic information on the process of forming Euroregions in the Slovak Republic, to present one of the interesting border regions – that of Skalica – from the aspect of crossborder collaboration using an analysis of the hitherto development of crossborder relations and co-operation (issuing in the creation of the Euroregion Pomoravie-Weinviertel-Jižní Morava in 1999). Some examples of hitherto research programmes, projects as well as planning documents pertaining to the crossborder relations and collaboration in this region are also here presented.

2. EUROREGIONS IN SLOVAKIA

The issues of crossborder collaboration are among the crucial trends of development within integrating Europe. Currently there are approximately 180 Euroregions on the continent. In Slovakia, potential presuppositions to form Euroregions have been created immediately since the rise of the Slovak Republic or even in former Czecho-Slovakia after socio-political changes (Buček, 1992; Faltan, 1997; Šťastný, Strussova and Malíková, 1997). Some of the Slovak regions have been initiative in this field from the beginning; however in respect to the lagging of the legislative and institutional framework behind, their activities and membership in the given Euroregions were unofficial (e.g. the Carpathian Euroregion). This initial phase was eventually prolonged to several years. Only in the last two years (1999–2000) a marked acceleration of development has taken place, which is – among others – related to the preparation of Slovakia for the accession to the EU. This is confirmed by the ratification of the European Framework Convention on Crossborder Co-operation between Territorial Communities and Public Authorities (1998) as well as its Additional Convention (2000) and also by the accession of the country to the European Chart of Local and Regional Self-government (2000). At present, there exist 4 forms of crossborder collaboration in the Slovak Republic:
- intergovernmental agreements on crossborder collaboration,
- collaboration of Euroregions,
- collaboration within self-government and territorial State organs,
- collaboration of Chambers of Commerce.

The guarantee and co-ordinator of crossborder collaboration is the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic. The first intergovernmental agreement on crossborder collaboration with Poland was signed already in 1994, the next ones followed as late as 2000 (those with Hungary and the Czech Republic; there exist also proposals for agreements with Ukraine and Austria).

The most significant form of crossborder collaboration is the collaboration of Euroregions. Until recently just two Euroregions associated with the territory of Slovakia appeared on the lists of Euroregions – the Carpathian one (5 countries) and the Euroregion Tatry (Slovak-Polish border). Both were established already in 1993 and 1994 respectively, but the Slovak participation in the Carpathian Euroregion became official only now. In 1999 four new Euroregions were founded followed by another four established in 2000 (Tab. 1, Fig. 1).

### Table 1. Development of Euroregions in Slovakia (1993–2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euroregion</th>
<th>Month and Year of Foundation</th>
<th>Main centres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral euroregions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak-Czech border:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Biele-Bilé Karpaty</td>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>Trenčín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak-Polish border:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Tatry</td>
<td>August 1994</td>
<td>Nowy Targ, Kežmarok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak-Hungary border:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Váh-Dunaj-Ipęť</td>
<td>July 1999</td>
<td>Tatabánya, Nitra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Ipęť</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>Šahy, Balassagyarmat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Neogradiensis</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>Lučenec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Košice-Miskolc</td>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>Košice, Miskolc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Košice-Miskolc</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Putnok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Rába-Dunaj-Váh</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Dunajská Streda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral euroregions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karpathian Euroregion</td>
<td>February 1993 (November 1999)*</td>
<td>Nyíregyháza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Pomoravie-Weinviertel-Jižní Morava</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Holič</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Beskydy</td>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>Žilina, Bieško-Biala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroregion Wien-Bratislava-Gyor</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Official membership of Slovak part.

According to the number of States, the bilateral Euroregions dominate – they particularly prevail on the Slovak-Hungarian border (five). Most of the hitherto Euroregions are made of more or less compact territories, however two Euroregions have a special character reflecting the collaboration between cities (Košice-Miskolc, Wien-
-Bratislava-Győr). After the stage of formation and institutionalisation, the stage of realising the concrete forms of co-operation should start. Nevertheless, this will be possible only after the creation of regional self-government hitherto absent (planned to operate from January 1, 2002) because its establishment should be the first step in the complex reform of public administration.

![Map of Euroregions in Slovakia (2000)](image)

Fig. 1. Euroregions in Slovakia (2000)

As regards the initial state and preparedness of the Slovak regions for crossborder collaboration, it has to be stated that the differentiation among them is relatively high. Evidently it is Bratislava which absolutely dominates among them because of its greatest potential and most progressive trends of development. It is a certain paradox that the already existing forms of collaboration should be metamorphosed into the official establishment of the last Euroregion until now as late as the end of 2000.

3. BORDER REGION OF SKALICA – PART OF EUROREGION POMORAVIE-WEINVIERTEL-JIŽNÍ MORAVA

3.1. Essential characterisation

During the former regime, the historical region of Záhorie whose northern part is made of the region of Skalica fulfilled the function of a transit region with limited activities in the zone located along the Austrian boundary and with a little dynamic economic development. After socio-political transformations in Central Europe, above all after opening up the frontier with Austria, the split of Czecho-Slovakia
and the following rise of the Slovak and Czech Republics, the situation changed radically.

According to the current territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic (National Council of the Slovak Republic Act No. 221/1996), the Skalica district is one of the 9 frontier districts at the border with the Czech Republic. This is the northernmost district of the Trnava administrative region and the northern part in the historical region of Záhorie. The Skalica district belongs to the lesser districts in Slovakia as for area (359 km²), the number of communes (21) and the number of population (47 thousand). The centre of the district and, at the same time, the border town is Skalica (15.3 thousand inhabitants in 1999). The other two towns in the district – Holič (11.7 thousand) and Gbely (5.2 thousand inhabitants) are also border communes.

In contradistinction to the northern and central parts of the Slovak-Czech border – which are marked by mountains, the southern part of this border comprising also the described region of Skalica is marked by the Morava River. In this tract the Slovak-Czech border is the most passable. It is demonstrated by the densest network of road and railway crossings at the borders of Slovakia, which are to be found in all districts. Also thanks to this fact the Skalica region has at present the most developed crossborder relations including a wide range of co-operation activities. A specificity of the local settlement structure is a quadropolis divided by the State boundary – the towns of Skalica, Holič (Slovakia), Hodonín and Strážnice (Czech Republic). This circumstance gives very good starting suppositions to form inter-settlement relations. The Skalica district has evidently the highest share of Czech and Moravian nationality in its population out of all Slovak districts (4.1% in 1991); among the Slovak cities this primacy belongs to Holič (7.0%) followed by Skalica (4.8%) (Fig. 2, Fig. 3).

![Fig. 2. Proportion of Czech and Moravian nationality inhabitants in border districts with Czech Republic (1991)](image-url)
3.2. From a Society and Associations to a Euroregion

Contrarily to the other tracts of the Slovak-Czech border, in the northern part of Záhorie (where a substantial part of the border is represented by the Skalica district – the rest by the Senica district) crossborder co-operation has been also officially supported in a certain form and developed by several organisations since the rise of the Slovak and Czech Republics. The most significant organisation dealing with the co-operation of Slovak and Moravian communes was the Society for the support of the Morava River region. The Society set its main long-term goal to make the Morava River navigable and to build the canal Danube-Morava-Oder-Elbe. The partial aims were: the gradual development of tourism, the establishment of new job opportunities, keeping of good neighbourly relations, creation of promotional materials, etc.

The district of Skalica is a part of the Záhorie region in which the inhabitants – unlike a majority of our historical regions – did not lose the sense of identity with their region as witnessed also by the good working and participation of almost all local communes in the Association of communes and towns of the Záhorie region (ZOZO) – one of the first regional associations within the Association of communes and towns of Slovakia. A part of ZOZO activities is the maintenance of crossborder relations with neighbourly Moravian and Austrian regions.

All these activities literally aimed at forming a Euroregion whose part could be the analysed Skalica region too. However, until recently the unpreparedness of legal documents and unwillingness to support such activities from the side of the former Slovak Government prevented these endeavours. But signing the European Framework Convention on Crossborder Co-operation between Territorial Communities and Public
 Authorities on September 7, 1998 in Strasbourg represented a marked turning point of crossborder co-operation in Slovakia generally, not only with the Czech Republic. The signing of this Convention meant for the Slovak Republic a logical completion of its efforts at clear delimiting a legal framework to develop crossborder collaboration.

Following the above-mentioned principal changes the initiative preparations to form several Euroregions in Slovakia began; in the process an active role was played by the Skalica region too. In June 1999 the first conference on crossborder co-operation was held in the towns of Strážnice and Skalica. Its part was also the solemn act of signing the Czech-Slovak-Austrian declaration on mutual crossborder collaboration with a perspective to create the Euroregion Pomoravie-Weinviertel-Jižní Morava. For the Slovak side the partner was the Regional association of Záhorie (a regional developmental agency), for Austria it was Regionalverband Weinviertel and for the Czech Republic the Association of communes and towns of Jižní Morava. It is a surprise that the main partner for Slovakia was not the logically expected then representative of communes and towns in Záhorie – ZOZO. This fact as well as clarifying the position of both named subjects uselessly complicates the situation in the newly establishing Euroregion.

3.3. Research programmes in the region of Skalica

A research programme aiming at the spatial aspects of crossborder relations and crossborder collaboration with the Czech Republic has been carried out under the supervision of the author of this contribution at the Department of Human Geography and Demography, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Comenius University, Bratislava already for several years. Results of the very first research (analysis of the border, suppositions for crossborder relations and collaboration, intensity of the selected kinds of relations – commuting, migration etc., survey on crossborder relations, crossborder co-operation in planning documents) were presented at several international conferences. Up to now the most detailed research was realised actually in the region of Skalica.

A part of the research programme in the region of Skalica is also the monitoring and analysis of all kinds of crossborder relations and crossborder co-operation. Within this the intensity of these relations is compared to the situation prior to 1993 and after the split of Czecho-Slovakia and the rise of the Slovak and Czech Republics (migration – Fig. 4; commuting patterns, transport connections, tourism, cultural relations, sport events, mass media sphere, etc.). The research programme is carried out in collaboration with the Municipal Office in Skalica. During the years of 1993–1996, almost 200 students of the Faculty of Natural Sciences, Comenius University, Bratislava participated in a detailed field research; since then this research has been still continuing. The first results were summarised in the expert analysis ‘Position of Skalica as a centre of settlement’ (Slavík, et al., 1994) made for the Municipal Office in Skalica. The analysis was used for organising and managing the town and in the creation of a new land use plan of the town. Currently a monograph on the city of Skalica is in print (Slavík, et al.: Skalica. Settlement geography ...), which has no analogy among the monographs of our cities by its dominant view to the present transformation stage. The monograph should
present and propagate the border town of Skalica as an example of a progressively
developed town and its catchment area in the present transformation stage. Within the
project ECOS-OUVERTURE INWARD II, the study ‘Connection of the Skalica region
to the Bata canal and the Morava River’ has been elaborated (Slavík, 1998). Several
partial topics were solved or are being solved in the framework of bachelor, diploma and
doctoral works.

Fig. 4. Migration of population in town Skalica (1990–1999)

It explicitly results from hitherto researches of crossborder relations and co-operation that the observed southernmost tract of the Slovak border with the Czech Republic in the region of Skalica has the best presuppositions to crossborder collaboration. It ensues, among other things, from the long-term tradition of collaboration, the least barriers and the densest network of crossings. The intensity of relations is in this region (with the exception of out-commuting in the Čadca district) the highest and having the most complex character. It is also proven by results achieved by colleagues – geographers from the city of Brno (Řehák, 1997 – a grant project), in their studies, diploma works etc. Some of these scientific outputs were already realised in the common co-ordination, e.g. the same survey was made in Slovakia along the whole frontier and in the Czech Republic in the selected localities.

3.3.1. Projects of crossborder co-operation

It is possible to evaluate the address of Skalica through Moravian partners with the proposal to connect the town to the Bata canal and the Morava river in order to develop water tourism as a result of appreciating the hitherto long-term traditionally good neighbourly relations and various forms of collaboration. In the past, Skalica belonged to the centres of forming the Czecho-Slovak mutuality, it was the seat of the Provisional Government when establishing Czecho-Slovakia. Since 1993, after the split of Czecho-Slovakia and the rise of new States (Slovak and Czech Republics), a certain limitation of relations (above all transport lines) and co-operation has occurred. Despite that Skalica and its region retain a wide range of crossborder relations; the most stable are cultural and sport ones.

Gradual implementation of new attractive forms in tourism and recreation belongs to new trends in the development of tourism. The realisation of the above-depicted project will enlarge the offer of an attractive form – water tourism in the Skalica region. Along with the current offer of a complex of cultural monuments in the town and its surroundings, the recreation resort of Zlatnicka dolina, the sport facilities and the planned offers of cyclotourism and a vineyard zone for the development of tourism, the spectrum of opportunities will be markedly enlarged. According to the hitherto experience of partners from Moravia where the prevailing part of the Bata canal is already in operation (the overall canal length is some 50 km), after the connection of Skalica (where the canal ends at the border) the town could be attended by approximately 20,000 visitors from Moravia – participants of water tourism. A significant fact is that Skalica belongs to the most attractive places along the entire canal (monuments, wine growing, folklore, etc.). For the time being, a drawback to the realisation of this project is its delay due to building a traffic bypass around the town and a new border crossing (close to the canal terminal) (Slavík, 1998).

In December 1999, a new Phare project was approved for the town of Skalica for the year 2000, being thus the sole crossborder project on the frontier with the Czech Republic. It is the project to extend the existing and insufficient wastewater treatment plant and sewerage in two localities of new housing estates. In order to complete the projects concerning the region it is necessary to give also a project of economic collaboration between the towns of Holíč and Hodonín.
3.3.2. Planning documents and crossborder co-operation

All hitherto planning documents deal with the issues of crossborder co-operation only to a minimum degree. The respective issues are partially comprised in branch analyses. Therefore – in the preparation of further planning documents – it will be necessary to pay heed to a greater harmony between such documents and new crossborder activities. The Skalica region is presented in these documents as one of the most important at the Slovak-Czech border. The region is – from the viewpoint of tourism – determined primarily for cognitive-cultural and transit tourism, but cyclotourism, individual water tourism, horse riding etc. have also good conditions to develop. However, the improvement of transport and technical infrastructures is a substantial presupposition for that.

4. CONCLUSION

The region of Záhorie, which encompasses also the region of Skalica, is becoming one of the most prospective regions in Slovakia with regard to its changed geographic position. Results of the hitherto analyses of crossborder relations and co-operation demonstrate that these relations show the highest intensity in the region of Skalica (with the exception of out-commuting in the region of Čadca). At the same time, these relations have here the most comprehensive character out of all border regions along the frontier with the Czech Republic and this tract of the frontier seems to be extraordinarily disposed towards complete integration. Therefore it is logical that one of the first Euroregions in the territory of the Slovak Republic is formed in this area. In order to fulfil the objectives of development in this new Euroregion we consider essential to utilise the results of hitherto research programmes and projects as well as to formulate correspondingly the prepared projects.

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RELIGIOUS INITIATIVES ON THE POLISH-CZECH BORDERLAND

In the 1990s, together with the social, political and structural changes, a number of restrictions in Polish-Czech relations were abolished. This opened new possibilities of co-operation, especially on the local level. But many years after the Second World War, despite the official declarations of friendship among countries of the socialistic block and the visits of high-ranking officials as well as the centrally controlled co-operation in the area of science, culture and economy, the co-operation on the local level was very limited. The borders were closed to the free flow of citizens; therefore dividing rather than united both countries.

This presentation will focus on different forms of co-operation between the Churches on the two sectors of the Polish-Czech borderlands which are Cieszyn Silesia and Lower Silesia. Due to historical conditions those two territories are different, although Polish, Czech and German influence formed the culture of the whole of Silesia. The political changes which took place in Europe after the Second World War, like the shifting of borders and the migration of people, had effected the ethnic structure of those two sectors of the Polish-Czech borderlands. Most of the local people immigrated to Germany. The new immigrants came from other parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia. This fact created an additional difficulty in integration of those people who did not have any experience in coexistence with each other except the stereotyped prejudices. The migrations caused an almost complete disappearance of the Czech settlements in the Kłodzko Region (Tobjański, 1994: 182–184; 189; 193). Nowadays on both sides of the border reside an ethnically homogeneous population, in the Czech Republic only Czechs and in Poland only Poles. Cieszyn Silesia has not experienced this phenomenon of migration (except the immigration of the Slovaks and Czechs to the Ostrava-Karvina coal – basin). Instead one can observe here an assimilation process of the Polish population living in the Czech Republic. On the Polish side of the border live an ethnically homogeneous Polish group, however on the Czech side live Czechs and Poles together (Zaolzie).

Possibilities for religious activities of Churches in the time of socialism in spite of similar ideology of the countries were different in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Poland

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1 Zaolzie is a term use in common language as well as in Polish scientific language since form 1920s, to describe part of Cieszyn Silesia on the Czech side of the border.
the Church was guarding moral values and the national identity, while in Czechoslovakia
religious activities were eliminated from public life. Consequently there was a significant
percentage of unbelievers (20% Catholics, 5% other religions, 30% people accepting
existence of sacrum, 45% atheists) (Fitych, 1995: 65).

Along with the changes which occurred in this part of Europe after 1989 the Christian
roots of culture of the Polish and Czech nations inspired a number of groups on both
sides of the border to initiate a co-operation and a sharing of faith experiences (Fitych,
1995: 381). When presenting religious initiatives on the Polish-Czech border it is
necessary to outline the religious structure of the population of that territory. In Lower
Silesia Catholics are the predominant group, with only a few parishes of other
denominations. Consequently the cross-border co-operation takes place mainly among
members of the Catholic Church, although there are some ecumenical activities. In
Cieszyn Silesia on both sides of the border there are two main Churches: the Roman
Catholic and the Evangelic Church of the Augsburg Confession. There is a co-operation
between Polish and Czech groups within particular churches and between different
denominations as well.

The most important religious event in Lower Silesia is the Polish-Czech Days of the
Christian Culture which took place for the first time in September 1990 and was initiated
by the Club of Catholic Intelligentia (KIK) at Nowa Ruda. The process of preparation
involved the authorities of the town and the district of Nowa Ruda, the Club of Catholic
Intelligentia at Lądek Zdrój, the Citizens Committee of the Kłodzko Region together
with the Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity. On the Czech side of the border the civil and
ecclesiastic authorities from Broumov participated in the event (Polsko-czeskie..., 
1997: 5; Serwatka, 1998: 105). Originally the organizers intended to embrace the
territory of the Kłodzko Region, using the idea from the Week of Christian Culture,
which were organized after 1980. At this time the activities involved the territory of the
Czech Republic as well.

The inspiration for the Days of Christian Culture comes from the Christian religion
itself (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 21; Serwatka, 1998: 106). The purpose is to bring closer
together the cultures of both nations, to learn more about the people, to develop relations
between the communities on both sides of the border, to restore historical connections,
and to create solid bases for dialogue. Because of the complicated religious situation
in the Czech Republic during the communist era, the Days of Christian Culture may help to
restore the religious traditions in that country (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 81). It is
important to see the message coming from the choices of the themes like: ‘That we all be
one’, ‘One Lord, one faith one baptism’, ‘Take the spirit and raise your heads’, ‘Let
brotherly love persevere in us’, and from 1994 ‘Let’s be one family’, emphasising the
common Christian roots and a strain to unity.

From the beginning the Days of Christian Culture were organized by a committee of
civil and ecclesiastic representatives from Czech and Polish towns (Polsko-czeskie..., 
1997: 22; Fitych, 1995: 383). Gradually more institutions like: the Czech Centre in
Warsaw, a different local cultural centres, the Museum of the Kłodzko Region at
Kłodzko, the Museum of Filumenism at Bystrzyca Kłodzka, the District Museum at
Wałbrzych, the Province Library at Wałbrzych, libraries at Nowa Ruda, Ząbkowice
Śląskie and Bystrzyca Kłodzka, the Polish Tourist Association (PTTK), the Sport and
Culture Center at Bystrzyca Kłodzka, the Forest Service at Łądek Zdrój joined the committee. Also the local establishments and schools like: High Schools at Nowa Ruda and Ząbkowice Śląskie, and the Group of Vocational Schools at Ząbkowice Śląskie took part in the preparation (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 135–136; 212). The Days of the Christian Culture are officially supported by the Polish Embassy in Prague and the Czech ambassador in Warsaw (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 150), and they are under the patronage of the Polish Ministry of Culture and Art (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 212).

In the following years the Days of Christian Culture had involved more and more towns in the Kłodzko Region as well as on the other side of the border like: Broumov, Nachod, Javorník, Police on the Metují River, Hronov, Bílá Voda, Mezímesť (on the Czech side), Nowa Ruda, Boguszów-Gorce, Bystrzyca Kłodzka, Głuszyca, Jaworzyna Śląska, Kudowa Zdrój, Kłodzko, Łądek Zdrój, Mieroszów, Polanica Zdrój, Radków, Stronie Śląskie, Walbrzych, Żywiec, Ząbkowice Śląskie, Złoty Stok, Wambierzyce and some of the villages of the Kłodzko Region (on the Polish side).

The Days of Christian Culture takes place every year in September and October. In the beginning the program of the Days of Christian Culture was dominated by not only religious but also historical and social presentations which were followed by concerts and exhibitions. In the following years more forms of activities like: theatrical performances, conferences and ecological meetings, children and youths festivals, economic seminars, film reviews, meetings for children and youth, and meetings for various groups of professionals were added (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 21; Serwatka, 1998: 105). Religious and devotional activities like: holy mass, devotions, Polish-Czech pilgrimages to the Church of Our Lady at Wambierzyce and to the Church of Our Lady of Sorrows on the All Saints’ Hill near Nowa Ruda-Słupiec, are important and ever-present points of the program every year. It is a tradition that the inauguration mass and the mass at the end of the Days of Christian Culture are solemn and they are celebrated by Polish and Czech priests and the Church authorities from the dioceses of both sides of the border (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 106, 117).

The results of the Days of Christian Culture are an opening of co-operation in different areas of life, especially religious, cultural, and economical. Agreements of co-operation between Polish and Czech towns and opening of new border crossings between the towns of Tłumaczów and Otovice, Lutynia and Travná, Golińsk and Mezímesť are another consequence of the Days of Christian Culture (Polsko-czeskie..., 1997: 21–22; 102; Fitych, 1995: 383; Serwatka, 1998: 106). All that actions were reflected in the decision to create Euroregion Glacensis in 1996, it was in part a consequence of all that activities.

In the Cieszyń Silesia section of the Polish-Czech borderland there is not one main religious event, like that in Lower Silesia. Instead there are a number of smaller activities. In most cases they focus on the co-operation of Poles who live on both sides of the Polish-Czech border. Here the Days of Christian Culture are organized every year by the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) at Cieszyń. Catholics and members of the Evangelic Church of the Augsburg Confession attend those activities. One of these activities, which took place in 1994 under the theme ‘That all may be one’ (J 17, 22) was organized in co-operation with the Evangelic parish at Cieszyń and the Christian Family
Association from Český Tešín. Lectures, concerts, and exhibitions were organized in different places such as in the Catholic and Evangelic Churches, at the National House, and the High School at Cieszyn, as well as in the hall of the Polish Cultural and Teaching Society at Český Tešín. In the 1995 the Inheritance of Blessed Jan Sarkander co-operated in the organization of the activities which were dedicated to Jan Sarkander. On the Polish side of the border the meetings took place at Cieszyn, Skoczów, and Strumień, and on the Czech side of the border at Český Tešín, Karvina, Jablunkow and Trzyniec ((cz), 1995: 4).

One form of these activities is the pilgrimage from Český Tešín to the sanctuary on Jasna Góra in Częstochowa that has been organized every year since 1991. Originally it was a Polish pilgrimage and was thus organized by Poles living in that territory and the majority of pilgrims were from the parishes where Polish priests are working. At the beginning only Poles form Czech Republic participated in the pilgrimage, but with time Czechs joined the pilgrimage. In 1994 also Poles from the Polish side of the border from Cieszyn and Pogwizdow joined the pilgrimage. Among the pilgrims are also members of the Evangelic Church. So, the pilgrimage has an international, Polish-Czech character and it serve to build unity between the people and nations (Domański, 1995: 23). However, in practice it is not easy at all. There are two languages used here: Polish and Czech. Definatively most pilgrims know both of them, nevertheless some people complain that this is in disagreement with the basic idea of that pilgrimage, claiming it is suppose to be a Polish one and go to Poland. Also Czechs are not always happy because of the domination of the Polish language. The language problems are less important because over all the religious values are of major significance here.

A few years ago, two Catholic parishes at Cieszyn (one on the Czech and one on the Polish side of the Olza River) have organized, on the Sunday nearest September 7, which is a feast of St. Melchior Grodziecki, a pilgrimage with the relics of the Saint. That pilgrimage proceeds one year from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus at Český Tešín to the Church of Mary Magdalene at Cieszyn, and another year it goes back to Český Tešín. In 1999, bishops from the Ostrava-Opava diocese of and the Bielsko-Biała-Żywiec diocese of together with priests from those dioceses and the Jesuits from the parish at Český Tešín participated in that celebration.

The Silesia Evangelic Church of the Augsburg Confession in the Czech Republic closely cooperates with the Evangelic Church of the Augsburg Confession in Poland, especially in the Cieszyn diocese. In a similar manner the Evangelic Society in the Czech Republic, which is part of the Evangelical Church, cooperates with the Evangelic Society in Poland. For instance, vacations camps for evangelical youth on the Czech side were organized at Toszanowice with about 500 participants (from Poland and Slovakia as well), and on the Polish side of the border at Dziegiełów with participants coming from

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2 The Catholic organization started in 1990 by Polish families, which live in the Czech section of Cieszyn Silesia. The organization was founded to bring together families from different denominations, but in practice only Catholics are participate in it.

3 At the present time he is a saint. St. Jan Sarkander (1576–1620) was born in Skoczów in Cieszyn Silesia. Pope John Paul II canonized him on May 21, 1995.

4 St. Melchior Grodziecki (1582 (1584)–1619), was born in Cieszyn and was canonized by Pope John Paul II in 1995.
different Evangelic groups in Poland and the Czech Republic. The camps have an evangelitical character. There are devotions, seminars, and lectures about religion and topics, which interests youth. Sport activities and concerts of Christian music are part of the camps as well.

Attempting to unite the evangelical community in the Czech part of Cieszyn Silesia, on June 14, 1998 an Evangelic Day was organized for the first time. Originally it was planned to take place in the amphitheatre at Lomna Dolna, but due to bad weather it was transferred to the church at Bystrzyca on the Olza River. Traditionally, like in other evangelical activities, alongside the local residents of Czechs and Poles alike, there were participants from Poland and Slovakia (-free-, 1998: 111; Bishop Vladislav Volny, interview from July 1998).

The Evangelic Church of the Augsburg Confession maintains a close contact with the protestants in the whole of Europe, especially in Germany. On September 24–26, 1999 there was a meeting of the four nationalities: Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Germans organized by this Church under the theme “Imitation of Jesus Christ – a way of hope”. That meeting was organized for adults, as well as for children and youth. In the past similar meetings took place in Poland and Germany. The goal of those meetings is to learn more about each other, initiate new contacts, extend the co-operation in the area of integration and establish guiding principles of co-operation in the future. Devotions, concerts, games and competitions for children and youth, and seminars on historical roots of the evangelical movements in Cieszyn Silesia were part of the meeting as well (Setkání..., 1999, v. 8: 123; v. 9: 138–139; Ctyri..., 1999: 4).

Churches, because of their universality, are examples of the multicultural integration which emphasize a common content – ‘catholic’ – to all (catholic in Greek language means universal) (Altermatt, 1998: 166). The above presented examples of religious initiatives on the Polish-Czech borderland indicates the possibility of undertaking joint actions, especially when the language is not a problem nor a barrier.

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SECTION IV
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
OF BORDERLANDS

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REGION

REGIONALISM
No 5

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL GROUNDS
OF FORMATION OF BORDERS OF FORMER
AND PRESENT-DAY POLAND

Long and complex process of formation of state borders is subject to many
fluctuations throughout the history of a state. The course and shape of borders and the
character of borderlands are resultants of multiple internal and external factors.

The primary, objective factor is the natural environment of the area where the
national ecumene came into being to be transformed subsequently into a state organism.
The geographic environment provides – in the form of regions and natural barriers
separating them – an objective frame for a particular statehood with the interregional
barriers as potential border zones.

The question whether or not a state will reach and fix (or even exceed) these potential
natural borders depends on several internal and external factors.

The internal factors are:
– demographic potential of the state-forming nation,
– nation’s character (sedentary or mobile; peaceful or belligerent),
– dominating form of economy (farming, raising livestock, commerce, mining),
– economic potential of the state,
– degree of self-organization,
– military power of the state.

The external factors include the corresponding characteristics of neighbouring states:
– demographic potential of the neighbouring nations,
– their national character, in particular the tendency for migration and expansion,
– dominating form of economy in neighbouring countries and, consequently, their
needs for external contacts,
– economic potential of neighbouring states their ability to influence other countries
(quest for new supplies and markets, diffusion of innovation),
– direction of foreign policy and military power of the neighbouring states.
As it was noticed a long time ago by historians, the oldest settlement was closely connected with hydrographic system. Supporting this thesis, A. Piskozub (1987) formulated a theory according to which the original tribal territories were situated within basins of medium-sized rivers or, in case of larger rivers, in particular parts of their basins (upper, middle or lower) or in the basins of their main tributaries. It was grounded on the finding that the process of settlement of every tribe started in the vast, fertile valleys of main rivers, then spreaded over the valleys of their tributaries, to reach finally the watershed zones. The tribal territories were thus formed with the main river as its axis. The capital of such tribal state – the heart of its political and economic power – was usually situated on the main river. In time, the state exceeded this core area to embrace the entire territory of the river basin up to the extensive watershed zone, usually scarcely inhabited and uneasily accessible.

During further stages of historical development the related tribes living in different parts of the river basin integrated into one single nation. In that manner the national ecumene and the state it formed fitted into the entire river basin, or even a couple of adjacent basins.

In the case of Poland the Piskozub’s theory (which, in our opinion, is universally adaptable) proves perfectly correct. As a matter of fact, the territories of six historical tribes, which eventually formed Polish national ecumene, with astonishing regularity fitted into particular parts of drainage of two main rivers of Poland – the Vistula and the Oder. Both basins were shared by three different tribes: the upper basin of the Oder was the territory of Silesian tribes which formed later the province of Silesia; the middle basin of the Oder and the Warta – its main right-bank tributary – was occupied by the tribe of Polanie which gave rise to the province of Wielkopolska (Great Poland); last, the lower basin of the Oder occupied by Pomeranian tribes became the province of Pomerania. Analogously, the Vistula basin was divided into three parts: the upper basin occupied by the tribe of Wiślanie was the heartland of the province of Małopolska (Little Poland); the middle basin – the territory of the tribe of Mazovians – became the province of Mazovia; in the lower basin, inhabited by Kashubians, the region of East Pomerania (Gdańsk Pomerania) developed (Fig. 1).

All the six historical provinces of Poland that developed from the original tribal territories fulfil entirely the criteria defined in the Piskozub’s theory. In each province the main river is the axis on which the regional capitals are situated in central position: these are Wrocław, Poznań, Szczecin, Cracow, Warsaw and Gdańsk correspondingly. Each province is framed by watersheds which are nearly exactly in line with the borders separating particular national ecumenes.

The tribe of Polanie (who lent their name to Poland and to Wielkopolska – which means Great Poland or, in Latin, Polonia Maior) assumed the state-forming function consisting in integration of the sib tribes into one single people. According to historians this role of Polanie was connected with their central position amid other tribes of one kin. Thus the Polanie were sheltered from foreign invaders which favoured steady development of their economic and military potential. Growing strong, the state of Polanie from the mid-10th century managed to submit neighbouring tribes and create centralized Polish state under the Piast dynasty (Poland was first mentioned as a state in 963 – the date traditionally marking the birth of the Polish nation).
Polish national ecumene was formed within the drainages of the Vistula and the Oder. Hence, the natural potential frame of the Polish statehood was determined by watersheds separating them from the adjacent river basins of the Elbe, Danube, Dniester, Dnieper, Neman, and Pregola. The catchment areas of these rivers were territories of other national ecumenes, namely those of German, Czech, Slovak, Russ, Lithuanian and Baltic Prussian nations.

Under the first Piasts (from the mid-10th to the mid-12th century) the state of Poland quite well fitted its potential, geographically natural frames (Fig. 2). The most exact conformity of political and natural borders occurred in the south where the uneasily accessible mountain ranges of the Sudeten and the Carpathian Mountains make up the watershed. However, this area saw some border shifts too. For instance, at the beginning of the 11th century, Boleslaus the Brave, King of Poland, temporarily got control of Slovakia and Moravia. It was the first time that Poland acquired a kresy (1003), that is to say an area lying beyond the natural geographical borders of the Polish ecumene. It was the territory belonging to the drainages of the Vah and the Morava – two important tributaries of the Danube – occupied by different, although Slavic, peoples. At a later time, it was Bohemia that deprived Poland – for good – of the area of the headstream Oder. Now it is Czech Silesia, an area where the Silesian dialect of Polish is still in use and Polish national identity partly survived.
Fig. 2. Polish state in times of early Piasts (10th–12th century) and its inner divisions into provinces

It should be noted, incidentally, that the southern borderland of Poland is marked with particular cultural features which emerged in somewhat later period. They stem from the fact that Polish people, mostly rural dwellers coming from lowlands, were not acquainted with husbandry in the mountains. Czechs and Slovaks, too, kept to large valleys and avoided the mountains. Thus, very extensive areas in the Sudetes and the Carpathians remained deserted as a typical vast border zone.

This ecological niche was interesting for newcomers from remote regions. First, the Sudetes, rich in diverse minerals, became the in 13th century an attractive target for Walloon miners followed during the next centuries by settlers from different German countries, both miners and farmers. As a result, a large zone of German settlement emerged in the Polish-Bohemian borderland. The Carpathian Mountains remained uninhabited till much later. It was only in the 14th and 15th centuries that Balkan shepherds (chiefly Wallachians) moving from the south along mountain pastures arrived to this area. They were subsequently joined by Ruthenian farmers dwelling in lower parts of the mountains. Some of the Wallachians were Polonized – these were ancestors of Polish highlanders who preserved their specific folklore. Others, living in the East Carpathians, were assimilated by the Orthodox Ruthenians. In this way the Polish-Slovak borderland became a vast zone of Ruthenian settlement.

On the western border of Polish ecumene, where the Oder and the right-bank tributaries of the Elbe – the Havel and the Spree – flows very closely to each other and
the watershed is very low and hardly visible, the conformity of political and natural borders is much less evident, yet still perceptible. In fact, the political boundaries in the Early Middle Ages changed very often. Sometimes these changes were in favour of Poland which exceeded the watershed and conquered Lusatia and Milsko – extensive territories in the upper Spree basin. Then again it was Poland that lost some areas – mostly left-bank parts of Pomerania.

The most significant unconformity of potential Polish borders fixed by natural environment and the real political borders in the early Middle Ages occurred in the east. The reason was that Mazovia – scarcely inhabited and constantly menaced by Prussian, Lithuanian and Ruthenian invaders – could not populate and permanently incorporate the areas in the upper basins of the Bug and the Narew – two main right-bank tributaries of the Vistula. It refers in particular to the basin of the Bug – 813 km long river – the upper basin of which was much closer to Ruthenian principalities established on the Dniester and the Priet than to central Mazovia. Consequently, the upper basins of the Bug and the Narew were durably peopled by the Ruthenians – the ancestors of the present-day Ukrainians and Belorussians. Process of ‘recuperation’ of this land – innate, in a way, to the Polish national ecumene – lasted for a few next centuries. This process was, however, of purely political, not cultural, character.

The above processes accounted for the politico-territorial structure of the Polish state represented on figure 3. The province of Wielkopolska constitutes the core area of the state. Its sub-core is composed of five external provinces: West Pomerania, East Pomerania, Mazovia, Malopolska, and Silesia. These six regions form the effective state area. In addition to this, during the rule of the first Piasts some parts or even entire ecumenes of bordering nations (Lusatia, Milsko, Moravia, Slovakia) were temporarily in Poland’s possession.

The year 1138 was the beginning of two-century long division of Poland. Getting reunited from the 14th century, Kingdom of Poland did not manage to incorporate two western provinces: Pomerania and Silesia. West Pomerania got under increasing control of Germany and underwent a far-reaching Germanization, whereas Silesia, divided into several independent duchies, came under control of the Kingdom of Bohemia, in 1526 was incorporated to the Hapsburg Empire and in 1740 taken over by Prussia. In spite of six centuries of separation, Polish language and culture survived in Silesia, particularly in its eastern part, until the present days (coloured map 1).

Beside West Pomerania and Silesia, Poland lost in that time, for the period of 158 years (1308–1466), East Pomerania, too. It was conquered by the Teutonic Order. The order founded in Jerusalem in the 12th century, after being expelled from the Holy Land, moved for a certain time to Hungary to settle eventually in Poland at the invitation of Conrad, Prince of Mazovia. They were to defend Mazovia from raids of pagan Prussian tribes. The Teutonic Knights did not confine themselves to this task: they made military conquest of the Prussians’ territories, founded there their own state and then aggressed their benefactors dispossessing Poland of East Pomerania. It was only after the defeat in the Tannenberg battle (1410) and the wars in 1454–1466 and 1519–1521 that this aggressive vanguard of Teutonism on Poland’s northern borders weakened and the secularized Teutonic State became a fief subject to Poland. Henceforth, till the end of the 18th century, the northern borderland was most stabilized.
Fig. 3. Scheme of territorial structure of Polish state in times of early Piasts (10th–12th century)

The shape and territorial structure of the Kingdom of Poland, finally reconstructed in the reign of Kazimierz the Great (1333–1370), greatly differed from its initial form determined by nature. After Silesia and the two Pomeranian provinces got detached, the hitherto central province of Wielkopolska along with Małopolska and Mazovia (which was attached to Poland merely by feudal bounds) became border regions. On the other hand, Poland acquired, for more than four centuries (1340–1772), Red Russia (the Duchy of Galicia and Lodomeria) belonging already to another national ecumene: namely the Ruthenian one, formed in the Dniester basin, which were Polonized only later. The schema of the deformed territorial structure of Polish state in the 14th century is shown in the figure 4.

The fundamental turning point in the process of shaping Poland’s territory and borders occurred at the turn of the 14th century: by virtue of the Kreva agreement in 1385 and the Horodlo union in 1413, the Kingdom of Poland was united with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one state.

Lithuanian ecumene was formed in the Neman basin. Initially, however, it did not cover the entire drainage – only the middle part occupied by tribal states Aukštaitija (upper country) and Samogitia (lower country). Since both states were united in the early
Map 1. Extent of Polish language in Silesia in the late 18th and 19th centuries after J. Partsch (Schlesien...). The continuous line marks the extent of Polish language at the end of the 18th century. The numbers at the place names stand for the years till which Polish was in use at the services in parish churches.
Map 2. Extent of Polish language on the former territory of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1920 after E. Maliszewski and T. Szturm de Sztrem
13th century Lithuania set off on a systematic conquest of bordering Ruthenian lands and extended enormously its territory – therefore it rightfully assumed the name the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This expansion was possible thanks to the Russian principalities being weakened by Tatar invasions in the mid-13th century and owing to the internal disintegration of the Golden Horde that ruled most of these lands in the 14th century.

At first Lithuanians—presumably driven by an unconscious ‘hydrographic imperative’—occupied Black Ruthenia situated on the upper Neman. Thus the Lithuanian state completed the process of fitting into the natural frame of the Neman basin. Nevertheless, strictly speaking it could not be considered Lithuanian ecumene because Black Ruthenia was inhabited by Slavic population differing from Lithuanians who descend from ancient Balts. These Slavic inhabitants had earlier come from the Dnieper basin which actually became the next target for Lithuanian expansion. They conquered first White Ruthenia in the upper Dnieper basin, then Polesie and Wolhynia in the basin of the Pryptet—right-bank tributary of the Dnieper—and finally the vast area of the former Duchy of Kiev (present-day Ukraine). Formally Lithuania controlled also the land on the lower Dnieper and Boh up to the Black Sea. In fact, it was an extensive no man’s land, properly named Wild Fields (in the sense of Wild Steppes), penetrated from one side by Lithuanian-Ruthenian army, while on the other side by Tatar units from the Crimean Khanate. It was a typical zonal frontier, maybe the last one in Europe’s history.

Kingdom of Poland united with Lithuania defeated the Teutonic Order, thus regaining the historical province of Gdańsk Pomerania including its capital Gdańsk. Moreover, it annexed Warmia (the Warmia bishopric) in central Prussia and, finally, made of the
secularized Prussian Duchy its fief in 1521. Thus Polish state substantially changed its geographical frames. Out of three provinces in the upper Oder basin it included only Wielkopolska – the ancient cradle of Polish statehood. Central part of the state was formed then of three provinces in the Vistula basin, namely Małopolska, Mazovia and East Pomerania. The key role of the Vistula was stressed by the localization of state capitals on this river: first Cracow, then from 1596 Warsaw, situated more centrally in the united Polish-Lithuanian state. The loss of two western provinces was compensated by acquisition of two provinces beyond the geographically natural frames – Red Ruthenia in the upper Dniester basin and Warmia in the Pregola basin (Fig. 5).

The united state: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was often referred to as “Two Nations’ Commonwealth”. The name was proper only in political terms as it was made up of two political nations: Polish and Lithuanian. However, ethnically it was a multinational country.

Conquered by Lithuania (partly by Poland), the eastern and southeastern periphery was peopled by the Ruthenians (ancestors of the present-day Belorussians and Ukrainians). Amid this native population there were many enclaves of allochthonous people. They arose chiefly around town because the new colonization was of urban character. The situation was, in a way, contrary to that in Polish western lands where German expansion involved mainly towns whereas the countryside remained mostly Polish and stuck to Polish culture, tradition and Roman Catholic religion (see coloured map 2). In eastern kresy it was Polish element, along with Jews, Germans, Armenians and Greeks, that formed urban enclaves amid Ruthenian autochthons. In addition to that there were some dispersed groups of refugees from bordering countries (Wallachians and Moldavians), settled captives (Tatars), mercenaries who stayed after their military service was finished (Scots, Circassians), and others.

A similar process occurred in southern part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the result of Polish settlement and Polonization of Lithuanian elite. Here, however, beside numerous urban enclaves, many dense clusters of Polish-speaking population, both in towns and in the countryside, accompanied by Jews, to a lesser degree Germans, exotic Karaites (Karaimes), and Tatars who enrolled for service in Polish army.

Prussia, that is the lands of the former Teutonic Order, was inhabited, aside from dominant Germans, till the beginning of the 17th century by Baltic Prussians – people akin to Lithuanians – who avoided Germanization.

In addition to the above groups such nations as Latvians, Estonians, Livonians, and Germans (stemming from the Livonian Order – a branch of the Teutonic Order) lived in so-called Inflantry (Livonia and southern Estland) or in the territory of present-day Latvia and Estonia conquered by Poland in the 17th century (Fig. 6).

This complex ethnic structure was reflected to a great extent in politico-territorial structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In accordance to its name, the core of the state was composed of both united political nations, namely Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The conquered lands (Ukraine in the Dnieper basin, Livonia and southern Estland in the Dvina basin) were their common property. Because of their peripheral location, cultural distinctness, political dependence, unstable boundaries and frontier ethos, these areas were typical kresy (Fig. 7).
In spite of being forced to concede some prior gains in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth retained the above politico-territorial structure till its partitioning in the late-18th century.

Partitioned three times among Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1772, 1793 and 1795, Poland temporarily ceased to exist as an independent state. The borders of three invaders on the Polish territory had nothing to do with the geographically determined boundaries of Poland’s historical provinces. To the contrary, they were mostly demarcated along the main rivers (Pilica, Vistula, Bug, Neman, and others). These were classic examples of the “diplomats’ boundaries” – the most nongeographical of any ‘natural’ borders. In natural conditions the rivers form axes for development of individual geographico-historical regions, whereas their borders emerge in watershed zones.

During the Napoleonic period a rump Polish state named the Duchy of Warsaw was established. It incorporated entirely only two historical provinces: Wielkopolska and Mazovia, and a large part of northern Małopolska. Besides, a part of western historical Lithuania, oddly delineated, was added to this area. Again, most borders of thus fixed country ran along the Vistula, Bug, Narew and Neman rivers.
Fig. 7. Scheme of the territorial structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (15th–18th century)

As an ally of France during the Napoleonic wars, the Duchy of Warsaw lost then utterly its sovereignty. The so-called Congress Kingdom of Poland within the Russian Empire and the Grand Duchy of Poznań within Prussia, two quasi-autonomous states formed of the former Duchy of Warsaw in virtue of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, kept up mere appearances of independence. Like previously, a river, namely the Prosna, marked the border separating these units (Fig. 8).

Owing to weakness of Germany and Austria defeated in the First World War and Russia devastated by the civil war and Bolshevik revolution, Poland could remerge as an independent state in 1918. Its western boundary was drawn after the victorious Wielkopolska insurgence (late 1918–early 1919), the Treaty of Versailles (April 28, 1919) providing for acquisition of East Pomerania by Poland (without Gdańsk which became a Free City administered by the League of Nations), three Silesian insurrections (1919, 1920, 1921) and plebiscites in Silesia, Warmia and Mazuria. Despite so complex process of demarcation of Poland’s western and northern borders, their course resembled to that from the pre-partition period (from the 15th to 18th century): the differences in favour of Germany occurred in East Pomerania and Wielkopolska, while Poland got an important gain in eastern Silesia. The border in Pomerania and Wielkopolska roughly corresponded to ethnic divisions, yet the loss of Gdańsk was painful for Poland. In Silesia the situation was very different. Appointed by the Allies the Commission for Poland’s Issues proposed to cede to Poland the whole part of Silesia inhabited by ethnically Polish population, that is Opole Silesia. Eventually, in spite of three revolts of indigenous people fighting for incorporation of the region to Poland, only a small section of Upper Silesia became Polish. In this way another ‘diplomats’ border emerged separating two areas of the same cultural features: with Polish-speaking peasants and
miners and German-speaking townsfolk and industrial bourgeoisie. Polish part of Silesia, as a bicultural region, was granted status of autonomous province with its own parliament. Similar privilege was theoretically accorded to the area on the other side of the border; in practice, however, it was hardly respected.

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**Fig. 8. The Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815) and the Kingdom of Poland (1815–1918)**

Formation of Poland’s eastern borders took a different course. Supporting the then popular conception of nation states, the Allies insisted on demarcation Poland’s eastern border according to linguistic divisions, that is along the so-called Curzon line being a prolongation of the lower Bug to the north and south. However, marshal Józef Piłsudski, the leader of Poland, tended to rebuild Poland in its pre-war shape, although based on different principle: as a federation (or confederation) of four nations – Poland, Lithuania (which was not interested in it), Ukraine and Belorussia. This idea, involved itself in controversies and intrinsic conflicts (concerning the course of Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukrainian borders), led to a conflict with the Soviet Union in 1919–1920. Neither Poland nor the Soviets achieved their goals in this war, in which both sides took alternatively the upper hand. The state border demarcated as a result of the peace agreement signed in 1921 in Riga had neither historical nor geographical grounds. It ran across the territories of Belorussia and Ukraine in a seemingly haphazard manner thus jeopardising their plans of independence. The western parts of these countries were incorporated into Poland and, unlike Silesia, deprived of any autonomy which, unfortunately, led to subsequent ethnic conflicts. It referred also Polish-Lithuanian relationship, as a large part of historical Lithuania, including Vilnius, fell to Polish army in 1920. A quasi-state named Central Lithuania, inhabited mostly by Polish and Polonized population, was established. In 1922 its parliament voted on incorporation of this area to Poland.

The politico-territorial structure of interwar Poland (called the Second Republic) formed as a consequence of the above processes is shown in figure 9. Out of six historical Polish provinces, only four were included in this state: Wielkopolska, East
Pomerania (without Gdańsk – its capital), Małopolska and Mazovia along with Podlasie (region in the upper Narew basin, ceded by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Poland in 1569). In addition to this, Poland held a small section of eastern Silesia. As concerns territories beyond the original Polish ecumene, Poland seized a large part of historical Lithuania, western Belorussia and western Ukraine. Consequently, contrary to previous intentions, Poland had again its kresy, although by two thirds smaller than the kresy of the First Republic. This state was formed, however, by one single political nation, although ethnic minorities – Ukrainians, Belorussians, Germans, Lithuanians, Jews, and others – accounted for 31.1% of population (according to 1931 census).

![Map of Poland](image)

**Fig. 9. Area and territorial structure of Poland in the years 1922–1939**

In the aftermath of the Second World War Poland's boundaries radically changed. It ceded eastern peripheries and extended its territory to the west. The contemporary shape of Poland formed after the Second World War resembles very much the original Polish territory under the first Piast rulers from the 10th to the 13th century. The only significant difference occur in the north-east where Poland acquired a half of Prussia – region in the Pregola basin, originally peopled by Baltic Prussian tribes, conquered in the 13th century by the Teutonic Order, partly annexed in the 16th century by Kingdom of Poland (Warmia) and partly remaining Polish vassalage. Today this province is called Warmia and Mazuria.

It can be concluded that Poland has returned to the territorial extent of Polish ecumene defined by geographically natural frames. As much as 96.6% of Poland’s territory lies within the catchment areas of the Vistula, the Oder and Pomeranian rivers flowing directly to the Baltic Sea. Nevertheless, the borders of present-day Poland can not be considered truly natural because they are not in line – except in the south – with watersheds (25.4 thousand km² of the Vistula basin and 12.7 thousand km² of the Oder
basin remain outside Poland’s boundaries). It should be noticed, however, that the first piasts could not reach the natural limits of Polish ecumene either.

The boundaries of present-day Poland were settled by diplomats during the Potsdam Conference and by Soviet rulers in Kremlin. Therefore these are classic “diplomats’ borders”. As rivers are the most visible features on maps used by diplomats, Polish borders actually run mostly along rivers.

The western border of the country extends along the Oder and the Neisse – its tributary. At the time when it was delineated it undoubtedly had a strategic significance as the shortest possible line to separate Poland from Germany – its secular enemy (because the Neisse rises in the northernmost range of the Sudeten Mountain, while the Oder feeds the Pomeranian Bay – southernmost part of the Baltic Sea).

The eastern boundary was purposefully created in the way that it correspond to the Curzon line, with some minor shifts in favour of Poland. Its central part runs along the Bug River, whereas both northern and southern parts are more or less geometric line artificially dividing geographic and cultural regions.

The most bizarre is the northern boundary. Its geometric, slightly curved course is said to be designed by Stalin himself. Having decided to split East Prussia half-and-half between Poland and Russia, as the tradition goes, he single-handedly drew a line on a map. In spite of the obvious absurdity of its course, nobody dared to change it later. This is a typical instance, unique in Europe, of an antecedent border or rather of one of its types labelled by U. Ante überlagende Grenze. First it was laid down, without regard to the population living in this area, then German autochthons were forcibly moved, and finally Russians were settled on one side of the border and Poles on the other one. Thus the ethnic distribution was determined by the artificial boundary previously created.

Poland is among those European countries which most frequently experienced border shifts (Fig. 10). These changes did not consist in temporary acquisitions and losses of some areas as it often occurred in other countries. Here, the country advanced beyond its proper, geographically natural frames and encroached deep into adjacent ecumenes while its own historical provinces fell away. In some periods Poland disappeared for a long time from the Europe’s map.

The territorial changeability of Poland is reflected by the confrontation of its extent in different epochs (Tab. 1).

Table 1. Changes in Poland’s territory from the 10th to the 20th century

<table>
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Albert (1989), Samsonowicz (1973).
Adopted after the Second World War under the auspices of the United Nations and reaffirmed by the international law, the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of any country in the world safeguards stability of Poland’s territory. It is extremely advantageous for Poland that now, when this rule is commonly accepted, the country has returned to its natural, original shape similar to the extent of Polish national ecumene.

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CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSIFICATION OF INHABITANTS OF THE POLISH-BELORUSSIAN BORDERLAND – THE CASE OF THE HAJNÓWKA DISTRICT

Borderland is a transit area between two or more states or nations. It usually arises as a result of various historical changes in political status of a given territory, mingling of population, and interfering political influences. The main factors responsible for diversity of borderlands are migration and settlement processes stemming from political and economic changes (Babiński, 1994, 1997; Kantor, 1989; Koter, 1995, 1997; Sadowski, 1991, 1995).

An important type of borderlands are ethnic borderlands that is contact zones of two or more ethnic groups. Nations, however, are internally diversified in respect of self-identity. Moreover, the processes of integration and assimilation eliminate ethnic differences. Therefore a borderland exists first of all in the consciousness of the inhabitants. There are some areas where even a part of a village or town lying beyond a river is labelled for instance Russian, Polish, or German.

A peculiar situation arises in ethnic borderlands within the territory of a third party, for example the borderland between Belorussian and Ukrainian population in Poland. Most often though borderlands have no definite boundaries, even in the public consciousness. This is one of reasons of conflicts in ethnic borderlands (Babiński, 1994; Sadowski, 1991, 1995).

One of vital aspects of borderland is its social dimension. Different ethnic groups inhabiting a borderland have different social status due to the territorial expansion and settlement of the dominating people. The social, cultural and economic gap between indigeneous and allochthonous population was usually very large and could tend to widen. Such was the case in the eastern borderland of Poland as well as in Polish-German borderland. Social differences were aggravated by the character of settlement for the rural dwellers were inferior in all respects to those living in towns (Babiński, 1997). Moreover, most newcomers settle in urban settings whereas the rural population is autochthonous. The coexistence of both groups is hardly ever based on equal rights. Usually the group which is culturally and economically more advanced forces its own culture upon indigenous peoples (Chlebowczyk, 1983).

Of particular importance here is the cultural dimension of borderland. In such area different cultural elements penetrate reciprocally, interfere, evolve and contribute to the
diversity of border population (Chlebowczyk, 1983; Babiński, 1997; Rembowska, 1998). That is how a specific frontier culture comes into being.

Polish-Belorussian borderland is the most diversified region in Poland in respect of nationality, culture and religion. It forms both an interstate borderland between Poland and Belarus and an internal ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic borderland. Prevailing nations are Poles and Belorussians but the presence of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Tatars, Romanies, Armenians, Russians, and Karaites makes of the region a maze of nations.

The investigation carried out in the town of Hajnówka and in rural areas of the Hajnówka District supplied data on the ethnic, linguistic and religious structure of inhabitants of the region concerned.

The survey was made in July 1999 and covered the town of Hajnówka and five communes in the Hajnówka District: Czeremcha, Czyże, Dubicze Cerkiewne, Hajnówka and Kleszczele. Among 592 respondents there were 241 inhabitants of the town of Hajnówka and 351 rural residents. The sample closely represented the total population of the area. The results of the questionnaire were immensely varied depending on the place of residence.

Although both in the town and rural areas declarations of Polish national affiliation prevailed (Tab. 1), nevertheless in the countryside those declaring Polish nationality were only 37% whereas in Hajnówka over 65%. The difference results from larger share of Belorussians among rural population and the settlement of allochthonous Poles mainly in towns. In addition, the process of Polonization is more intense in urban communities than in the country.

**Table 1. Ethnic structure of the area concerned (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
<th>Town of Hajnówka</th>
<th>Hajnówka District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local inhabitants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s researches.*

It is highly significant that a third of rural respondents label themselves ‘local inhabitants’ thus avoiding on open declaration of nationality. In the town such an answer is very rare. It may stem from a repugnance to reveal one’s national affiliation or an underdeveloped ethnic identity among countrymen. It can be also explained in terms of strong sense of belonging to a territory.

Though only a small percent of respondents declared Ukrainian nationality, it indicates that Ukrainian identity develops among Orthodox population of the region based on a distinct language, culture and origin (Sadowski 1995, 1997). This is a relatively new process so those claiming Ukrainian identity represent a small proportion of the respondents (Tab. 2).
Table 2. Linguistic structure of the area concerned (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother tongues</th>
<th>Town of Hajnówka</th>
<th>Hajnówka District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local dialect</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As in table 1.

A comparison of ethnic (Tab. 1) and linguistic (Tab. 2) structure of the respondents leads to some interesting conclusions. In the country the percentage of those declaring Ukrainian as the mother tongue was almost twice as high as those admitting Ukrainian nationality. It gives substance to the hypothesis suggesting that Ukrainian identity is based mainly on the distinct language. In fact, it was found that north-Ukrainian dialects are spoken in eastern and south-eastern part of the Podlasie region (Sadowski, 1995).

It is also typical that a third of rural respondents claim the local dialect their mother tongue. In the region of Podlasie different dialects of Polish, Belorussian, Ukrainian and Russian have coexisted and mingled for centuries. A significant part of the population – particularly in the country – is aware of speaking a language that is neither Polish nor Belorussian. It is a transitional dialect related rather to eastern Slavonic languages (Belorussian, Ukrainian, Russian) than to Polish. Most respondents indicating the dialect as their mother tongue were Belorussian or ‘local inhabitants’ (Tab. 3).

Table 3. Mother tongue of main ethnic groups in the Hajnówka District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
<th>Mother tongues (in %)</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Belorussian</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Local dialect</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As in table 1.

Almost all Polish respondents, obviously enough, declare Polish as their mother tongue. Polish is also a native language for a considerable number of ‘local inhabitants’, Ukrainians and 20% of Belorussians, especially in towns (Tab. 3). From this, it appears that the language assimilation proceeds faster than the absorption of minorities into Polish nation. It stems from a domination of Polish as the only official language used in the media, education and in everyday life.

Of fundamental importance for ethnic and cultural relations in borderlands is the question of religion. Very often it is a main factor of national differentiation and a basic criterion of belonging to an ethnic group. When ethnic divisions correspond closely to the religious ones it is much easier for minorities to preserve their distinct national
identity (for instance Poles and Belorussians). Otherwise, when two groups share the same religion, it is very likely that, sooner or later, both cultures converge and differences between particular peoples fade away. As a rule, border people put a premium on religion as an element helping in preservation of national values (Sadowski, 1995, 1997).

The area concerned is the most diversified region in Poland in respect of religion. There are very little areas in Poland where the Roman Catholicism is not prevalent. However such is the case of the communes in question which are predominantly Orthodox, in particular in rural areas (Tab. 4).

Table 4. Religious structure of the area concerned (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religions</th>
<th>Town of Hajnówka</th>
<th>Hajnówka District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As in table 1.

Commitment to a particular religion determines very often, in popular opinion, one’s nationality. Deep-rooted stereotype invariably associates Polish with the Catholicism and Belorussian with the Orthodox Church. However, if indeed an overwhelming majority of Catholics declare Polish nationality, it could not be stated that all Orthodox are Belorussian. A confrontation of the national and religious declarations (Tab. 5) shows that among Orthodox respondents there are a large number of Poles. It was found that almost a half of Polish respondents are Orthodox. On the other hand among the Roman Catholics there are some ‘local inhabitants’, although they form rather small proportion. The inconformity of ethnic and denominational data in the area concerned shows that the stereotypical division between Catholic Poles and Orthodox Belorussians does not correspond to the facts. It seems significant that those who avoid an open national declaration by naming themselves ‘local inhabitants’ are predominantly Orthodox.

Table 5. Religious affiliation of main ethnic groups in the Hajnówka District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
<th>Religions (in %)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local inhabitants</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As in table 1.

1 The former Białystok Voivodship (which includes the Hajnówka District) is marked by the highest proportion of religious minorities in Poland – 37% (Sadowski, 1997).
The questionnaire showed place of residence to be a strong factor influencing identity. Rural dwellers greatly differ from urban residents as to the social, economic and professional status. It has a direct impact on declarations concerning national and religious identity. The inhabitants of Hajnówka most often declare Polish nationality, Polish language and Catholicism whereas the respondents from the country are predominantly Orthodox, Belorussian or ‘local inhabitants’.

The study has come to the conclusion that ethnic divisions not always conform to the linguistic and religious ones. It follows that the stereotyped classifications of population hardly apply to ethnic borderlands where the reality is by far more complicated.

In addition it has showed that at the turn of the 20th century in Central Europe – a very divers region in respect of nationality, culture, and religion – there still exist borderlands where almost a third of the population – due to either indisposition to self-determination or poor sense of ethnic distinctness – classify themselves as ‘local inhabitants’ and declare local dialect as their mother tongue.

REFERENCES


CULTURAL DIVISIONS OF SYCÓW BORDERLAND

1. INTRODUCTION

The Syców region used to be a borderland for a long time. For ages connected with Silesia, it became a cause of conflict between Poland and Germany in the first half of the 20th century. Finally, after the Second World War situation has changed and the Syców region turned into the relict borderland, located almost in the centre of Poland.

The Syców region was a borderland in, at least, two senses of the word, in two dimensions:
- as a borderland between regions,
- as a borderland between states.

In the first case it constituted a part of borderland between Silesia and the Great Poland. The remaining northern (or north-eastern) periphery of Lower Silesia or Middle Silesia for hundreds of years since mediaeval times it could become a well-established region of cultural borderland. The Syców District belonged to Silesia while its northern and eastern borders marked at the same time the boundaries of Silesia and the Great Poland. It followed the line Bogdaj – Hetmanów – Mały Tabor – Piotrówka. Although environs of Kępno and Ostrzeszów belonged to Silesia till the 13th century but then, incorporated by the Great Poland, grew together with it for the next seven hundred years (Piskožub, 1987; Fig. 1).

Created after the First World War, Polish-German border generally followed regional boundary between Silesia and the Great Poland, although this rule was abandoned in case of the neighbourhood of Syców. It means that from that time the border between regions ceased to be a state border. What is astonishing, that this change was justified by ethnic and national reasons.

The Syców region constituted a borderland of two countries between the wars – from 1918 to 1939. The border formally existed as a demarcated line in 1921–1939, whereas from 1918 to 1921 it was under formation. In the summer 1921 all the talks, delimitation and demarcation processes were finished.

During eighteen years of border existence the Syców region was a borderland between two states. Since the international border divided the district into two parts along the line Bogdaj – Cieszyn – Międzybórz – Syców – Trębaczów – Drożki – Bukowa, it became a part of the borderlands of two countries. Old, western part constituted the
Syców District in Germany, while old, eastern part, belonging to Poland, was divided into three districts: Odolanów, Ostrzeszów and Kępno.

Fig. 1. Syców borderland in the 20th century

Although the border was abolished during the Second World War, some of its functions were kept (e.g. control). Based on these spatial foundations was, for example, settlement policy of the Third Reich (Poles were displaced from the south part of Great Poland while in their place Germans from Baltic states, Russia and Ukraine were settled down).

1.1. Aim and assumptions

Territorial and temporal conditions, defined above, constitute the frames for considerations over cultural divisions in the Syców borderland. The literature pertaining to the Syców neighbourhood and border creating after the First World War has been enriched with the valuable results of research, conducted by the author from 1996 to 1998 in this area. It showed the diversity of cultural elements from the point of view of
local inhabitants. The research was carried out with biographical method and with recorded interview technique.

What cultural divisions existed in the Syców borderland? For how long after the Second World War did they survive? Do they exist at the end of the 1990s? An attempt to answer these questions can be an introduction to the discussion on the following subjects:

- the need for research on relict boundaries and relict borderlands as the important element of change in cultural structure of both region and country, meant as not only historic change but also a modern one
- influence of state policy attempting to liquidate all the traces of a border on the situation in a borderland (especially cultural divisions).

2. LIQUIDATION OF THE POLISH-GERMAN BOUNDARY AND CULTURAL BORDERLAND

At the beginning of 1945 the old Polish-German border was finally abolished which resulted in some changes in the borderland and its structure.

Many Germans had to leave or escaped from that area already before the east front approached and most of them have never come back. Progress in capturing the land made by allies resulted in settlement process of civilians and the military, coming from different regions of Poland but mostly from its southern parts. Germans were displaced systematically. Some of local inhabitants left after the war voluntarily but some were allowed to remain as autochthons after a verification. It seems highly significant that these processes concerned people living on both sides of the former border. It means that Germans not only from Western and Northern Territories were displaced. Also weight of the war and strength of the Red Army were felt in the same way by the whole native community, classified by the Red Army soldiers as Germans.

Some stabilization took place in the borderland after these violent and short-lasting changes. Polish-German border was located far west of the Syców region, which remained only the borderland for two voivodships: the Silesian and the Poznań Voivodships (later also the Opole Voivodship).

Was not that only a formal borderland? Majority of the inhabitants were not connected with this region by their roots. Changes in the administrative division in 1975 could be interpreted as confirmation of that thesis, however, on the other hand it should be rather related to the intensification of the liquidation processes of the Syców borderland. Creation of the new Voivodship of Kalisz, which included the Syców borderland (cutting it off from Silesia and old local centre of Oleśnica) resulted in a general confusion of regional identity of Syców neighbourhood. This phenomenon was confirmed by the research, conducted in the borderland from 1996 to 1998.
3. ‘NATIVES’ AND ‘STRANGERS’

In the Syców region, like in every borderland, categories of ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ were the basic division line. This notion together with feeling what is own and what is strange occur in all social groups, especially in natural ones, where belonging is determined mainly by birth (Klosek, 1994). Polarization plane is in that case the connection to the Syców region by the fact of being born and living there.

The notion ‘natives’ means autochthons, indigenous people, everybody who has been connected with his region already through generations. National or religious differences, although recognized, were of no importance in this division. Thus a ‘native’ can be Silesian, German, Polish, Roman Catholic, Evangelic, Baptist or Jew.

Differences were recognized and taken into consideration. Religious and ethnic tolerance has been noticed in collected reports. Religious festivities were not shared by different groups of believers but treated with esteem, and provocative attitudes did not take place. It was especially the case in localities with compound societies.

Report number 8:
“here they respected, because here at Janistawice, there are mostly Catholics, there were even not Protestants. And here at Jarnostów too, some were Catholics and there at Starza there were two Catholics and the rest were Protestants, so they respected. When there was a festivity of Protestants, Catholics adopted themselves to it, did not do anything spiteful, and when Catholics celebrated a festivity and they had more of them because there are also these of Saint Maria, so the village respected them too, may be mothers at home did some bread baking or washing, but nobody went out into the field to do anything spiteful, there was nothing like this in our village, everybody was trying not to irritate others”.

Report number 14:
“I was bred in such a way that when there was a festivity of Protestants we were also celebrating and when we had a festivity they did nothing on the field and it was so taught, no, in the Holy Friday mother did not let us do anything, to chop the wood or anything else because Protestants had a festivity, and so on, and to the school too, we were friends and we are still friends up till now”.

The category of ‘strangers’ comprised all people who were not coming from the region. Therefore, they could be Germans from central Germany, Poles from central Poland, from the Great Poland or Upper Silesia (although the Syców region was much connected with these two, last mentioned, regions). In the neighbourhood of Syców ‘strangers’ showed up most often as merchants and manufacturers (businessmen) seeking to start their business in Syców or its surroundings, or new clerks or people who married autochthons (‘natives’). Between the wars they were also border clerks and military and new settlers, who appeared on the Polish side within the frame of settlement action in borderlands (Polonization of borderland).

Report number 21:
“but they brought so many people from Russia, there, from the Baltics there and Lithuania, and later from the Black See, here lived people from different places, and they were settled down in Polish farms, no, because Protestants were not usually settled down in here”.
Report number 30:

"natives? because they came in 1936. They are not natives, they are from the Little Poland (...), I am from Kępno, I am local, we are, and my parents-in-law were also locals. They get married between themselves".

Finally, after the Second World War, division into ‘natives – strangers’ changed or even lost its meaning. ‘Natives’ can feel like at home, when they constitute the majority in the region. Whereas changes taking place in the Syców borderland led to the situation where few years after the war, the ‘strangers’ constituted a majority of the inhabitants.

Distinguishing ‘natives’ from ‘strangers’ remained an important indicator of cultural divisions. However, in this situation it was used only for the reason of gathering together all dispersed members of a group being under domination of others – a group which separates itself and closes. This idea was confirmed by the reports about reluctance to or even prohibition on marriages with ‘strangers’.

This fight for preserving group identity, lasting for tens of years, finally was lost. ‘Natives’, autochthons, constituted minority of a few percent and there were no other opportunity – the fact which was pointed at in reports – than to marry somebody from new inhabitants.

Assimilation process goes on in the opposite direction than it does in most cases: ‘natives’ are absorbed by ‘strangers’. However, at the same time old ‘strangers’ become new ‘natives’. This process will probably end with the next generation, when there will be no more witnesses of the old cultural divisions.

3.1. Poles and Germans

Between the wars the division of the local society into Poles and Germans became the most important one (Kosmala, 1999). It resulted from creation of the state boundary and growing importance of nationalistic ideologies. Polish-German boundary demarcated for the first time after the First World War in this region introduced almost automatically these two categories of cultural divisions.

Research, carried out from 1996 to 1998, have confirmed the significance of this cultural division. It used to exist, however, together with the Polish-German boundary that is in the period between the wars.

Language was a fundamental criterion of the division, although not the only one. It separated Poles from German-speaking people. Biligualism was, however, a common phenomenon and the Silesian dialect was more widespread going southward. Among other determinants of division are religion, life style, customs and tradition. To the latter kind in the Syców region belong: celebrated festivities and celebrating birthdays or name days.

Report number 3:

"Before the war people spoke – Protestants – all spoke German. They were born here, were locals, yes, but they spoke mostly German. And Catholics spoke rather Polish, but some did speak German (...) as we were going to school, if the speaking is concerned, when I was going up to I was six years old, so this first year on the way we were going with Germans, with these Volksdeutsche, these Protestants, they were rather speaking
German, they were speaking German, not to us, and when I was going somewhere I used to say in Polish ‘Good morning’ and they to themselves spoke ‘Guten Tag, Guten Morgen’...”.

Before the First World War inhabitants of the Syców region were German citizens and after the Second World War all, or almost all, were Polish citizens.

After the border line was finally set up in 1921, it divided the Syców borderland society in the following way:

- on the German side apart from Germans a small group of Poles was left,

- on the Polish side beside Poles remained a large group of Germans (Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 1999).

According to archival materials, in 1923 some villages in the borderland region in the Odolanów District were inhabited entirely by Germans (Hetmanów, Kocina, Pawłów) and many others were dominated by them (e.g. Sośnie, Cieszyn, Janisławicem, Chojnik) (State Archive in Kalisz ...). It was also confirmed by the results of the research, carried out on the former borderland from 1996 to 1998. The reports that included the characteristics of nationality of inhabitants from many villages, confirmed, for example, that a village was inhabited mostly by Germans or by Poles, or in half by both nations.

Thus Sośnie, Chojnik, Pawłów, Drożki and Krzyżowniki were mentioned as villages inhabited mostly by Germans, while Cieszyn, Trębaczów and Mąkoszyce had, according to the people in the poll, a compound national structure.

Such divisions could have caused and really caused conflicts. Already creation of the boundary, which mechanically divided people into citizens of Poland and Germany resulted in some troubles. Therefore some accidents took place which were sometimes illegal. Not everybody agreed with such division of the two nationalities. Troubles were growing during time of tension on the international stage when nationalistic movements intensified were specially fanned. This phenomenon was very well recognisable before the Second World War on the Polish side of the Syców borderland. In that time many German organizations were active, often having character of fighting squads, while on the other hand Germans were exposed to legal and adminstrative difficulties as well as political and social ones. It is possible that it was a transfer of problems between nations onto the local level but these sort of phenomena took place and this division was very well noticeable in the period between the wars.

Report number 8:

“and then it started with the border guard that something like a small misunderstanding and in those villages young active people, who were active I don’t remember much because I was young then, but I know that there were such misunderstandings between these Polish authorities and these people who were active, who, I would say, prepared themselves to the war to free these lands from Polish, from Poland. So that it would be German land here. These were young people who were active and then there were these misunderstandings between these Polish authorities, these clerks, guards, there were misunderstandings”.

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1 According to the archival materials some border signs were destroyed and border clerks, who demarcated the boundary, were assaulted; after: Kosmala G., 1999, pp. 30 and 34.
4. DISCUSSION

Division into ‘natives-strangers’ take place in the Syców region as a main indicator of a cultural diversity always dominant except for the inter-war period when this region was the Polish-German borderland. There existed also subcategories within this division into Poles and Germans, Silesians and inhabitants of Great Poland, Catholics and members of Evangelic Church, Christians and Jews. However, the division into ‘natives-strangers’ was the most important. Furthermore, it was always the one which was concerned finally. This division is still actual notwithstanding changing political situation of both the region and country.

The same problems have been analyzed by Klocek (1994) in his work “Swoi” i “obcy” na Górnym Śląsku od 1945 roku. He has been investigating the phenomenon using the example of two workers’ quarters: old quarter of ‘familoks’ in Świętochłowice and in a quarter of new blocks in Chorzów. The communities under investigation were located in the centre of Upper Silesia. Klocek drew a conclusion that polarization into ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ has been maintained and it has been intensified after the Second World War as a result of inflow of people from the East and conflicts caused by this new settlement. Moreover, the most important condition for the division into ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ is factor called ecological, that is autochtons and newcomers. The only dimness that could have the influence on the final results seems to be a mistakenly formed question in the poll, that was: “And so in general: who do you consider yourself in the first order – Polish or Silesian?”. Lack of category ‘German’ suggests, that author assumes only two categories of the ideological division, which makes the results very simplified or even mistaken. This remark is important because of the fact that one of persons taking part in the poll wanted to be classified to another category – as a German (Kłosek, op. cit., p. 53).

5. CONCLUSION

After the Second World War both divisions, that is ‘natives’ – ‘strangers’ and Poles – Germans, have lost their meaning. Especially the latter one completely vanished, because of the sociopolitical changes (although one can meet individual Germans living there in the interwar period and their descendants).

The categories of ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ still exist. ‘Natives’ include all the old inhabitants of the borderland – autochtons – and their descendants. It is the minority group compared to ‘strangers’ but still strongly diversified. The most important is the attitude towards ‘strangers’ – Catholics or Poles are much closer to ‘strangers’ than Protestants or Germans. The same situation regards descendants of autochtons because the youngest generation seems to be almost completely integrated with newcomers.

‘Strangers’ also constitute a diversified category. One can distinguish ‘strangers’ who settled down before the Second World War, the group of those, who arrived after the Second World War during massive movements of people and those who came later. And again the group with the longest history of settlement is closer to the ‘natives’ than those who came as the last ones. In some reports it was even stated that all people who have
lived in the region before the war are ‘natives’. Therefore, slow modification of the notions ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ is taking place. One can even conclude that the change has the character of looking for a new balance.

In all changes being considered it was the state that always took an active part (Szczepankiewicz-Batek, 1999) no matter if it was the Polish and German state before the Second World War, or the Polish state afterward. In the interwar period a systematic Polonization and Germanization of borderlands took place while since 1945 the old borderland has only been Polonized through the exchange of population after the war or action of liquidating traces of Polish-German boundary. Changes of the administrative division especially the one in 1975 were to play probably the same role. They did not bring the expected results because after the last administrative reform a part of the Syców region came back to the Lower Silesia. It is, however, return to the borders from the interwar period and not to the former regional boundaries. In that case some historical spatial divisions have been changed successfully, which was possible thanks to the changes in cultural divisions in the Syców borderland.

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THE IDENTITY OF INHABITANTS IN BORDER REGIONS
OF THE MAŁOPOLSKIE VOIVODSHIP

1. INTRODUCTION

Forming the territory of Poland was a very dynamic process which is now visible in cultural landscape and demographic, ethnic, economic and social. It differentiates nowadays Poland and delimits the regional fragmentation, which appear most at cultural borders structures (Jałowiecki, 1996).

The regions placed near the Polish-Slovak borderland, in the southern part of the Little Poland Voivodship – Podhale, Polish Spis, Polish Orava and the western Lemko Region – are seldom in Europe examples of regions with a distinct specificity of borderlands of various cultures. They all had remained under Austrian control till 1918. Spis and Orava were influenced by Poland and Hungary for a few centuries. Since 1920 (with exception for years 1939–1945) the national border finally divided historical and cultural regions of Spis and Orava. The population at both sides of the border speaks similar dialect. Moreover, both population of Podhale (customarily the name embraces the proper area of Podhale, but also the Polish parts of Spis and Orava) and population of the Lemko Region, as well as those from Slovak Tatra region are in some way the descendants of Wallachian and Russian shepherd population, which arrived in the 14th and 15th centuries from south and east. Among the regions in question, the Lemko Region distinguishes itself by the fact of displacement in 1947 (the ‘Vistula’ action) of the autochthonous population to western and northern Poland and to the Soviet Union. There is also a great number of newcomers from the Nowy Sącz region and Podhale, whilst in Podhale, Spis and Orava are mostly inhabited by native population.

The regions in question kept their cultural individuality in spite of many inauspicious circumstances such as changing political attachment, dispersion of native Lemko people, and split of Spis and Orava by the state border. To what extent are they present in consciousness of their today’s inhabitants? How do they value proprieties of their own territory? Do the inhabitants feel a need of revealing their affection to the homeland through various social activities, positive estimation of their features, identification with their community to which this region belongs and with its culture? And finally: what is their attitude toward the Polish-Slovak transborder co-operation? These are the main questions to be considered in the presented research. The most important aim of this
research was to identify mutual similarities and differences in the inhabitants’ identity of the regions under discussion.

2. THE RESEARCH METHOD

The empirical research was based on a survey conducted in 1998. The random sample of 773 adult respondents included 203 inhabitants of Orava and 117 of Spis. The research took under consideration all villages in the regions, that is 14 in Orava and 15 in Spis. In Podhale the research was carried out amongst 352 persons from 12 localities situated in various parts of the region. In the western Lemko Region 4 villages (101 inhabitants) were interviewed. Spatial distribution of the test is approximately equal to the numbers of inhabitants in the above-mentioned localities.

The method employed were standardized interviews which were realised with questionnaires consisting of 32 questions. The method of the research allows to gather some extra information and experiences which cannot possibly be added to the questionnaire, most of them were used and helpful with an analysis and interpretation of the results.

3. THE REGIONAL IDENTITY

According to Andrzej Kwilecki (1993) “in a sociological sense a region is a synonym of a regional community, that is a human group which forms one of the types of territorial society. The essence of this society is an integration based on more or less developed sense of the separateness and attachment stemming from emotional relation to the inhabited territory”.

One of the types of regional groups are communities of borderland. They undergo fluctuating political, economic, linguistic and also religions influences and they are the result of this interference. Such confrontations of attitudes, value systems, cultural patterns appear in all borderlands but their final result depends on the proximity of interfering cultures, the extent of their potentials and on the quantity of institutional support of the state. In borderlands there are alternatives. Some choices are made impulsively, other result from purposeful actions. Eventually they both lead to forming a specific sense of identity, ‘borderlands consciousness’, creating a base for the sense of regional separateness against competing spheres of influences. It cannot be doubted that such separateness has also a protective function – against own culture’s disintegration (Chlebowczyk, 1975).

Border societies, like the inhabitants of Podhale, Polish Spis and Orava and late inhabitants of the Lemko Region can be called ‘regional cultural-ethnic groups’ (‘regional society’) and their identity can be considered a main criterion of belonging to these groups.

Collective identity is a feeling of mutual attachment of some number of individuals, who temporary or continuously feel total or partial affiliation to a certain social group. The base of such a feeling can be a place, idea, activity, etc. The collective identity is
characterised by the following features: continuity and transformation, combination of subjective and objective elements, activity (mutual influence of factors), overall character and convertibility of aspects and categories (Berque, 1978).

It can be assumed that the basis of the identity in case of ethno-regional societies would be, first of all, a territory generating attachment to the whole group and a feeling of separateness based on language and other factors of cultural heritage. The question appears if Podhale, Polish Spis, Polish Orava and the Lemko Region exist in inhabitants’ consciousness as certain sociocultural wholes — in other words if they are source of inhabitants’ identification and identity.

4. THE NAMES OF THE REGIONS

The respondents used many historical, physico-geographical, and administrative names to identify the territory of inhabited regions.

Both Spis and Orava are areas the regional names of which are obvious for nowadays inhabitants on the Polish side of the border. In both regions 100% respondents call their region appropriately Spis or Orava. It should be noted that many respondents emphasised that the terms Spis and Orava referred to larger regions on both sides of the state border. Besides, ‘Podhale’ is used as a superior name. Among less precise names appears also less widespread term ‘Little Poland’ and administrative names of district and voivodship level.

The research conducted in Podhale show that there is large uniformity in the way of calling it. The most frequent name used for designating the region was Podhale — as a name of own region or larger area in which own region is included (91% of respondents). Less frequent, indicated by 56% of the respondents was the name ‘Little Poland’ with Podhale as its part.

In the western Lemko Region there is no such commonly used name which denotes the region. Many respondents indicated physico-geographical names like Beskid Sądecki (34%), the Carpathians (16%) or simply ‘mountainous region’ (20%). The most common name for the regions was ‘Little Poland’ indicated by 64% of respondents. The Lemko Region, term used in this work, is not in use among the researched population.

5. TERRITORIAL EXTENT

An important stage of research was the analysis of how the inhabitants conceive the extent of their regions. In Orava the core of the region, in the sense of regional consciousness, is to be found in villages around Jablonka (Fig. 1) while in Spis it is in villages around Łapsze Niżne (Fig. 2). It seems that there are two levels of territorial identity. The basic level is connected with the reach of sub-regions (Polish Orava and Polish Spis); borders of Polish Spis are sharper and more evident in the consciousness of researched inhabitants than those of Polish Orava. The second level has to do with the reach of historical lands and is not enrooted in consciousness of the inhabitants. It reflects the settlement structure of Upper Orava and its territorial extent limited by the
mountain range of Magura Spiska. The reach of the regions indicated by the sample was also affected by course of main routes.

Fig. 1. Territorial extent of the region of Orava according to the consciousness of its inhabitants

Fig. 2. Territorial extent of the region of Spis according to the consciousness of its inhabitants
In Podhale the respondents found the reach of their region depending on their dwelling place (Fig. 3). The centre of region was commonly identified as so-called Skalne Podhale (Rocky Podhale) – that is Zakopane and its surroundings (Kościelisko, Poronin, Witów, Małe Ciche, etc.). Some informants defined their regional attachment very broadly – the reach of ‘their land’ is in line with geographical borders of Podtatrze. The Podhale inhabitants clearly perceive dividing line between Podhale and Spis. In Orava answers were similar, although localities of Orava were more frequent indicated as belonging to the region than those in Spis.

Fig. 3. Territorial extent of the region of Podhale according to the consciousness of its inhabitants

The respondents of the western Lemko Region placed the core of their region in Muszyna. From Muszyna it extends toward Piwniczna and Tylick, along communication tracts. Such a localisation of the centre can be effected by the presence of many offices and the railway junction joining southern Europe with northern Poland. The sample did not any definite confines of the region.

6. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE REGION

Characteristic feature of regional consciousness of inhabitants of all regions was a very high positive evaluation of own region and even more positive opinion about its inhabitants compared to other parts of the country.
The features symbolising region of Spis, Orava and Podhale in spheres of culture and tradition (particularly in Spis) include language, traditional costumes, festive customs and ceremonialis. Due to the respondents from the western Lemko Region such features as dialect, traditional ceremonialis and customs or traditional costumes were of smaller significance as features differentiating their region from others. In their opinion more important in this case are economical functions (tourist traffic) and features of natural environment (mountain landscape, fresh air). However, inhabitants of Tylicz and Muszynka rate culture of the traditional to the Lemko Region as important, which is probably caused by longer period of habitation. It is highly characteristic that the inhabitants of Tylicz and Muszynka, when asked about typical festive meals, in first place they mentioned ‘kisielica’ – kind of sour soup prepared on oatmeal (the typical dish of Lemkos). Such a meal was not known by the inhabitants of other villages in the region, nor in Podhale, Spis and Orava. Regional dishes are definitely of greatest importance for distinctness of Spis people who, similarly to Orava people, indicated ‘gałuski ze śliwkami’ (dumplings with dried plums) as a typical Christmas Eve meal. Spis and Orava people also mention cabbage with peas, mushrooms or ‘grule’ (potatoes or ‘rzepe’ in Orava), dishes which are the most typical for Podhale.

In the economic sphere the most distinctive factor is dispersion of farms. As to the natural environment, mountains, large forests, clear water and air have a symbolic meaning. Among monuments, in the inhabitants’ opinion, the most valuable in Orava are the open-air museum at Zubrzyca Górna and the church at Orawka, in Spis – Niedzica Castle, in the Lemko Region – the Uniatic churches. The inhabitants of Podhale mention in the first place Pęksowy Brzyzek cemetery in Zakopane and wooden buildings (also reconstructed in open-air museums). The most important social features of inhabitant of the regions in question are religiousness and involvement in public affairs.

Situated far from municipal and industrial centres and communication tracts, the regions of Podhale, Polish Orava, Polish Spis and the Lemko Region have managed to preserve their folklore and natural environment. It was found that mountain landscape and natural environment are account, to a great degree, for the attachment of the inhabitants to their regions.

The identification with own group in Podhale, Spis and Orava is based on certain elements and of culture, costumes, rites and customs, as well as the moral nature of the communities. Their meaning is so important since the inhabitants of these regions still cultivate many elements of the traditional culture. They still have certain functions in the inhabitants’ live. Also, the regional tradition is maintained by folklore bands and social organisation such as the Society of Polish Spis, the Society of Podhale People, Slovak Association in Poland, Orava’s Friends Society. Thanks to them those cultural elements still play the role of determinants of regional identity.

7. PODHALE, SPIS, ORAVA AND THE LEMKO REGION AS BORDER REGIONS

The regions of Spis and Orava distinguish themselves by the presence of Slovak minority. Slovaks coming from these regions live also in Silesia and other regions of Poland. Northern parts of Spis and Orava were incorporated to Poland in 1920. These
lands remained under Poland’s control till the outbreak of the Second World War. Then in the years 1939–1945 they belonged to Slovakia to be regained by Poland in 1945. After the disintegration of Austria-Hungary it was the only territory of the former Hungarian Kingdom to be attached to Poland. The results of the research confirm Polish national consciousness maintained among Spis and Orava peoples (living in Poland). But it is also true that there are some groups totalling a few percent of the population identifying themselves with Slovak nation. The percentage of respondents claiming to be of Slovak nationality is larger in Spis (20%) than in Orava (5%). Distribution of those declaring Slovak nationality within the regions (Fig. 4) approximately reflects the reality. In Orava, the respondents declaring Slovak nationality are mostly persons of elementary education, aged over 50. In Spis the variety in this category is greater, although the amount of Slovaks raises among older people with lower level of education. In the researched group of Orava people only one respondent declared the regional affiliation ‘of Orava’ instead of defining his national nationality. It shows that the once observed by researchers of the region tendency to avoid national declarations is now of very infrequent occurrence (Kantor, 1995).

Activity of Slovak minority in the regions under investigation was evaluated ambiguously. On the one hand the Society of Slovaks supports and presents regional culture, on the other hand, the minority takes part in sustaining national animosities.

In the researched communities a positive relation to neighbours from the other side of the border dominates but the most positive is the attitude of the respondents from Spis. According to this group of respondents Slovak citizens have the same positive view of neighbours. The inhabitants of Podhale have the most unfavourable, yet generally still
positive, attitude toward the people from the other side of the border. Most informants declared a friendly and very friendly (61% in Spis, 54% in Orava and 49% in Podhale) or neutral attitude to citizens of Slovakia (32% in Spis, 43% in Orava and 31% in Podhale). The percentage of people with a very friendly attitude was higher in Spis and in Orava. Naturally, it was even higher among inhabitants declaring Slovak nationality. The attitude of Poles was the least friendly (mostly friendly and neutral); in Orava only Poles assumed a negative attitude to the neighbours (6%).

Interesting are facts concerning the way the society from the other side of the border is seen from the point of view of particular comparative features. In the opinion of respondents Slovaks do not differ much from Poles. At the same time the image of Slovak citizens varies in particular regions. Among the inhabitants of Spis and the western Lemko Region the picture of Slovak people seems to be more positive. Both regions value the most thriftiness, amicability and favourable attitude toward Poles, which was especially stressed by the Spis people. This group of respondents pointed to Slovak honesty, hospitality and the inclination to alcohol, frankness and diligence. The informants in all regions were more critical as for Slovak hospitality, tolerance and laboriousness. As to the most distinctive feature of Slovak people the respondents indicated that they are much less concerned about religion.

The respondents from Polish borderland (in Spis, Orava, and Podhale alike) uniformly evaluated particular motives of crossing the nearest border. They think that shopping is the main aim of Slovak people crossing the border (especially at weekly markets of Jablonka in Orava and Nowy Targ). Another motive of crossing the border is visiting friends and family in Poland, sentimental reasons, recreation (tourism). Business is less important, not to mention work in Poland. For Polish border communities shopping remains a very important reason (mostly alcoholic beverages). Visiting friends and family, tourism, and visiting places of sentimental meaning are also important motives (especially for Spis and Orava people). Work in Slovakia is still stereotyped as a reason for crossborder traffic, although it became very marginal. A big number of Poles once employed in bordering communist countries made people think of Slovakia as of a prosperus country being a target for work migration. According to the respondents from Spis, Orava and Podhale making businesses at Slovakia is of no importance. Completely different is the hierarchy of motives expressed by respondents from the Lemko Region: main cause of Polish visits to Slovakia are cultivating own farms lying abroad, cultural exchange, possibility of profit or making businesses. Slovak citizens visit Poland for the following reasons: cultural and sport exchange, fire-extinguishing and flood protection, work and business.

Among the factors that favour co-operation the respondents mentioned living in the borderland and proximity of border crossings, passport-free crossborder traffic. Respondents in Orava and Spis emphasised similarities of the language and culture, common history, tradition, family, friendship and work-contacts. Trade in borderland and an existence of the Tatra Euroregion were mentioned as a valid factor of mutual contacts. Amongst factors mentioned in Spis and the Lemko Region was those not marked by the respondents from Orava and Podhale: using pastures, fields and woods on the Slovak side of the border.

Main obstacle for Slovak-Polish rapprochement are the difficulties at the border custom clearance and passport checking. There are two aspects of these problems: on the
one hand the informants complained about meticulousness of custom officers (especially on the Slovak side), and on the other hand talked about the necessity of far-reaching changes in law regulation. The obstacles are nationalistic animosities, which are mainly connected with Slovak minority. Some respondents indicated difficult economic situation of Slovakia and its political orientation as also making the crossborder contacts difficult.

Few respondents expressed their concern in seeking ways to improve Polish-Slovak relationship. Generally they spoke about cultural and tourist co-operation, about a freedom of contact: liquidation of customs barriers, enlarging border zone up to 50 km, creating new border crossings and improvement of those already existing.

At this moment we cannot call this borderland a transborder region. Neither a real co-operation nor socioeconomic integration develop satisfactorily. It seems that common efforts and initiatives leading to closer co-operation are in an initial stage. The research has show that there is a base for wider contacts. It is possible that in Polish-Slovak borderlands new transborder regions will appear. This Polish-Slovak co-operation will probably never have a large economical; and geopolitical significance, nevertheless it could be a model of good transborder relation.

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THE LASTING AND HISTORICAL INTER-REGIONAL BORDERLANDS IN POLAND

The notion of the region has a vast and varied meaning. The term is used for designating huge and small, uniform or heterogeneous areas of the globe or of particular countries (Berezowski, 1959).

K. Dzewoński (1967), integrating the views on the theoretical bases of the region, distinguished 3 fundamental meanings of this notion: region – a tool for research (analysis or generalisation in, e.g. statistical, ethnographic, sociological and historical research), region – a tool for action (e.g. in planning, economic, environment protecting activities, in defence policy), region – an object of cognition. In the former two from among these meanings, spatial divisions (definite areas – regions) serve as tools for the purposes of a definite social action in space. In the third case, the division of space in itself is an object of examination, i.e. the tendency is to distinguish regions – parts of the space which is investigated.

Besides the above mentioned first group of definitions, the geographical sciences offered the widely represented trend connected with the division of regions into the nodal and uniform ones, which had been separated by Whittlesey (1954) in his work:

1. Uniform regions (homogeneous, formal) correspond to the arrangements of the distribution of phenomena.

2. Nodal regions (functional, of spatial organisation) correspond to the arrangements of links (Wróbel, 1965; Chojnicki and Czyż, 1973).

Z. Batorowicz and A. Suliborski (1988) refer to the above mentioned theory, distinguishing 3 categories of the economic region: a zonal, uniform or homogeneous region – an area whose particular parts have many common features and which, as a whole, is significantly different from the surrounding areas, a nodal or vector region – an area which gravitates to the main node (a city or a complex of cities) and the region as a production complex.

On the basis of the conception of the region of node, there appeared the theories concerning the functional urban region. The common element of all the conceptions of the urban region is that they distinguish the city (internal zone) and its surroundings (external zone), connected with each other, in it (Domański, 1985; Dutkowski, 1994; Liszewski, 1996).

There exist many ways of defining the region according to the accepted criteria of
distinguishing it and to the mode of perceiving its specific features. The distinctive features of a given region, resulting from its physical and geographical characteristics, from the economic development, from the historical, social and political transformations, enable the classification into different kinds of regions. In the majority of cases the area defined as a region is an artificial construction, created by specialists in order to arrange and classify the reality (Jałówiecki, 1998).

According to various features and criteria of division, the following regions are mentioned in literature: urbanised, industrial, administrative, urban, rural, tourist, demographic, historical, sociological, geographic, linguistic, ethnical, confessional, cultural, economic, political, morphological, natural, etc.

The geographic region is characterised by specific features of the natural environment and is distinguished by a certain definite type of man’s activities (Dylikowa, 1973; Kondracki, 1976, 1988).

As far as the cultural region is concerned, its ethnographic specificity in the spatial approach as well as the complexes of cultural features, their time dynamics and spatial variability are concerned. Certain regions make up bigger ethnic-cultural constellations. Sometimes, the term ethnic-cultural region is used for designating this huge complex of phenomena (Damrosz, 1987). Ethnography emphasises cultural factors and the occurrence of ethnic groups (Bystroń, 1947). We speak about the ethnic region when there are distinctive ethnic, linguistic or cultural features in it (Jałówiecki, 1998).

The considerations of: S. Ossowski (1947), A. Kwilecki (1980), Z. Dulczewski (1967), M. Ciechocińska (1983), for whom the region is a synonym of the regional community, are ranked among the classical studies in Polish sociology.

The regional community is a territorial community, whose members have, to a greater or lesser degree, the sense of their separateness, but do not regard themselves as a nation (Ossowski, 1947). The features distinguishing the region are at the same time the features which distinguish this community, and the awareness of the regional separateness, which makes the people identify themselves with the region, usually is an additional argument (Ciechocińska, 1983). K. Frysztacki (1993), in his theoretical approach to the sociological region, emphasised the existing social bonds. He decided that the designate of the sociological conception of the region is constituted, first of all, by concrete communities distinguished by the existence of a network of varied links and their various consequences, and that these features have a certain, distinctive base and contents (symbolic culture, the arrangement of values and meanings, experienced subjectively in given communities and mutually important for them). There occur two components of the regional bond: the objective component (territory) and the subjective component (the inhabitants’ positive attitude towards the territory). The regional bond means the sense of the community of fate (sense of belonging), the existence of the sense of separateness from other territorial communities (Gumula, 1988).

Within one country, there may occur different types of regions. The region is an area which possesses certain objective features, making it possible to distinguish it from the rest of the country’s territory. On the one hand, it is regarded as a historical, cultural, ethnic as well as economic community of people inhabiting a certain separate area. On the other hand, the emphasis is put on the economic bonds and similarity of geographical conditions. These two directions of defining the region do not fully reflect the difficulties
in unambiguous and precise stating the meaning of this term (Radwan, 1993).

The notion of the region is of interdisciplinary character; different branches of science refer to different criteria of determining regions. Various approaches to understanding the region are generalised below:

Elements of regions:
– a separated, or uniform, objectively existing area (territory, space) – so the region is a geographic notion;
– existing boundaries: linear (administrative, political and legal) or non-linear;
– possessing specific features (elements, properties) which distinguish this area from the rest – natural or connected with the community inhabiting the given area (historical past, culture, economic level, etc.).

Administrative regions signify the governmental administrative units of the 1st order, centrally managed, created to perform administrative tasks connected with the territorial administration (Polish voivodships until 1999). Political regions, in turn, are the units of the 1st order, which gained a certain degree of independence – they were made the subjects (Polish voivodships after 1999). There occur two approaches to defining the political region in literature: on the one hand, it is every unit of the highest order, equipped with a certain degree of independence (executive, financial or decision-making), on the other hand, the emphasis is put on the bonds which occur within the given administrative unit; in this case, the political region is a complex spatial system, consisting of definite population structures, settlement arrangements, transport, institutional arrangements, legal and administrative systems (Koter, 1993).


The autonomous region is characterised by a very high degree of independence and, among others, by a certain range of legislative power; it is equipped with a number of tools (law-making, administrative and financial rights), which compose the notion of autonomy. F. Saint-Ouen (1990) distinguished two types, i.e. autonomous and federative, within the autonomous region. The difference between both the types of regions lies in the fact that the federative region is based on the constitution (in federative countries), and the autonomous region – on a certain status of autonomy, negotiated with the central authorities (in regional states).

The essential difference between the autonomous region and the self-governmental one, on the legal-and-constitutional plane, lies in the fact that the self-governmental regions do not have legislative rights, and the range of their sovereignty is determined by ordinary acts and not the constitution. The organization of the self-governmental region is based on the principles of territorial self-government. It has its own representative body and several competences (Zawadzka, 1993).

In the area of Poland, within the current boundaries, there have existed different administrative units of the 1st order (regions). The Polish statehood was connected with provinces, districts and voivodships. Other countries used to be divided into guberniyas,
provinces and departments. As a result of numerous administrative reforms, the number of administrative units and their range have been changed.

On the basis of analysing historical materials, containing administrative divisions of the Polish lands within the current state boundaries between the 18th century and the year 1999, the zones of historical inter-regional borderlands were outlined. While demarcating these borderlands, those districts (powiaty)\(^1\) were put a special stress upon which changed their regional affiliation regardless of the changes in the number of the highest administrative units. Two categories of borderland districts were distinguished. The criterion of the division between these categories is vague, but it enables the separation of the districts whose regional affiliation resulted not only from the partitioning of the Polish lands under annexation, but was also similar in other historical periods (the 1st category). The districts of the 2nd category were administratively subordinated to a centre different from the current one only in one of the periods (‘annexation’ or ‘communist’) in the history of Polish lands. The indicated districts have composed zones of historical inter-regional borderlands which run along almost all regional boundaries (Fig. 1).


The 2nd category includes the districts of: Gorlice, Chojnice, Olecko and Godąpia, Elk, Słupia, Konin, Koło, Turek, Kalisz, Bielsko-Biała, Cieszyn, Oświęcim, Ostrołęka, Ostrów Mazowiecka, Łuków, Biała Podlaska, Radzyń Podlaski, Parczew, Włodawa, Piła, Częstochów.

The historical borderlands give evidence of a high changeability of administrative divisions on Polish lands, in particular in Russian sector of partitioned Poland. Interregional borders are not permanent, well-established lines. They merely coincide with divisions from some historical periods. Therefore there are no definitely unchangeable interregional boundaries.

This fact had its influence on the discussion on the new territorial division. Many proposals based on historical premises significantly differed as to the spatial configuration. Moreover, even in similar proposals, many district were attached to different regions, thus confirming their historical changeability of regional affiliation.

In July 1998, The Seym (Parliament) and the Senate passed the acts on the implementation of the three-degree territorial division of the country (commune, district, voivodship). The clause saying that before the end of the year 2000, the government and Parliament will assess the functioning of new voivodships and make necessary corrections, was also adopted.

\(^1\) The network of district centres and their range in the area within the current political boundaries of Poland has changed over centuries. In the case of the government’s conceptions, there also occur numerous differences between the number of districts and their range, therefore a certain degree of generalisation has been applied. The territorial membership of a district in a given administrative unit of the 1st order has been defined on the basis of classifying the current district town to it.
Map 1: The historical inter-regional borderlands in Poland.

The official government's conceptions from 1993 and from March 1998 assumed the division of the country into 12, 17 or 25 voivodships. Two variants of the division into 12 voivodships (from the years 1993 and 1998) and the division into 17 voivodships were analysed, because they differed by the regional affiliation of some districts. On the basis of the demarcated areas which had changed their regional affiliation regardless of
the above discussed conceptions (the number of regions), and on the basis of the analysis of amendments made in the Seym and Senate in June and July 1998, the potential zones of administrative-spatial variability were demarcated in the perspective of the year 2000.

The areas which had not had an unambiguous regional affiliation in the government’s conceptions or during establishing the inter-voivodship boundaries in the Seym and Senate, were included into the areas of the potential administrative variability. They are distributed all over the area of Poland, but their main concentration is in the central part of the country.

They include the districts of: Koło, Turek, Elbląg, Włocławek, Gostynin, Skierniewice, Olecko and Gołdapia, Elk, Bielsko-Biała, Żywice, Sandomierz, Żnin, Mogilno, Gorlice, Grudziądz, Brodnica, Wąbrzeźno, Chełm, Golub-Dobrzyń, Toruń, Głogów, Wałcz, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Bielobrzegi, Koziennice, Przysucha, Radom, Szydłowiec, Zwoleń, Lipsko, Racibórz, and the communes of: Uniejów (in the Poddębice district), Banie Mazurskie, Andrzejewo, Boguty-Pianki, Nur, Szulborze Wielkie (the Ostrów Mazowiecka District), Bukowno, Bolesław, Klucze, Sławków (the Ołkusz district), Izbicą Kujańska (the Włocławek district), Szerzyny (the Jasło district), Secemin (the Włoszczowa district), Gidle (the Radomsko district), Nowa Brzeźnica, Pajęczno, Strzelce Wielkie (the Pajęczno district), Babimost, Kargowa (the Zielona Góra district) (Fig. 2).

The lasting zones of variability were demarcated on making the comparison between historical inter-regional borderlands and the zones of potential variability. In the cases when the districts were classified to the historical borderland districts of the 2nd category, and they constitute potential zones of variability, also in this case, the 2nd category was created for them. The districts of lasting variability are the units which, during the history of the administrative divisions of the Polish lands and in the government’s conceptions (and/or in the Seym’s and Senate’s proposals) did not possess a clearly defined regional affiliation. Such areas also occur in different parts of the country.

The 1st category lasting borderland districts include the districts of: Wałcz, Żnin, Mogilno, Białobrzegi, Koziennice, Radom, Szydłowiec, Lipsko, Zwoleń, Przysucha, Ołkusz, Żywice (Fig. 3).

The 2nd category lasting borderland districts are the districts of: Koło, Turek, Skierniewice, Olecko and Gołdapia, Elk, Gorlice, Bielsko-Biała.

The research was based on districts, leaving out of account lower levels of the territorial division, that is the communes. As a result, the distribution of historical, potential and permanent borderland became more generalized.

The numerous changes of administrative divisions in the area of Poland within the current political boundaries, resulting from the history of this land, influenced the shaping of areas with unambiguous regional affiliation. Therefore it is hardly possible to refer to a fixed, historically grounded division of the territory of Poland. It is possible though to determine some areas of common historical background, which do not have, however, clear, linear boundaries.

2 In order to demarcate the potential zones of variability in the year 2000, shorthand materials from the debates of the Seym and Senate from June and July 2000 were used.
Map 2: The potential zones of administrative-spatial variability.

Fig. 2. The potential zones of administrative-spatial variability
Fig. 3. The lasting inter-regional borderlands in Poland

They are surrounded by zones of changing administrative condition, being subjected to different centres with indefinite regional affiliation.

Perhaps the districts from the historical and lasting borderlands, after the recent territorial reform of the country, will find their constant place in the new regions of the administrative division.
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THE CULTURAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY OF THE POPULATION OF ŁEMKOWSZCZYZNA (LEMKO REGION) IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

1. INTRODUCTION

The history of the Lemkos and the Lemko region is relatively well documented in the pertinent literature in various research disciplines (cf. Pieradzka, 1939; Reinfuss, 1948, 1990, 1995, 1998; Kwilecki, 1974; Budzyński, 1993, 1995; Czajkowski, 1995; Pudło, 1995; Żurko, 1997). However, the works by ethnographers and historians are of fundamental significance for every researcher of this subject, and especially those by Roman Reinfuss, an ethnographer renowned as an authority in this area.

The Lemko region is an ethnographic region in the Polish Carpathians which was for several centuries inhabited by Ruthenian highlanders belonging to the Ukrainian language group. Its population consisted of Ruthenian people (Rusnacy) who have been known as Lemkos since the second half of the 19th century. The boundaries of this region were delineated by Roman Reinfuss in the period between the two world wars, which was confirmed by him in the 1990s (1948, 1998). He stated that the territory inhabited by the Lemkos remained unchanged since the mid-19th century, when D. Zubrzycki delineated the Polish-Ruthenian border. These borders are believed to have become permanent a hundred years before by Z. Budzyński (1993, 1995). According to him, the area of the jurisdiction of the Eastern (Uniate) Church which he believed to have become defined in the second half of the 18th century, had exactly the same boundaries as the limits of the region inhabited by the Lemkos. Therefore, the territory inhabited by the Lemkos remained unchanged for at least two centuries from the mid-18th century to the Second World War. In the 1940s, the demographic continuity was abruptly broken as a result of forced resettlement. Polish people gradually settled in the depopulated villages (totally or partly), which, in consequence, resulted in a total change of the ethnic and religious composition of the local population. Although the boundaries of the Lemko region have survived in the cultural landscape of the Carpathian region, but in many places (in villages which are totally depopulated and sometimes even demolished) it has assumed the character of a ‘mental’ border.
2. METHODOLOGY

The aim of this study is to present the diversification of the internal ethnic and religious structure of the Lemko region in the 19th and 20th centuries against a background of general population development. Two aspects have been included in the study. Firstly, it gives a general picture of diversification in time and space. Secondly, it includes the issues connected with the increasing or decreasing differences between specific groups resulting from the mixing of populations, chiefly as a result of immigration or emigration. To achieve the aim of this work, a slightly different approach to demographic issues has had to be adopted than that most frequently used in the pertinent literature. First of all, the balance of the total population should be considered in demographic studies, including not only Lemkos, but Poles, Jews, Germans and other ethnic groups and all settlement units that R. Reinfuss (1948, 1998) included in the boundaries of the Lemko region (including ‘islands’ of Polish population which are not counted in the figures concerning the territory and population of the region).

Statistical data assembled in the Austrian (1869–1910) and Polish censuses (1921–1988) have been used in this study. During that time, the region was situated in the Galicia Province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The data concerning the late 18th century are quoted after Z. Budzyński (1993, 1995). To obtain the comparison concerning time and space (1869–1988), an aggregation of data was performed to make them correspond with the contemporary administrative division of that area (as in 1988, i.e. the most recent census in Poland). For example, the data for the village of Nowica (Uście Gorlickie municipality) cover the villages of Nowica and Przyślup (the latter no longer in existence) which was incorporated into the municipality after World War II.


The tragic history of the region in the 1940s divided the demographic development of the Lemko region into two distinctly different phases (Fig. 1). The first (1869–1931) is characterised by changes due to natural evolution, similar to those which occurred in other parts of the Carpathian region. The changes in the second phase, which began during World War II, have not been the same as those which have occurred in the overall Carpathian region, except for the Bieszczady.

The late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century are characterised by variable dynamics of population changes in the region under discussion. A population increase of 20.0% was observed at that time (from 89.1 thousand in 1869 to 107.9 thousand in 1931), but in 1900–1921 a decrease was noted by approximately 10.0%. The population fell from 99.6 thousand in 1900 to 97.3 thousand in 1910 and 90.3 thousand in 1921. This decrease in total population and the decrease in the demographic dynamics which had been observed in the 1890s, indicate that migration processes in the Lemko region, initiated in the 1870s (Czajkowski, 1995) were of significant size at the time. Emigration from that region was so extensive that the high birth rate which was typical of Greek Catholic people, higher than for people of other religions, could not compensate for the loss resulting from migrations. Depopulation of villages in 1910–
1921 was undoubtedly an effect of World War I, but equally due to the emigration from that region. As for the entire Carpathian region, the greatest increase of the population occurred in 1921–1931 (from 90.3 thousand in 1921 to 107.9 thousand in 1931). In 1931, the Lemko region reached the peak of its population density.

![Graph showing population changes](image)

Fig. 1. The dynamics of demographic changes in the Lemko region in 1869–1998 (1869=100)

Source: Author’s own study based on the data from Austrian (1869–1910) and Polish (1921–1988) censuses

The 1940s were particularly tragic for the Ruthenian people. As a result of the war and the resettlement action carried out in distinct phases (in 1941, 1944–1946, and 1947), the region suffered enormous losses both in people and material wealth. During the first and second phase of the resettlement action, local people were resettled to the former USSR, while during the third, most extensive phase known as ‘the Vistula Action’, Ruthenian or Ukrainian people were resettled to the northern and western parts of Poland (Maryański, 1961, 1964; Kwilecki, 1974; Pudło, 1995; Zurko, 1997). The repatriation and resettling of people caused the ‘demographic void’ in the depopulated areas (Maryański, 1961). The settlement which later occurred in this area, mostly by Poles, was a lengthy and difficult process which has not been completed to this day (24 villages are still deserted). In its first phase, the settlement in uninhabited areas was of a ‘pioneer’ character, i.e. consisted of the organisation of life ‘from scratch’. Such a pioneer-type settlement was a unique phenomenon in Europe at that time. Colonisation was carried out step-by-step, as it had been centuries ago. It began from the relatively easily accessible and attractive villages extending to the mountain areas after several years. It should be noted that many depopulated villages vanished completely from the maps of the region, as they had been incorporated into larger, populated settlement units.

According to the 1950 National Census, 31.1 thousand people lived in the territory of the Lemko region, which means that the region’s population had decreased by 71.2% in comparison with 1931. The population was even lower than 80 years earlier (89.1 thousand in 1869). The broken demographic and settlement continuity caused a change in land use. Abandoned and unpopulated areas were gradually taken over by woodlands. The proportion of forest areas increased from 30.0% at the turn of the 19th century to 70.0% in the late 20th century.
Almost 50 years were needed for the region to double its population (over 60 thousand residents in 1998). The highest rate of the population growth was in the 1950s (increase by 44.0%), years of new settlement and the greatest influx of people. A minor return of Lemkos was observed at that time (2,000 people) (Maryański, 1961). As in other parts of the Carpathian region, the lowest growth rate was observed in the 1970s with the mass migration of the rural population to urban areas.

Today, the Lemko region is inhabited by over 60 thousand people (1998), i.e. 45% less than during the period between two world wars, however, almost twice as many as in the 1950s. The region is characterised by a relatively small but steady increase of population. It is slowly becoming an attractive area for new settlers, sometimes from big cities.

4. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

Religion was undoubtedly a factor uniting various groups which settled in the territory of the Lemko region. Researchers of the history of that region give special attention to the role and significance of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and later the Uniate Church in the process of Ruthenisation of the local people. The Orthodox Church was culturally unifying through the Eastern Orthodox rites, church customs and common liturgical language (Budzyński, 1993, 1995).

The juxtaposition of two colonisation cultures – Wallachian and Ruthenian from the East and the less numerous Polish one from the West shaped religious relations in Łemkowshczyzna for several hundred years. The radical change, i.e. the reversed proportion in the religious structure occurred no earlier than 1947.

The analysis of the religious structure includes the overall population of the Lemko region divided (by villages) into four religion categories – Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Judaic and others (including Protestants). The data from 1880–1921 can be compared as in both Austrian and Polish censuses identical groups were involved.

The progressing demographic development of the Lemko region was characterised by an increase (1869–1900), and later a decrease in the population (1900–1921) which was reflected in the increasing or decreasing number of adherents of each religion. This refers in particular to Greek Catholics (from 80.7 thousand in 1880 to 86.8 thousand in 1900 and 77.5 thousand in 1921) and Jews (from 3.8 thousand to 4.5 thousand and 4.0 thousand respectively). A characteristic feature of the religious structure in the Lemko region in the late 19th century was an increasing proportion of people of Judaic religion and a slight decrease in the number of Roman Catholics. The same feature was recorded when analysing the religious structure of urban population in the Carpathian region at the turn of the 19th century (Soja, 2000).

The population of the Lemko region consists mostly of members of the Eastern Church. Domination of the Uniates in that region continued until World War II. Although in absolute figures an increase of that population was noted, their share in the total population fell from 93.0% (the late 18th century) to approximately 87.0% in 1880 and 1900, and 85.8% in 1921. The proportion of Roman Catholics increased (from 5.7% in the late 18th century to 9.2% in 1880), and at the turn of the 19th century decreased (to 8.2% in 1900). In 1921 Roman Catholics accounted for 9.2% of the total population.
of the region. The greatest rate of change was observed among the people of Judaic faith. The total number of members of this religious group increased fourfold within less than a century and a half. Its share grew from 1.3% in the late 18th century to 4.0% in 1880, 4.5% in 1900 and 4.4% in 1921.

Greek Catholics, the prevailing group, inhabited the entire area of the Lemko region. In more than 80.0% of the total of villages, the share of the Uniates was higher than 90.0% of all residents (Fig. 2). Throughout the whole period under discussion, in the compact area inhabited by the Uniates, there were villages in which the entire communities declared Uniate religion, especially in the central part of the region. On the other hand, there were a few enclaves in which Roman Catholics and Jews were dominant groups, mostly on the western and eastern boundaries of the region.

Fig. 2. Greek Catholic population in the Lemko region, 1921 (by villages)
Source: Author's own study based on the 1921 census

The second largest group constituted Roman Catholics. Although the share of that community increased steadily, except for the period at the turn of the 19th century, Roman Catholics were not present in many villages of the Lemko region (39 in 1880, 34 in 1900 and 1921). Roman Catholics tended to concentrate in certain areas and villages. Beginning from the late 18th century, most Roman Catholics were concentrated in a few localities (mostly small towns and resorts); the rest were spread in the villages situated along the northern border of the region, a few or less than twenty families in any one locality. Roman Catholics generally lived outside the compact area of the Uniate settlement, but even within it there were traditional Catholic 'islands'.

One of such 'islands' was Muszyna, situated in the western part of the region, as well as Jaśliska and Huta Polańska in its eastern part. Posada Jaśliska was an example of a mixed Roman Catholic-Uniate village, in which the proportion of Roman Catholics steadily grew (from 64.1% in 1880 to 67.3% in 1921).

Jews were significant but formed the smallest religious group in the Lemko region (Fig. 3). In many villages this community was not represented at all. In the late 18th
The cultural and ethnic diversity of the population of Lemkowszczyzna

In the 19th century, they formed a community which was numerically a quarter of the Catholic one but was represented in a greater number of villages (54% as compared to 44% out of the total number of villages). So adherents of Judaism were dispersed all over the region. Sometimes it was just one or two families in the village, while Roman Catholic formed groups of a few or more than ten families. Jewish communities were not as numerous as Catholic. The largest Jewish community was in Wola Michowa (5.9% of the total), Wielok Wielki (4.1%), Uście Gorlickie (3.8%), Muszyna (3.3%), and Tylicz (2.4%).

![Map of Jewish population in the Lemko region, 1921 (by villages)](image)

(W %)
- zjawisko nie występuje
- < 2
- 2 - 3
- 3 - 4
- 4 - 5
- > 5

Fig. 3. Jewish population in the Lemko region, 1921 (by villages)
Source: Author's own study based on the 1921 census

The situation changed in the 19th century. The number of adherents of the Judaic faith increased as a result of Jewish migration to the Carpathian region and through this process, Jewish people were represented except in less than twenty villages (10 in 1880 and 14 in 1900). The 1921 census revealed a new phenomenon. This was the tendency for a concentration of Jewish people in certain areas. The share of residents of Judaic faith was greater than 5% of the total population in as many as 21 villages. In 1921, the largest Jewish community was in Krynica (29.7%; within the present administrative borders), followed by Jaśliska (25.5%) and Łabowa (25.2%). The proportion of the Jewish community increased several times in traditional centres such as Wola Michowa (19.0%), Muszyna (16.8%) and Tylicz (11.2% of the total population). The spatial distribution of people of Judaic faith was diversified, but during the entire period under discussion, Jewish communities were concentrated in two areas – the western edge of the Lemko region (villages in the Sącz Beskid range), and the eastern border (villages situated in the area where the Bieszczady and Low Beskid ranges meet). This was mainly in trading towns, such as Wola Michowa and Jaśliska, large villages or resorts, such as Muszyna and Krynica. Their advantageous geographic location along the main trading routes leading south was beneficial for the development of commerce and services, which, in turn, brought about steady Jewish migration.
The Protestant share of the population of the Lemko region was negligible. Several dozen Protestants (0.1% of the total population in 1921) lived in a few localities – Mocznaczka (3.1%), Krynica (0.6%), Barwinek (0.2%), Śniętnica and Polany (the latter each with 0.1% of the total population).

5. ETHNIC STRUCTURE

The ethnic and cultural diversity of the population of the Carpathian region was a result of a long historical process running in two directions – the North-South and East-West axes. The first was connected with the successive waves of settlement (Wallachian and Ruthenian) that ethnically unified the population of the Carpathians of similar cultural background. The lines parallel to the East-West axis partitioned ethnic groups of the Carpathian region into sub-groups with their own local cultural features (Reinfuss, 1995). The ethnic structure of the Lemko region resulted mainly from the superposition of subsequent phases of the development of the settlement network in that region, so the latitude direction with ethnically uniting effect was relevant to this aspect.

The 1921 census was the only one so far to contain the question about nationality. Residents of the Lemko region declared Ruthenian, Polish, Jewish, German and ‘other’, i.e. undetermined nationalities. The group of Ruthenian people was the most numerous (80.2% of total population). Its proportion for residents of villages exceeded 92% in 70% of villages (Fig. 4).

![Population of Ruthenian nationality in the Lemko region, 1921 (by villages)](image)

Fig. 4. Population of Ruthenian nationality in the Lemko region, 1921 (by villages)
Source: Author’s own study based on the 1921 census

It covered a very compact area, in which the villages in the current Uście Gorlickie, Sękowa and Krempna area could be considered the ‘core’ of the Lemko region. This is particularly true for the villages situated within the Magura Range (Magura Wątkowska...
and Małastowska). The high concentration of the Lemko population in this area can be easily seen even when the language criterion which was used in Austrian censuses, is applied (Fig. 5).

![Map of Ruthenian nationality in the Lemko region, 1880](image)

**Fig. 5.** Population of Ruthenian nationality in the Lemko region, 1880 (language criterion)

*Source: Author's own study based on the 1880 census*

In 1921 Uniates accounted for 85.8% of the total population. Ruthenian nationality was recorded as being slightly less, i.e. 80.2% of the total population. This discrepancy may indicate that the Ruthenian people's sense of national identity was not complete. This was visible in a few villages. For instance, all residents of the village of Żydowskie (Krempna municipality) with 100% of Uniates, declared 'other' nationality, so neither Ruthenian nor Polish. Perhaps, what they meant by that was 'the locals'. Other villages situated east of the Jasiółka River, like Zawoje (Rymanów municipality) and Rudawka Jaśliska (Komańcza municipality) inhabited exclusively by Uniates claimed a 100% of Polish nationality.

Ethnic minorities in the Lemko region consisted of Poles (16.8%), Jews (2.4%) and a small group of Germans. It is noteworthy that the proportion of Polish nationality was higher than that of Roman Catholics, while the share of Jewish nationality was lower than that of adherents to the Judaic faith. One cannot preclude a distortion in the data concerning nationality which has been raised by researchers into this subject (Eberhardt, 1996; Sobczyński, 2000), however it can be said that some people declaring Polish nationality were not Roman Catholics but Uniates or adherents of Judaism, while some Lemkos were Roman Catholics (Żurko, 1997). This may indicate that the groups were mixed but it may also mean that some people concealed their actual ethnic background for political reasons (Sobczyński, 2000).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The social and demographic history of the region under discussion is characterised by: 1) multi-national population with prevailing Ruthenian population, 2) high population density (146 persons/100 ha of cultivated land in 1900), combined with the lack of industrial centres, which resulted in a lack of workplaces, 3) high seasonal and permanent emigration rate, 4) distorted gender structure with more women than men (110 women/100 men in 1921). The current situation is characterised by 1) low population density (28 persons/km² in 1998), 2) existence of uninhabited villages, 3) high proportion of people employed outside agriculture (72.0% w 1988), 4) gender equilibrium, and, first and foremost, 5) uniformity of the ethnic structure. To what extent this last statement is true will be resolved during the next census which is currently being prepared.

In conclusion, this work shows general trends in, and outlines the demographic development of the Lemko region (1869–1998), one of the ethnographic regions of the Polish Carpathians. On the basis of the available statistic data (1880–1921), cultural and ethnic changes in time and space were determined for that region. Due to the fact that it covers the entire population (not exclusively the Lemkos) and all settlement units, the development of a population balance was possible as well as the presentation of the population’s internal diversification, including ethnic minorities which existed in the Lemko region during the period under discussion.

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THE VALCANALE – ETHNO-GEOGRAPHICAL PROBLEMS OF A QUADROLINGUAL ITALIAN BORDER REGION

Situated in the extremely north-east part of Italy the Valcanale/Kanalska dolina/Valcjianal/Kanal tal is the region Italy claimed from Carinthia in 1919 together with the community of Weißenfels which was part of Carniola then. In this area Europe's three most important language families meet each other – the Slavs, Romans and Germanics – and no fewer than four distinct ethnic groups have settled next to each other and mixed in an overlapping pattern: the Friulians, Italians, Slovenes, and Germans. This 'Little Europe', as the valley is called sometimes, offers itself as a good example to analyse multicultural problems (Steinicke, 1984; 1992; 1996; 1998b). The main goal of the present study is to identify the impact of the new Italian law about the protection of historic linguistic minorities (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1999) on the ethnic minorities in the Valcanale. The questions we want to raise are: Will its application have a favourable effect on the various minority groups and will it contribute to maintaining the ethno-diversity or – what may surprise at first sight – could such a law create new problems and even conflicts in a quadrolingual region?

The definition of what constitutes 'ethnic minorities' used here includes only autochthonous (historic) linguistic groups. Guest workers and immigrants from Turkey or south-eastern Europe do form ethnic groups in the countries of the Alps, but they are not designated 'ethnic minorities'.

Although the Italian constitution provides for the protection of linguistic minorities (Articles 2, 3 and 6), the respective implementation ordinances have not been put in place until now. By the end of the year 2000, however, the individual municipalities will be free to decide on their own which protective measures they want to take in this respect. Up to the present, the various groups (i.e. Italy's ethno-linguistic minorities except the Germans and Ladins of South Tyrol, the Slovenes of Trieste, as well as the French- and German-speaking population of the Aosta Valley) enjoy but few cultural privileges. As a result, we witness a marked numerical decline of the various minorities (Steinicke, 1998a).

1 In the following chapters the place names of the quadrolingual Valcanale are written either in the official German version before 1919 or in today's official version, i.e. Italian.
Before addressing the new possible situation in more detail, it is necessary to have a look at the ethnic development of the Valcanale. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to highlight the fact that this border area is different from the neighbouring Friulian Alps in demographic and economic terms as well as with regard to geographic settlement patterns (Steinicke, 1998b). Nevertheless, some local peculiarities can be explained by analysing the ethnic processes during the last 100 years.

The first settlers were the Slavs who came in the 7th century in the Valcanale, soon joined by a few Bavarians and Friulians. The real land rush, however, began with the colonisation activity of the Franconian diocese of Bamberg (1007–1759). From the end of the late Middle Ages to the beginning of modern times the inhabitants of the villages were not all the same in an ethnic respect (Fig. 1).

![Map of the Valcanale showing ethnic distribution](image)

**Fig. 1.** The Valcanale: ethno-linguistic situation in the 18th/19th century


Beside Slovene centres (Saifnitz, Uggowitz, Leopoldskirchen) there were settlements with a majority of German-speaking people (Pontafel, Greuth, Weißenfels). Friulians and Venetians dominated in Tarvis and Malborgeth. The German-Slovene character of the area was strengthened on the one hand by the constant arrival of German workers promoted by the diocese, and on the other hand, by the decrease of the Friulians and Venetians, which started in the 16th/17th century. After the taking over of the Valcanale by the Habsburgs also the number of the Slovenes decreased in the official statistics. This process was not only due to the fact that they assimilated to the German ethnicity, but also to the arbitrary interpretation of the ethnic groups. Moreover, through the co-existence of Slovene and German settlers for centuries, a kind of mixed population came into being which complicated the ethnic situation; and a part of the Slovene-speaking people felt closer to German than to Slav culture. In 1910 only 10 Italians (Friulians)
lived in the Valcanale, compared to 6,397 German-speaking and 1,682 Slovene-speaking Carinthians.

Like South Tyrol after World War I the Valcanale was severed from Austria and ceded to Italy, whereby the native population suddenly became Italian citizens. The period between the Wars was characterised by a government-sponsored migration policy attracting ethnic Italians to this area, which resulted in massive assimilation. In the resettlement agreement of 1939 (the so-called ‘Option-Agreement’) – whereby the population was made to choose between German or Italian citizenship – 97% of its Slovene- and German-speaking population voted for the German Reich. Almost two thirds of them (5,700 individuals), especially the German-speaking population, were relocated in Austria (Fig. 2). They did not return after the war.

![Map of the Valcanale showing resettlement agreement of 1939 and relocation](image)

**Fig. 2.** The Valcanale: resettlement agreement of 1939 (‘Option’) and relocation

*Source: Steinicke, 1984: 38–46.*

Unlike the South Tyroleans, the remaining 2,500 native population of this border area were not granted any autonomy rights. They were exposed to further assimilation – a result of Italians and Friulians migrating there. Our own research shows that they currently number around 1,600 persons; 60% of them are Slovene speakers, 40% speak German. Today, the Slovenes, the German speakers, the Friulians as well as the Italians of this valley live side by side in a particularly limited space. Remarkably, the elder Slovene speakers in the Valcanale are using all four of these languages in their day-to-day conversations – a phenomenon which is quite unique in Western Europe.
Fig. 3. The present ethno-linguistic situation in the Valcanale (without guest-workers)


Nowadays, representing 18% of the total population the Slovenes and Germans of the Valcanale form very small minorities in various centres. Both ethnic minority groups gradually decline. Rural exodus and mixed marriages have led to an estrangement from the mother tongues. Likewise low fertility – being the consequence of their unfavourable bio-demographic situation – will enhance these losses. Furthermore, the condition of "diffuse ethnicity" (Steinicke, 1991: 178) presents a significant obstacle to the preservation of the Slovene-speaking population. Although the Slovene tradition has been encouraged by the church, a good part of them express their ethnic identity through their traditional relationship to (the German-speaking) Carinthia, and not through the awareness of belonging to the Slovene culture, at best with the so-called ‘Windischen’ – a third category artificially created between World War I and World War II (Unkart et al., 1984; Reiterer, 1986).

In the 1970s and 1980s this fact led to a conflict between those native Slovene-speaking people who felt as Slovenes and those who did not identify with the Slovene minority (‘Windische’) as well as with local German-speaking persons: In the Valcanale’s elementary schools some teachers introduced German language in the regular morning classes – without any official permission. In reaction, the speakers of the Slovenes, especially the clergy, demanded the same right. However, they only could teach Slovene to the pupils in the church in the afternoon. Newspapers in Italy, Austria, and Slovenia reported this ‘discrimination of Slovenes’, and serious quarrels among the native population hurt their cultural situation.

The above mentioned new legislation as well as a special law regarding the protection of the Slovenes in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, currently in preparation, should help avoid such ethnic conflicts in the future. The first law provides comprehensive
protection rights for all ethnic minorities in Italy. They extend to all levels of public life—
from pre-schools, schools, to the use of one’s preferred language with public authorities.
In order to respond to the minorities’ demands the Italian government is prepared to
support them with a considerable financial base. There’s no doubt that the new law which
provides measures for promoting understanding of one’s own ethnic identity (e.g. in the
future all ethnic groups will be entitled to bi- or multilingual town signs) represents
a significant benefit to the preservation of those linguistic communities with clear
majority-minority relations.

Eventually, this paper seeks to answer the question hitherto not addressed, namely, to
what extent can such a legal base be used for solving ethnic tension and preserving
ethnic plurality in multiethnic regions. However, difficulties could arise, if two or more
minorities express similar demands. In this respect there is a high probability in the
quadrolingual Valcanale that the cultural associations of the three minority groups, the
Friulians, the Germans, and the Slovenes, call for the same additional rights in pre-
schools, elementary schools or in the administration. As a consequence, the activities of
public authorities will be dramatically complicated. Moreover, the communities’ costs of
the ethnic protection measures will rise disproportionately. In the not too-distant-future,
distribution questions over the granted financial contributions will certainly lead to
disputes among the various communities. Not surprisingly, such a scenario constitutes
a high potential for ethnic conflict as well as a significant obstacle to creating reasonable
strategies designed to ensure the survival of the small minorities in the villages. Conflicts
over language count among the thorniest political problems!

As described above, in this multiethnic border region it is not at all wise to promote
the single minorities on a group by group basis as provided in the new legislation.
Therefore, the individual municipalities of the Valcanale would be well advised not to
take any measures so far in this respect.

It appears, however, more promising if in the Valcanale – given its special historic
and ethnic situation – a form of cultural and economic autonomy could be implemented,
whereby the knowledge of a minority language should bring decisive economic
advantages. Furthermore, the relations to the neighbouring regions, Carinthia in the
north, Slovenia in the east, and Friuli in the south and west, should be significantly
extended: The installation of a cross-border Euro-region would constitute an important
move toward strengthening the ethnic self-perception of the Valcanale’s minorities.
Considering the fact that both the German as well as the Slovene language are only
anchored in the native population aged 40 and above, the prospects for the preservation
of the Valcanale’s ethnic diversity are rather meagre. Radical changes could occur only if
there were an upcoming demographic boost from the neighbouring regions, e.g. through
re-orientation of labour movements or spatial marriage patterns. The development of
such strategies could be a principal objective for this proposed Euro-region.

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SPATIAL FUNCTIONS OF DISPERSED MINORITIES

1. INTRODUCTION

Minorities take a very important place in the political geography. Many researches and conferences were dedicated to this question, which is of vital importance for international policy yesterday, today and tomorrow. The Council of Europe has, at least in its proclamations, taken a special attention to the problems of ethnic minorities. This represents common European will to protect smaller communities and give them chances for ethnic survival. Ethnic, cultural and linguistic richness of old continent depends also on smaller minorities. The popular slogan ‘small is beautiful’ shows this common European awareness, which acts against globalisation trends such as homogenisation and unification. At the beginning of the third millennium, the minorities have many times no other choice than a self-protection.

Even not officially, the number of minority groups is of great importance, as well as the concentration of their members. Minorities need to be visible if they wish to play any serious partner-role on local, regional or state level. Traditionally understood, national minorities are groups of people, differing from majority population in language, culture and ethnic (national) awareness. As autochthons, their members have strong and quite closed links inside their local community. Thus consciousness of ‘community’ regenerates, because the members have a rich experience in communication among themselves. Especially in rural areas those communities are quite stable, if they represent local majority with more than 50% of common population.

During the process of social modernisation coupled with different measures of assimilation policy (or even without it) the structure, mobility and settlement system have changed. In some cases they just hardly can be recognized as minorities, because of their today’s invisibility. Those submerged communities are a typical product of modern and post-modern society (Stranj, 1992).

During the process of modernisation and urbanisation, socioeconomic structure of border regions has changed. Obviously enough, it applies also to minority groups. Instead of agrarian population and industrial workers those regions have even more inhabitants employed in the tertiary sector: trade, traffic, tourism, financing, education, health and different services. Many people emigrated towards central areas and the rest of population became demographically exhausted. A great number of elderly people,
negative natality trends and social and economic troubles connected with this are rather poor developing potential.

Minorities, settled in peripheral border zones, lose their members because of emigration and because of assimilation. Each minority member is involved in different organisations and institutions of major society: schools, media, policy, work, culture, and in minority institutions. This double socialisation shows multilevel identity as its final result. Minority members are bilingual: this is a cultural heritage and a way of social and economic survival. The way of life has changed. Today’s society is marked by a high mobility.

During the process of modernisation, many minority members emigrated to central areas because of education, work and way of living. Minority members need a much larger space than their native territory. An important part of minority members live out of traditional territory, in regional and national centres and central areas. Are those ‘dispersed minorities’ completely lost? What role do they have?

Researching the structure and mobility of minority members, we can notice that even higher number of them live outside their ‘home’ traditional territory. In many cases, this inner emigration is treated as a fear of ‘losing’ of those members forever. Observing some minorities in details, those ‘dispersed minorities’ appear much more vital than their own community estimates. Are they really lost and completely assimilated? Even though they were individualised, with very poor opportunities for using their own language and attending cultural life, even with a high share of mixed marriages, they have survived and retained their ethnic characteristics. Moreover, they also maintain some connections with ethnic base on traditional territory and feel till today as minority members.

The problem of dispersed minorities exists. Political geography has maybe less experience in researching this phenomenon of ethnic question in post-modern mobile society. Therefore, we try to show some empirical experience in researching of this new field of ethnic geography. The aim of this contribution is to show the genesis, extension and actual problems and opportunities, but especially the spatial (and other) functions of the new kind of minorities – the dispersed minorities. The term ‘dispersed minority’ denotes here those minority members who live out of their autochthonous area (traditional territory), but still in the same state. Second criteria is the share of the minority population under 10% on the local, that is the communal level.

2. PROCESS OF SPATIAL DISPERSION

The dispersed ethnic minorities are the result of two processes: migration movement and assimilation. They both stem from one common reason which is the social modernisation.

New horizontal (spatial) and vertical (social) mobility, caused by different structural changes in society create gradually new conditions for ethnic living. Mobilisation of people included nearly all inhabitants and starts already in early ages. The instruments such as educational system, system of work, social relations, social and political participation, media, social communication homogenised the community. Higher level of social integration pushed practically all minority members into daily communication and
contacts with majority population, organisations and institutions. Through different instruments, assimilation pressure increases and minorities lose their members. The total number and the share of minority population start to decrease. On the other hand, social modernisation has brought about a new social structure, new mobility and new needs. Traditional autochthonous territory became too small and many members could not be supplied on the local and regional level. The only possibility for enlargement were migrations to central areas, far away from the ‘home’ territory. Traditional territory was more or less – a peripheral region, with all demographic, economic and infrastructural weaknesses. Such were typical emigration areas. Also by this way, the total number and share of minority population decreased rapidly on autochthonous territory, but increased the number of displaced, emigrated members. We became new part of former common minority community: dispersed minority.

The case of Carinthian Slovenes in Austria (or Austrian Slovenes) illustrates very well the process and consequences of the spatial dispersion of a community.

Carinthian Slovenes have populated the territory of 2,500 km² on southern Austrian region of Carinthia. They are a national minority with all kind of experience of interethnic relations (from interethnic conflicts and war till productive co-operation) in its history. At the same time, they are one of the European minorities with the most rapid assimilation process. Half of their settlement area is mountainous (the Karawanken mountains) along Slovenia-Austria border with, naturally, all peripheral characteristics. The other half of the ethnic territory belongs to central areas situated in central part of the Klagenfurt basin. This part of traditional Slovenian territory has a positive economic and demographic development. The area between Klagenfurt, the capital of the region, and Villach, the second regional centre, belongs to most important tourist areas in Carinthia. Glacial lakes, hilly area with woods and swamps, picturesque nature and cultural landscapes, well developed infrastructure and old tradition in tourism make this area very attractive not only for foreign visitors, but also for immigration. This area has one of highest level of suburbanisation in Austria. Minority members live in active and attractive space, well developed, early transformed from agrarian to tertiary society. The tertiary sector (trade, traffic, tourism, different services, banking, insurances, etc.) is here already tradition and guarantees (with other activities, of course) a high standard of living. Austrian welfare state (society), good infrastructural connections, attractive tourist and suburbanised landscape with small distances to all city-services in Klagenfurt (Celovec) and Villach (Beljak) offer to Slovenian minority many advantages, but also threats and weakens it, especially from the viewpoint of ethnic development.

According to dominant trends in Carinthia, also Slovenian minority has changed its structure and undergone a modernisation. Slovenes were included in main educational, professional, political and cultural streams and have gradually changed their predominant agrarian character. They became industrial workers and employees in different public and private agencies and services and private enterprises; they became teachers, lawyers and doctors. On the way of successful social integration and changing social structure, the activity of Slovenian educational institutions were of great importance. The oldest and till today the largest minority high school, the Slovene gymnasium in Klagenfurt, educated more than 1,500 students. Later, they had taken the highest positions in Slovenian community in Carinthia, as well as in Austrian social, economical, cultural and
political life. Slovenian minority became, thank to the above-mentioned educational institutions, a modern mobile society.

This looks like a happy story, but at the same time, the period of social transition of Slovenian minority was characterised by very strong assimilation. There is no wonder that many minority public workers, teachers and politicians described those processes as the way of ethnic disappearing of Slovenes in Carinthia. In the space of the last 30 years, the number of Slovenes (Slovenian speaking, according to official census criteria) decreased by more than half. In many local communities their share fall under 10%. They became minority not only on state and regional, but also on local level. What really happened?

As the minority members are affected from childhood by non-Slovenian linguistic environment, the function of Slovenian language decreased. In public life, minority language has no efficient support. It has even worse position especially because of the power of majority (German) language and culture in the media. All this pushes the minority language back behind home walls. In many public domains like at work, in school, in public communication on local level, in public offices, in free time activities, etc., German language is predominant. And the language is the most important, indicative, and stable sign and element of ethnic belonging and awareness, and at the same time the only measurable criteria of ethnicity (Susič and Sedmak, 1983). Because of the described situation (aggravated by a strong assimilation pressure of authorities and major population), the presence of Slovenian language in public life diminishes. The official censuses showed this assimilation process: the strong decrease of total number of Slovenian speaking and their share on regional and local level. Assimilation pressure was especially efficient in central, suburbanised Carinthian areas with a strong immigration of major population. In some communities like Maria Rain (Žihpolje), Koettmannsdorf (Kotmaru vas) or Wernberg (Vernberk) near Villach, total number of inhabitants increased for 20% and more in just ten years. Just because of that, the share of minority members decreased rapidly (Klemenčič, 1990). Moreover, it changed the linguistic situation in local schools, kindergartens and parishes and other public institutions. In those cases, minority has been dispersed by strong immigration of major population, what worsened the position of minority language (Fig. 1).

![Fig. 1. Process of spatial dispersion of national minorities. The case of Carinthian Slovenes in Austria](image)

Source: Zupančič (1999). Remarks: assimilation: percentage of Slovenes on the native area; decreasing because of assimilation migration: % of Slovenian minority, settled out of the native area because of migration
Another aspect of modernisation is a socialisation process connected, first of all, with education. In order to attend secondary schools in central areas like in Klagenfurt and Villach children have to migrate out of their home community. Later on they become students and move to Austrian universities, especially to Vienna, Graz, Innsbruck and Salzburg. All this ‘strange’ places exert a strong influence on socialisation and creation of national identity. During long process of primary and secondary socialisation, they acquire more elements of ethnic identity of the majority than those of minority. Living outside their ‘home’ society they are susceptible to change their ethnic identity and become assimilated into the dominant society. On the other hand, they have to migrate in order to obtain higher educational level, better job, professional experience and for other particular reasons. Contrary to the traditional understanding of those ‘inner emigrants’ many of them consolidate their ethnic awareness, become richer with new personal experience of living outside and also take critical distance in relation majority – minority and inside minority. Some of them returned back to Carinthia and took important positions in minority organisations and institutions as teachers, professors, translators, lawyers, economists and politicians. Nevertheless, many of them find new home far away from Carinthia, especially in bigger Austrian cities like Vienna and Graz. This new group, stemming from autochthonous minority, live now dispersed throughout the country (Zupančič, 1996). This is the new dispersed minority.

Both processes, migration and assimilation, create a new situation for minorities. Because of emigration from traditional territory and also because of assimilation of minority members on autochthonous area, the number and the share of Slovenian population in southern Carinthia decreased. This ‘fall’ is bigger in suburbanised communes in the vast area between Klagenfurt and Villach. Even though the number of Slovenian inhabitants remained steady, the share decreased because of strong immigration. We also observe the emigration from mountainous area in the border belt (the Karawanken Mountains), but the share remains the same. These are typical depopulated areas. The opposite trends can be observed outside the autochthonous territory, where the number of Slovenes increases. It is a paradox that during the period of strong assimilation, minority group enlarged the settlement and functional territory. All this changed the character, structure and function of borderland.

3. THE EXTENSION OF DISPERSED MINORITIES

According to the above-mentioned processes of migration and assimilation, the phenomenon of dispersed minorities involves a rather extensive area. In order to fulfil all their functions and needs, minority members had to move outside autochthonous territory. This mobilised minority is now spatially divided into the traditional and the dispersed part. The key question is how strong and how important are nowadays this new ethic communities, that is the dispersed minorities.

The comparison between some minority groups in the Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian space shows very clearly the spatial and numerical relevance of this matter. Hungarians and Italians in Slovenia, Slovenes in Italy, Austria and Hungary all belong to typical traditional autochthonous ethnic minorities, situated along the border and have (in fact rather different) protection norms and rights. They all are recognized, known and
juridically protected, but with substantial differences in regional developmental trends and type of border. All of them have something in common: important part of their members live now outside traditional territory, if we not count those living in conditions of spatial dispersion on autochthonous territory (Klemenčič, 1994, *Die Minderheiten in Alpe-Adria Raum*, 1990). The share of 10–50% of dispersed settled members sufficiently indicates the vital importance of this topic.

Fig. 2. The extension of dispersed minority members in Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian space


The most compact settled minority are Hungarians in Prekmurje, in northeastern Slovenia, who settled the border belt along Slovenian-Hungarian border. They still represent local majority, with exception of some villages (Komac, Winkler and Zupančič, 1999). Approximately 10% of Hungarians live outside their autochthonous territory. One can observe a continual increasing of spatial dispersed members. Those have three concentrations: in regional centre Murska Sobota, in Maribor and in Ljubljana, the capital (Kocsis, 1998).

Slovenes in Italy settled the border region along the whole Slovenian-Italian border, hilly and mountainous in the northern part and urbanised in southern part (in Gorizia and Triest). Slovenes in both cities have there all services and do not need to emigrate to other urban places in Italy. The changing of settlement system was especially remarkable in the middle part of the so-called Venetian – Slovenian Hills (Beneška Slovenija). Because of bad economic situation of that region, with predominant small farm structure, deficit of working places, worse opportunities for supply, education etc., pushed many Slovenes to central areas near Udine. Because of small distances and many connections with traditional territory (relatives, weekend houses, etc.) this new minority part co-operate very well with ‘older’ part. According to estimates, the share of dispersed minority members is near 20%. We still do not have any empirical data about Slovenes in other big Italian cities (e.g. Milan, Turin, Rome). We can just suppose that this number is significant (Gestrin, 1998; Bufon, 1995).
The third group are Italians in Slovenia, the smallest and most urbanised among all communities in question. Traditionally settled in Slovenian coastal cities Koper, Izola, Piran and Portorož. They are the rest of once much stronger community in this area (the great exodus of Italians in the period 1945–1954), they practically all live in spatial dispersion (the share of Italian population is under 5% on local level). On the other hand, short distances between settlements in Slovenian Istria and proximity of Triest as an important Italian city, bid them using minority institution in Slovenia and Italian institution in Italy (Komac, Winkler and Zupančič, 1999). As early modernised community, Italians were mobile enough in Slovenian space and most of them rest outside Slovenian Istria. There is no wonder, that approximately one third of them live outside the traditional area, especially in bigger Slovenian cities. Italians are generally a typical urban minority.

The case of Slovenes in Austria shows the typical development from concentrated, compact and predominantly agrarian population to urbanised and dispersed community. This transformation was done in the space of only two generations. Because of relatively fast social transition this community changed also his settlement system. Depopulation of mountain (till today predominantly ‘Slovenian’) areas and strong immigration on suburbanised areas in central parts of Klagenfurt basin are the most indicative processes in the last twenty years (Zupančič, 1993, 1999). High level of spatial and social mobility created relatively numerous dispersed Slovenian communities in bigger Austrian cities like Vienna, Graz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Linz, etc. In Vienna Slovenian immigrants, coming from very different parts of Slovenian ethnic territory, have been present for almost 600 years. Today, more than a quarter of the total number of Slovenes (according to official census data) live outside traditional territory. On the another side, on approximately half of traditional territory, Slovenes present less than 10% or 5%, so they are a local minority. They live in conditions of ethnic dispersion.

The last and most dispersed ethnic minority in Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian region are Slovenes in Hungary, even though they were described as ‘most traditional by social structure and poor’. This community, which holds nearly 5,000 members, is situated on the border-triangle between Slovenia, Austria and Hungary, named ‘Porabje’. Living for a half-century along closed border and ‘iron curtain’, developmental program with primary orientation to forestry and lack of any aid, caused extremely bad economic situation and forced strong emigration from this area (Zupančič, 1998). After Informbiro resolution, authorities ‘punished’ many minority members, especially intellectuals, and displaced them to other Hungarian (central) areas. But a great number of today’s dispersed minority members stem from economic emigrants. Even not well known, this is the most dispersed minority. Near half of Slovenes in Hungary live outside their autochthonous territory.

One of the most interesting analytical questions is on what factors does the share of dispersed members depend (Klemenčič, 1994). Observing the situation in details, there are four remarkable factors, which determine this share:

- level of formal (juridical) minority protection,
- mobility and modernisation,
- social structure,
- regional development.
Minority protection norms and law should protect the community on a given territory (territorial principle). The aim of these is to guarantee economic, educational, social and political conditions for ethnic survival on 'home' territory. Minority protection rights, norms and measures should be 'pull' factor and should strengthen minority communities. Unfortunately, this norms and measures are very often inefficient.

The modernisation and mobility is a certain 'push' factor stimulating migrations. Because of work, education or many other reasons, people move to central areas. The more mobile is a society (community, group), the larger space it requires and the higher share of minority live in spatial dispersion.

The 'pull' or 'push' factor depend on the level of development, standard and possibilities, the minority members find on their own territory. Well-developed, equipped in infrastructure and urbanised area along an open border offers also to minority members many opportunities for supply, education, working, living quality and other vital functions. In this case, minority members have less motivation for emigration. Very often, however, the economic, demographic and infrastructural weaknesses take the role of 'push' factors.

Social structure of minority is the base for mobility and a sign of modernisation. Tertiarised, urbanised minority certainly has to be mobile which results in the increase of its spatial dispersion. On the other hand, the most mobile, well-connected and ambitious minority members move to central areas. The rest, settled on traditional, autochthonous territory cope with a 'worse' social structure. This happen in almost all minorities situated on peripheral areas.

The above-described cases from Alpine-Adriatic-Panonian space show that dispersed part of minorities represent relatively numerous, spatially extended and important groups. Another question is whether they really form a 'community'.

4. SOME PROBLEMS OF DISPERSED MINORITIES

From the ethnic point of view, the dispersed minorities have some specific problems, concerning their way of life and possibilities of preserving their language, culture and national identity. Those problems have to do with law, organisation, communication and socialisation.

Officially, the dispersed minorities are not protected in any formal way. They just can use their minority rights within a frame of autochthonous community, if they are well connected with organisations and institutions in place. Minority juridical protection is - more or less - oriented to territory and group. General human rights are not usable for daily problems of dispersed members. They have declarative character, unfortunately.

The most indicative problem is the deficit of organisations and institutions. Because of long distances, the dispersed minority members hardly connect each other in a real, organised community. They are very often small groups of individuals, much more integrated in local and regional communities and organisations than their own ethnic community. The communication deficit has its impact also on the language, especially among the second generation (children). During the socialisation process, minority member receives much more elements stemming from majority. In many cases only the parents
keep contacts with the minority on the traditional area, what brings them some more chances for preserving their identity, language and cultural features. Children have almost all connections on ‘new’ area and there they have just a few communication partners.

As a consequence of poor organisational, communicational and juridical support, the threat of assimilation process is strong and constant. Already the fact of emigration from traditional area is understood as ‘a way of disappearing’, even though the newest empirical results do not confirm with this view. Threat of assimilation exists all the time in the whole life of the minority members. Mixed families are particularly ‘threatened’. They have to decide every day about retaining their identity. Communication inside mixed families is because of practical reasons oriented much more to majority language. In this way, socialisation brings them many ethnic elements of majority language, culture and ethnicity.

5. SPATIAL FUNCTIONS AND INFLUENCES OF DISPERSED MINORITIES

The key question in the context of dispersed minorities is the role and function of those minority members and communities. In order to show this it is necessary to compare the activity in transborder connection and co-operation of both parts of minority: those settled on the their traditional territory and spatially dispersed members (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Contacts of Austrian Slovenes with Slovenia. Differences between autochthonous and dispersed minority group

Source: Field research work (Austria), questionnaire 2, N = 99, 1996.
Comparing the autochthonous and disperse part of Slovenian minority in Austria draws a very interesting and rather surprising picture. Both groups differ not very much in the frequency of different contacts of their members with Slovenia. The respondents were questioned if they visit Slovenia, spend holidays there, go shopping, read Slovenian newspapers, listen radio and watch TV, if they have different cultural contacts, if they have working contacts or business co-operation, if they work there and if they have friends or relatives. This field research work, done several years ago, brought some very significant results. It shows relatively high level of transborder activity and co-operation of both groups. The traditional minority predominates markedly, of course, in contacts like visits, spending holidays and shopping; more than half of them were active in this area. As for the contacts with media and cultural activities (very important for preserving the language) the autochthonous minority still predominates, but the dispersed minority members follow closely. On working field both groups are quite equal; over 25% of informants have some working and business contacts. Just a few of them really work in Slovenia. Further, it is very interesting that the dispersed minority members have more relatives in Slovenia than the traditional minority, perhaps because of mixed marriages. Generally, the dispersed group play in transborder connection and co-operation a visible role, despite his ‘smallness’ and long distances. They are a group with strong spatial and social influence and in any case important enough for researching their situation and function.

The next observation concerns working and business contacts. It includes also some other activities in domain of politics such as culture, education, translation, law, tourism, cross-border projects, trade, investment services, banking, assurances, etc. With the exception of working on cross-border projects, both groups do not differ very much. In most domains the autochthonous part of Slovenian minority slightly predominates. But in some activities, like in politics, trade, translation, assurance and investment services dispersed minority predominates. It is explicable in terms of higher educational level of dispersed members. They retained their language and ethnic (national) identity with help of their high education, social position and experience. They are efficient in different contacts because of their mobility and because they live and work in central areas of Austria. There they are near decision centres and power centres. They are included in economic and political sphere. In this position, they have much better opportunities to develop working and business contact with institutions in Slovenia, especially on the so-called higher level (banking, investment, etc.) (Fig. 4).

Slovenes in Austria are just one of instructive cases. To find the spatial efficiency of different dispersed minorities is necessary to compare all this groups on a common scale. Unfortunately, we have not any larger empirical results of field research work. We use instead some estimates which could help us to see some general trends and a situation as a whole. The observed domains were the same as in previous case, so the activity in the field of politics, culture and economy (Tab. 1).

According to spatial influences and functions, we can divide dispersed minorities into two groups: predominantly passive (with small influence) and active groups (with greater influence). Slovenes in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovenia belong to the first, less efficient group in transborder co-operation. They just take part in some educational and cultural activities, but in some activities they are totally absent.
Fig. 4. The cross-border activity of autochthonous and dispersed Slovenian groups in different domains – the case of Slovenes in Austria.

Source: Field research work (Austria), questionnaire 2, N = 99, 1996.

Table 1. The estimate of cross-border activities of dispersed ethnic minorities. Minority members co-operate with Slovenia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
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<th>Italians in Slovenia</th>
<th>Slovenes in Italy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Assurance</td>
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Legend: The importance on specified fields: 0 – missing, + – important, ++ – very important.
Spatial functions of dispersed minorities

Other three dispersed minority groups, Slovenes in Italy, Slovenes in Austria and Italians in Slovenia are very active in cross-border co-operation in all domains. All three groups have very significant influence on border regions and cross-border co-operation and also on spatial development of border regions. They initiate an interstate economic collaboration. Very important factor that initiate and support those activities is the social (and educational) structure of those minorities and their connections with economic sphere in own country and relations to the so-called ‘mother country’ (in this case Slovenia). The next, not less important factor is the formal and real position and structure of autochthonous part of national minority and connection between traditional and dispersed group. Hungarians in Slovenia and Slovenes in Hungary, settled along the border that remained closed till the 1990s (‘iron curtain’), emigrated massively to central areas of both states. No traditional neither dispersed members had for years any serious possibilities for crossborder connection and co-operation. Closed type of border which created a tradition of passivity. Minority members adapted themselves to this actually unpleasant situation. Those people having no tradition of co-operation probably do not see the reasons and chances for cross-border co-operation.

In this case, regional development of border areas is very important also as a supporting factor for a better cross-border activity. Just well educated, mobile, dynamic persons, who knows the language, mentality, habits, cultural norms, economy, land and people (society) of two countries and nations, persons with experience in communication in this space and with personal contacts are able to make good business and are efficient in cross-border co-operation. Dispersed minority members, especially those living in bigger cities and central areas, belong to this kind of people. There is no doubt, that those dispersed minority members have important spatial function, comparable with minority on traditional territory.

6. CONCLUSION

European integration process changes the character of border regions, traditionally treated as a peripheral, marginal zones. Many new local initiatives revitalised economic and cultural life. Minorities, settled along the border – ‘local minorities’ – have important spatial functions as initiator of transborder co-operation. Researches point to spatial functions of local minorities, but not to dispersed members. The last group has many conditions for co-operating in transborder connection on local and regional level. They know the conditions, the culture, language and mentality of inhabitants on both side of border. They have great interest to participate in these transborder activities also for the reason of ethnic survival. Living in important centres, close to the centres of power, they have good opportunities for playing a visible, active role in transborder communication, together with local minority (Medetnični odnosi v slovenskem etničnem prostoru, 1998; see also: Bufon, 1995). Despite their small number they constitute an important factor in changing border regions today and tomorrow. According to the importance of dispersed minorities, we should maybe give more attention to spatial influence of these, forgotten till today, groups. Dispersed minorities are important part of today’s ethnic colourfulness in common Europe.
If the dispersed minorities have an important spatial role and functions is more or less only rhetorical question. This phenomenon of modern society, result of ethnic (assimilation) and migrational processes, is very extended and typical today. It has its importance and functions, even though it will maybe never be object of juridical and political negotiations. Juridical protection of dispersed minorities is maybe kind gesture, but in fact will not help them a lot (Tichy, 1983). The protection of those communities lies in their structure, modernisation and mobility. In this case they are efficient in communication also with people of common language and culture, living in two or more states. They realised their protection through their spatial and social functions, using in this activity the language, culture and other elements of their ethnic identity. They ‘live’ the identity.

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CHANGES OF STATE BOUNDARIES AS FACTORS DETERMINING INTERNAL TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS

When a country's territory is enlarged it often extends over areas with a completely different administrative system. A problem arises then whether to retain the administrative division existing on these areas or to adapt it to the system used in a given country. It is the latter solution that is adopted in most cases. It usually entails changes in internal divisions in the whole country. Poland's territorial restructuring resulting from state boundary changes provides good illustrations of both solutions. Poland has had its boundaries altered many times since the beginning of its existence, especially the eastern and, to a slightly lesser extent, the western boundary. This has had significant consequences for the territories which make up Poland and for its internal divisions.

In this paper the author treats as Polish the territories which belonged to Poland in each particular period of its existence. For the period when Poland was partitioned the author regards as Polish the areas, which made up the Kingdom of Poland before the first partitioning of Poland. Whether some of these territories can unquestionably be regarded as Polish is a controversial issue, nevertheless the fact that they came within the limits of Poland had considerable significance and many consequences for them at the time (including administrative changes).

The voivodship – the highest level unit of the administrative division of Poland – developed in an evolutionary way, that is not as a result of external factors. The first voivodships were formed in the 15th century, their shape being largely determined by former territorial units – duchies. Duchies emerged in great numbers after Poland's division into provinces (dzielnice) in the 13th century. They were the largest territorial units of the country at that time (12th – 14th century), which comprised territories inhabited by Slavic tribes, that is the districts of Silesia, Cracow, Sandomierz, Wielkopolska, Mazovia, Kujawy, Sieradz and Łęczyca. Thus a more recent administrative division had its origins in an old, centuries-long tradition consolidated by subsequent decisions of the rulers. There is therefore no question of following foreign models of administrative division – it was developed on the Polish territories and transplanted onto the neighbouring areas when Poland's boundaries were changed.

After partial unification of the country in the early 14th century, former duchies began to be called 'ziemie' (districts), the majority of which subsequently became voivodships. Some of the districts retained their distinct character and existed parallel to voivodships or as part of them. Their distinctive feature was lack of a voivode.
The break-up of Poland into provinces, though disadvantageous for the country, was favourable to formation of new administrative units – voivodships. The boundaries of the first voivodships were delimited on the basis of existing duchies (later districts). This new type of territorial units, which proved satisfactory in terms of administration, was subsequently introduced on territories, which were reunited with Poland, for example in Mazovia. The seigniorial province (property of the ruler) in the central part of the country was divided into five voivodships. The Wielkopolska province gave rise in the 14th century to one voivodship (though of slightly smaller area), and two more voivodships were created at that time in the Districts of Kujawy and Dobrzyń.

There were great discrepancies in the size of the newly formed voivodships – from 22,800 km² to 2,600 km². The differences arose from various degrees of advancement of the process of division of the provinces into duchies. The greatest fragmentation occurred in border areas between Wielkopolska and Mazovia.

The voivodship districts at that time were divided into several castellancies. This division was replaced in the second half of the 15th century by a division into administrative districts (powiat). Their number varied in different voivodships. They were not formed on the basis of any former territorial units. Their delimitation depended largely on the organization of the system of courts. Originally ‘powiats’ were not territorial units, but sort of institutions, associations of people. A court in a given locality served the surrounding area. There was no strictly established territory nor fixed boundaries. No parallel therefore can be drawn between a castellany and ‘powiat’, either in terms of forms and boundaries or the functions performed.

In the following centuries Poland’s expansions were mainly directed to the east, which is discussed by M. Koter and M. Kulesza. The administrative units which existed there (mainly duchies) were gradually transformed into voivodships or disappeared. In the 15th and 16th centuries Poland’s area expanded considerably. It was a sort of compensation for territorial losses in the west. The shift of Polish boundaries to the east and annexation of those areas by the Kingdom of Poland resulted in introduction of the Polish administrative division and creation of new voivodships. In the 15th century their number reached fourteen. Three voivodships were formed as a result of acquiring new territories after a victorious war against the Teutonic Order in 1466. The peace treaty allocated a part of their land to Poland as Royal Prussia while the remaining part obtained the status of Poland’s fief called Tuetic Prussia renamed Prince’s Prussia after the secularization in 1525). The origin of the fourth voivodships formed in the 15th century was different than the previous ones – it came into being as a result of a division of one of the existing voivodships - it was a precedent.

New voivodships followed successively in the course of incorporation in the Kingdom of Poland of liege duchies of Mazovia. Two voivodships were delimited before the end of the 15th century and one in 1526.

After the Lublin Union the sixteenth voivodship was formed on the eastern territories of Mazovia belonging formerly to the Great Duchy of Lithuania. The last voivodship before the partitioning of Poland was created in 1768 as a result of a division of one of the existing voivodships (Fig. 1). An unusual occurrence, unprecedented in Central Europe, was the conservatism of the territorial divisions of Poland’s area, both the administrative and the ecclesiastical one. The new division into voivodships was based
on the old division; also on territories annexed to Poland (except for two arbitrarily delimited voivodships).

![Map of Poland's division into voivodships in 1922](image)

**Fig. 1.** Poland's division into voivodships in 1922  
**Source:** A. Piskozub (1987)

Voivodships, functioning as administrative units, were established on both Polish and Lithuanian territories (except for two duchies).

The second half of the 18th century was a period of Poland's decline, resulting in partitioning of the country and major changes in the territorial division of Poland's area. In the period 1772–1795 Russia, Prussia and Austria carried out three partitions of the country, with resulted in installation of three different administrative systems.

After the first partition (1772) Russia seized a part of Belorussia between the Dvina and the Dnepr. The Prussian and Austrian sectors consisted almost entirely of ethnically Polish territories: Prussia annexed Warmia, Pomerania, the district of Chelmno and an area along the Noteć River, while Austria controlled the southern part of Małopolska and Ukraine.

After the second partition in 1793 the Russian sector expanded to include Belorussian and Ukrainian territories, while the Prussian sector comprised Wielkopolska, Mazovia
and Kujawy. In 1795 the third, final partition of Poland took place. The new Russian boundary ran from the Baltic Sea along the old Prussian border, along the Niemen River to Grodno, Niemirów and along the Bug River. Austria occupied territories between the rivers of Pilica, Vistula and Bug. Prussia seized the rest plus a small area on the right bank of the Vistula River in the vicinity of Warsaw. New administrative divisions were introduced, which ran counter to the old Polish tradition and obliterated completely the former internal boundaries.

The Prussian sector was divided into new units – provinces, which were subdivided into departments and districts (powiats). The territorial organization for judicial purposes consisted of ‘regencies’. This division was maintained until 1806.

After the first partition Austria created on the occupied Polish territories the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. The land seized in 1795 was called West or New Galicia. The whole sector was divided into 18 parts called ‘cyrkul’.

The Russian sector was divided into ‘general guberniyas’, each subdivided into several guberniyas.

In 1807 the Duchy of Warsaw was created, which comprised a large part of the territories seized by Prussia in the second and third partition. The new boundaries coincide neither with the pre-partition division nor with the Prussian administrative organization. The Duchy of Warsaw was divided into six departments, which were further divided into 60 districts (powiats). In 1809 West Galicia was annexed to the Duchy, which meant for Austria a loss of the territories seized in the third partition and a part of the land occupied after the first partition. Four new departments were added to the existing six. These departments were divided into 40 districts (powiats), so the total number of districts in the Duchy of Warsaw was 100.

The formation of the departments in the Duchy was a compromise between the Polish administrative tradition and the division introduced by the partitioning powers. The six department capitals were the former capitals of the voivodships from period of the First Republic of Poland (Poznań, Warsaw, Kalisz, Plock, Cracow and Lublin). As a result of decisions taken at the Vienna Congress (1814) a new division emerged, which survived until the end of the First World War: West Prussia, the Grand Duchy of Poznań (controlled by Prussia), Galicia (controlled by Austria), the Republic of Cracow, the Congress Kingdom of Poland and the former Polish guberniyas of the Russian Empire. The Grand Duchy of Poznań was formed out of the Noteć District and the rest of Wielkopolska territories taken from the Duchy of Warsaw. It was divided into regencies, further subdivided into districts (powiat). The boundaries separating the regencies did not coincide with the boundaries between former departments.

In 1815 the Austrian sector comprised Galicia within the limits from after 1809. The boundary between the Congress Kingdom of Poland divided Małopolska (and two former voivodships) in half. The Free City of Cracow was established, which together with the surrounding district was called the Republic of Cracow. Austria did not regain any piece of land gained by the Duchy of Warsaw in 1809. The Republic of Cracow was annexed to Austria in 1846.

The Duchy of Warsaw, apart from the territories allocated to Prussia, became the Kingdom of Poland. The boundary between the Prussian sector and the Kingdom of Poland ran across Wielkopolska and Małopolska. The old name of the highest level
administrative unit — voivodship — was restored. As a result of the change of state boundaries, internal boundaries had to be changed, too. There were slight shifts in relation to the departments from the period of the Duchy of Warsaw — eight voivodships were formed out of the ten departments of the Kingdom of Warsaw. The former subdivision into districts (powiaty) was maintained, because they were to be constituencies for delegating representatives for the Seym (parliament). The Kingdom comprised a total of 77 districts, which were subdivided into smaller units (obwód). The boundaries of the latter units were frequently established artificially.

In Prussia the provinces consisted of regencies, and in the Austrian sector 35 new districts (powiat) were delimited.

In 1863 a national uprising broke out. The insurrection government organized their own administration, but the defeat of the uprising brought severe consequences. Russian authorities reduced the Kingdom of Poland to a Russian province and divided it into 10 guberniyas. Some of the guberniyas liquidated in 1845 were re-established, and two new ones were created. This entailed a number of changes in existing internal boundaries. Until the outbreak of the First World War there was only one alteration in this division, namely one more guberniya was formed in 1912. Russia territorial organization consisted of four levels: general guberniya, guberniya, district (powiat) and commune (gmina).

In the Prussian sector there were not any major changes — the province remained the highest level administrative unit, and the regency — a lower level unit. Districts (powiat) were the next in the administrative hierarchy, and the commune was the basic unit. In the Austrian sector a four-level organization was replaced by a three-level system (‘kraj’, district and commune).

After the outbreak of the First World War all the ethnically Polish territories came under the control of the Central Powers. These countries divided the occupied territories into two zones: German and Austrian. In 1917 the Germans reduced the number of districts from 47 to 32 by combining a number of smaller districts into bigger ones. The new division of a part of the old Republic of Poland once more arbitrarily intersected old Polish provinces and introduced new boundaries, which further complicated the already complex administrative mosaic.

During the entire period from the loss of the independence till its regaining the impact of external boundary changes on internal administrative division was very strong, as the occupying states introduced their own administrative units.

When Poland regained independence in 1918 the new government had two alternatives with regard to the administrative organization of the country: to retain the internal boundaries set by the partitioning powers and introduce Polish units (voivodships and districts) within these limits, or to return to the division from before the partitions with some modification where necessary because of the new shape of the country’s territory. The need to organize administration when the knowledge of the entire territory was still rather limited forced the adoption of the first solution that is retaining the existing division. Each of the former sectors was separately divided into voivodships, which consolidated the differences between the regions. The administrative organization of the Second Republic of Poland was very different from the one from the pre-partition period (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Poland's division into voivodships in 1922  
Source: A. Piskozub (1987)

After the Second World War Poland comprised among others Silesia, Pomerania and former East Prussia. In the remaining part of Poland most of the voivodships from the period of the Second Republic of Poland were re-established in 1944–1945. They were considered temporary, anticipating the future administrative reform. Only one new voivodship was formed. Greater changes took place in the western and northern part of Poland, in the so-called Regained Territories. In the 1944–1946 fourteen new voivodships were created (Fig. 3).

In 1949–1950 administrative reform of the country was carried out. Three new voivodships were established in the Regained Territories. Another important change was granting five largest cities the status of voivodships. None of the voivodships existing at the time conformed to the historical division of Poland. The number of voivodships – 17 – was maintained until 1975.
In 1954 a reform of the lowest level administrative units was launched. The existing communes and units called 'gromada' were replaced by new units also called 'gromada', but in 1973 the communes were restored. In 1975 the number of voivodships was increased considerably – up to 49, and the middle level unit – district (314 units) was liquidated. The boundaries of the new voivodships were quite artificial, marked out arbitrarily by the central administrative bodies following a theoretical model, without regard to geographical and historical factors (tradition) or human bonds. In many cases the new boundary (of a voivodship or commune) cut across areas with very strong economic, transport and social ties.

In 1990 work began on new administrative reform. Many variants of a new territorial division were developed and finally a new system was introduced in 1999, which involved major changes of the existing administrative division. The number of...
voivodships was reduced from 49 to 16. An important factor determining their number was the economic aspect. It was assumed that large voivodships should be strong economically and could compete successfully with large top level administrative units in Western Europe. The names of the new voivodships recall the names of the historical provinces. The three-tier administrative system, natural in Polish conditions, was restored, which meant that districts (208) were reintroduced.

The case of Poland shows how changes of state boundaries may affect internal divisions. The territories, which came under control of a country with a different administrative system, may adopt it, or the administrative system of a country, which annexed a given territory, may adapt to the one existing in this area. The latter case, however, occurs definitely less frequently.

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GEOPOLITICS ALIVE AND WELL IN SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA – THE CAPRIVI FRONTIER SHARED BY ANGOLA, NAMIBIA AND ZAMBIA

The paper seeks to assess the confusing and sometimes volatile geopolitical environment in the northern Namibian border region shared with Angola and Zambia. Imperial Germany gained territory comprising the Caprivi from Great Britain in 1890 at a time when the two countries were experiencing good relations and were in the process of exchanging Zanzibar for Helgoland (Jenny, 1976:112). Chancellor Caprivi sought a larger role in Africa for his country and purportedly envisioned control of a land connection between German Southwest Africa and German East Africa (Louw, 1979:155). An opportunity to use the Zambezi River for possible commerce may also have been considered. This narrow strip of land was taken from Bechuanaland and a once cohesive ethnic region was further fractured by still another international boundary. Addition of the Caprivi Strip brought in fragments of Lozi-speakers (Mafwe and Subiya among others) whose linguistic-ethnic roots (Murdoch, 1959) and population base are in Zambia’s Barotseland. These Lozi have weak links to the other, more numerically larger and politically important groups in Namibia (Logan, 1968:25). The small European communities in northern Bechuanaland (Botswana) and adjacent Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) were aware that the land between the Zambezi and Chobe rivers (Fig. 1) was under German authority but that there were no German officials in the area (Fisch, 1999: 43–51). White poachers and criminal elements crossed into the easternmost Caprivi to escape the authorities in adjacent English controlled territories. Knowledge of this territorial refuge prompted district commissioners and magistrates to write to their superiors asking their assistance in communicating with the Germans to urge them to send administrators to their new territory. It was not until October, 1908, however, that the first official German delegation left for the Caprivi, 18 years after the legal acquisition of this narrow sliver of land and 30 years since the creation of the Protectorate. German colonial authorities were occupied in pacifying areas farther south and in encouraging European immigration.

At the time of South Africa’s assumption of its Class-C Southwest Africa Mandate in 1920 from Great Britain and the League of Nations (Dugard, 1973: 69), the Caprivi was deemed sufficiently isolated that arrangements were made with the British Bechuanaland Protectorate Government for it to administer the area.
Fig. 1. Reference map of Namibia's Northern Frontier with special emphasis on the Caprivi Region

It has been suggested that the Caprivi might better have been amputated from Southwest Africa after World War I and officially assigned to Rhodesia or to Bechuanaland (Logan, 1968:25). The first Bechuanaland officials posted to the Caprivi reached their assigned area using the Cape Town to Livingstone (Northern Rhodesia) rail line, followed by a boat journey up the Zambezi River to a landing astride the former German administrative headquarters at Schuckmannsburg. Later, the administration was moved farther up the Zambezi River to Katima Mulilo. During the years 1920-1939 when the region was administered from Bechuanaland, the tenuous and short lived communications link between distant Windhoek, capital of South West Africa, and East Caprivi was all but severed. This is testimony to the penalties of distance and difficulty of access. South Africa took direct control in 1939 at the outbreak of World War II and administered East Caprivi from Pretoria. Administration was returned to Windhoek, Southwest Africa in 1966 when South Africa's legal right to the Mandate was revoked by the United Nations General Assembly.

1. A SOMETIMES MARGINAL LOCATION

Throughout its brief history as a German Protectorate (Fisch, 1999) and for nearly two-thirds of its 75 years under South African rule, the Caprivi was peripheral to Southwest Africa's heartland. This was the situation until late in South Africa's tenure,
when the region achieved strategic significance. Until then, the Caprivi remained a sleepy backwash, difficult to reach and with little beyond its wildlife to attract the occasional visitor. Except for missionaries and administrative officials, Southwest Africa’s relatively small white Afrikaner and German speaking populations resided far to the Southwest, within what later was to be known as the ‘Police Zone’ north of which no European could pass without special permit (Wellington, 1960:215). The deteriorating discourse between the General Assembly of the United Nations and South Africa concerning the latter’s rule over Southwest Africa/Namibia brought to a close this stage of the marginal Caprivi.

Article 4 of the South West Africa Mandate specifically forbade the building of fortifications (Dugard, 1973: 73). SADF (South African Defence Force) exercises in the Caprivi in contravention of its Mandate were ignored by countries best able to influence South Africa, especially Germany, Great Britain and the United States. This reluctance on the part South Africa’s major trading partners to speak out publicly against military exercises suggests that, among other factors, perception of the Caprivi within the overall Mandate may have been different from that for the rest of the country. Military confrontation between South Africa and various factions united in opposition to continued South African rule in Southwest Africa/Namibia and to minority government in South Africa served to move the Caprivi from the distant geographical periphery of South African influence and international awareness to centre stage. For the duration of hostilities, this narrow and elongated region took on both tactical and strategic significance.

The Government in Pretoria did not publicize the growing conflict in East Caprivi, presumably to avoid further internationalizing the issue and very likely not to alarm its citizens. It was the inability of South African Police Counter Insurgency Units based in East Caprivi to stop incursions that led eventually to the introduction into the region of the SADF (Steenkamp, 1989) and to a widening of the war, both on the ground and politically. In time, the conflict expanded along much of the 1,680 km border linking SWA/Namibia to Angola and Zambia (Barnard, 1985:198–99) and would increase in intensity as it spread into southern Angola (Grest, 1989:119–20). Escalation was due in part to incursions into southern Angola by SADF units claiming the right of ‘Hot Pursuit’ to retaliate against SWAPO (Southwest Africa People’s Organization-current Government in Namibia) incursions, and to regional and international geopolitical issues (Vanneman and James, 1976:93–95). Besides SADF units (land, air and sea), the conflict introduced into war ravished Angola approximately 60,000 Cuban troops, advisors from the Soviet Union and East Germany (Bridgland, 1986:442) and material of varied description from numerous countries. The massive amounts of war material brought into Angola may have been of a magnitude to compare with that deployed in parts of North Africa during the campaigns of World War I (Bridgland, 1990:15;18). Not least, population dislocation created a refugee problem in Angola (McColl, 1993:172) that has yet to be resolved. Indeed, if anything, the refugee problem has got worse.
2. BORDER REGION AT RISK

South Central Africa’s socioeconomic and political landscapes are undergoing change. The Congo is in turmoil and the presence of military units from several African countries including Namibia has exacerbated an already deteriorating environment. Foreign troops are in place either to give protection to the regime in power or to help bring it down. Issues are blurred although access to mineral resources, especially to diamonds provides some rationale for involvement. Appropriation of white farms in Zimbabwe is a component of that country’s destabilization and military success in Angola seems to lead only to more civil war and hardship. Explanations for instability range from governments that have ceased to govern for the benefit of the many to state fragmentation because of social conflict and ethnicity. The Colonial Period has not escaped blame.

After independence, national development priorities in Namibia not unexpectedly were directed toward the Ovambo heartland in the western portion of the northern frontier. The once vibrant political opposition evident during the first universal suffrage election in 1989 monitored by the UN was falling into disarray. SWAPO’s majorities were increasing at each election. Less than ten years after independence, Government had sufficient votes in the National Assembly to revise the country’s constitution to permit a third five year term for the President. Balancing some of the accusations that political opposition was in danger of being co-opted by the ruling party, revelations have surfaced that the political opposition in 1989 may have been inflated by generous financial support from a South Africa anxious to deny SWAPO control of the country’s first post colonial Government. Nevertheless, voter apathy is on the rise. Turn-out for the 1998 local and regional elections was 33%, only 20% in the key Lozi speaking constituencies comprising the heart of the East Caprivi. This was 50% lower than the previous local and regional election in 1992 (Keuler, 1998:1) and a 30% decline from the turn-out for the 1994 presidential election. SWAPO has a substantial majority of elected seats in the East Caprivi now that the political fortunes of the opposition are in precipitous decline. Nevertheless, Namibia’s SWAPO Government to date has proven to be more moderate than envisioned in some of the pre-independence scenarios (Thomas, 1985:166–71). Its attitude toward minority opinions is less strident than its actions to keep intact the nation and a free press continues to flourish.

At the outset of Namibia’s war of independence, a relatively short stretch of boundary shared with Zambia was the only strategic opening for anti-South African military operations. This was the principal theatre of the border war from 1966 to 1974 (Steenkamp, 1989). Newly independent Zambia was supportive of African liberation movements and in 1962 permitted SWAPO to establish a presence in Lusaka. SWAPO had a working relationship with CANU (Caprivian African National Union), reinforcing the attractiveness of East Caprivi’s geography for military action at a time when other sectors of the border were less promising. West Caprivi, however, shared a border with Angola controlled by UNITA forces friendly to South Africa. UNITA also had effective control of the Zambia-Angola frontier, which provided a relatively secure flank for the western Caprivi (Bridgland, 1986:365). Compared to what occurred but a few years later
in the Oshivambo-speaking region (Hooper, 1990:179–93), cross border incursions from or to East Caprivi were small in scope and not well publicized.

There are rumours that the CANU leadership may have received verbal or even written support from SWAPO favouring a referendum for independence or regional autonomy in the East Caprivi once hostilities ceased. That this failed to materialize may be one of the issues behind the region’s present instability. SWAPO, at the time, was not the overpowering component in the liberation movement that it later was to become. Furthermore, many of the military operations took place in CANU’s territory and Lozi-speaking Caprivians would have had no trouble integrating themselves in the portion of western Zambia known as Barotseland. Oshivambo-speakers from areas to the west would have been at a disadvantage.

The northern frontier during Namibia’s war of liberation was a setting in which the one side (SADF) had most of the mobility, equipment and fire power and where the use of the latter in whatever amount could only serve to further alienate the local population whose protection was the primary objective for the troops being there! As often the case in such conflicts, some of the protagonists were brothers and the means to achieve one’s end could be unpleasant. Coercion was readily used to support political and military objectives. Oshivambo speakers nurtured SWAPO’s leadership cadres and fighting force and its territory was to be the scene of much of the fighting and counter-insurgency activities. Oshivambo-speaking troops also comprised one of the military formations fighting against SWAPO’s People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) units and this particular unit frequently was accused of destroying property and of intimidating the population (Weaver, 1989:97–99).

Twenty-three years of mostly low level war came to an end in 1989. The conflict helped to transform the economic and social perspective of many; combatants, residents and those passing through. Modernization occurred but the preferred change associated with such a process in developing regions did not always take root (Van der Merwe, 1989:273). It is widely accepted in both Namibia and South Africa that the impact of the war on the local population was negative, to the extent that a dependency model was created. A case in point is in the West Caprivi where the SADF established several bases. One served as a base for Kxoe-speaking San (Bushmen) troops and their families. To assist the San women in making the adjustment from a traditional lifestyle to one in which external inputs dominated, South African women were hired to teach the San women how to use sewing machines and, in general, to facilitate their adjustment to this new environment. To what extent such skills retained value in the post war environment are problematic (Lee and Hurlich, 1982). The San, whose traditional culture through the years has been all but destroyed, and who did not leave the area with the withdrawal of South African forces, were integrated into the post-independence environment more or less where they were stranded at war’s end. Those who returned to their traditional homeland found a changed situation; others obtained homes in new resettlement communities built by the Government astride the main highway in West Caprivi. It is these very settlements where the Namibian Defence Force is purported to have sought out supporters of the Mafwei rebels in 1999 and to have done so with little regard for the rights of the inhabitants (The Lozi Lost, 1999). A number of San chose refugee status in Botswana.
The war years in the northern frontier were a time of serious social dislocation. Rapid expansion of retail roadside beer stalls (Cuca shops) mirrored an important investment on the part of some benefiting from military or military-support employment. While small-scale enterprise can be viewed positively (Rogerson, 1993:63), this particular phenomenon could be interpreted as a breakdown of the traditional social fabric. Forced removals, often of entire villages, undertaken by the SADF to neutralize pro-SWAPo support led to scores of people being resettled away from their traditional habitats, often in areas devoid of livelihood from the land or in conditions of economic dependency on civil and military sources. SADF never was to succeed in winning the hearts and minds of the local population in the North although it may have been more successful in the Caprivi judging from voting results in the 1989, first post colonial election (Pendleton, 1993:10).

Newsworthy for much of 1998 and 1999, East Caprivi has been overshadowed by the deteriorating security situation farther west. Whatever the rationale for permitting one side in the Angolan civil war access to Namibian territory and in aligning the Namibian Defence Force with the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—currently the Government), the result is that UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola-led by Jonas Savimbi), merely by staying in the field and raiding occasionally across the border, has assumed a measure of tactical control over one of Namibia’s most important sources of foreign exchange, its tourist sector! The Namibian Defence Force all but insists that drivers join military convoys organized twice daily during daylight hours at designated times and places, effectively constraining the free flow of traffic. To reinforce the security issue, the Defence Force will not accept responsibility for the safety of anyone travelling without escort. Between Rundu and Divundu (Bagani) in Kavango, the main road is unofficially but effectively closed during hours of darkness. Northbound drivers arriving at Rundu in the night park their vehicles on the grounds of a service station to await sunrise. There are no signs directing this move, only the widespread understanding that to continue driving toward the Caprivi in darkness is to place one at risk. There have been incidents and few travellers, especially tourists, are prepared to suffer the inconveniences and implied danger.

Although the northern frontier of Namibia is the scene of the troubles, the image is felt throughout the country. Foreign tourists scare easily and tour groups, the backbone of overseas visitations, are the first to leave a country perceived to be risky. Those planning holidays and tour operators seldom differentiate between regions. Abductions or murders of Namibians in villages near the Kavango River and of Namibians and foreign tourists driving on the trans-Caprivi Highway have placed the entire northern frontier at risk. Government troops from Angola have been accused of recruiting or of forcibly retaking Namibian deserters in Rundu, the regional capital of Kavango.

Finally, there is still a conspicuous military and police presence in East Caprivi and 87 local activists remain incarcerated elsewhere in Namibia after last August’s troubles (The Lozi Lost, 1999:48). Even the most optimistic of observers acknowledge that it will require a long time to undo the region’s present negative reputation.
3. NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA AT ODDS

Botswana and Namibia can be cantankerous when it comes to water and the need of it has motivated some singularly unfriendly international relations. One paper (Schneider and Richter, 1991:38) suggests that access to fresh water may have been one of the reasons behind Chancellor Caprivi’s push for territory. A potentially serious confrontation between the two neighbouring, arid countries emerged in late 1996 at the height of one of the most severe droughts in memory. A long-conceived and recently activated scheme in Namibia to draw water from the northern river frontier with Angola nearly caused a rupture in diplomatic relations.

Botswana sought to protect its valuable, wildlife-underpinned Okavango Delta tourist industry nurtured with Kavango River water, the river whose water was to have been diverted. Both countries are sensitive to issues of sovereignty and water use. Namibia’s focus has been to insure an adequate supply of fresh water for Windhoek, the country’s major urban area. A notable exception occurred in 1962 during South African control when plans were released to construct dams along the Kavango River where both banks belong to Namibia (Lau and Stern, 1990: 58).

Unlike the arid and semi-arid western portion of Namibia’s northern frontier, East Caprivi (Logan, 1969:57) and the part of West Caprivi astride the Okavango River have year around access to plentiful water (Fisch, 1987:66). A dispute emerged in 1994 over the small, uninhabited island of Kasikili in the Chobe River. Namibia questioned Botswana’s sovereignty, claiming that it ignored a long-standing seasonal presence by Namibian farmers on the otherwise uninhabited island. There may also have been concern for protecting Namibia’s future access to tourism built around this river’s fauna. Botswana controls almost all riverine traffic; bluffs for the siting of tourist camps and hotels are on its side of the river. Botswana Nature Conservation Officers also monitor river traffic and collect fees. It was not until President Mugabe of Zimbabwe intervened that troops from Botswana abandoned a small post established earlier on the island. The issue reappeared in late 1998 when Caprivian dissidents seeking asylum in Botswana purportedly were quoted by Namibian officials as saying that Kasikili Island would be offered to Botswana in exchange for support of an independent Caprivian political entity (Namibian: Nov. 2, 1998). The long-awaited World Court ruling in 1999 awarded the island to Botswana because the primary channel (thalweg) of the Chobe is to the north of the island.

There is no irrigated agriculture in northern Namibia aside from a few commercially operated farms and those at mission stations. Subsistence agriculture remains the dominant form of land utilization. Proclamations notwithstanding (SWAPO 1989:11), neither the present Namibian government or its pre-independence predecessor have been overly concerned in practice about protecting the off-reserve wildlife of the North. The physical openness of much of the region and an unwillingness to effectively maintain protected game habitats are pull factors in attracting settlers in search of new land for farming. A questionable pull factor is Government’s use of the area to construct villages for citizens displaced by war. Perhaps admirable from war reconstruction and nation building perspectives, this is occurring in a narrow strip of territory separating substantial herds of large game animals in Angolan or Zambian habitats from their treks to
Okavango Delta water. The animals seem destined to lose. Gardens and crops have been trampled by passing elephants and settlers respond by killing them. There was modest cause for optimism when several externally sponsored and funded conservation programs were implemented in the northern frontier. These were designed to generate modest incomes for farmers willing to provide camp sites and animal sightings to attract tourists and campers. Political turmoil has all but ended these endeavours.

4. CONCLUSION

The Caprivi’s peripheral location and marginal relationship to the Namibian heartland was temporarily altered during the war along the northern frontier. Its geopolitical importance emerged in the mid-1960s when South Africa first used this narrow strip of land to counter CANU, SWAPO and even ANC cadres seeking to use Zambian territory for military penetrations southward. The Caprivi also served as an important supply corridor linking Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA forces in southeastern Angola to South African assistance. Namibia’s independence in 1990 caused a precipitous decline in what had been largely war-stimulated growth. The region was to experience serious economic problems and political destabilization. East Caprivians shared with SWAPO and other groups the armed opposition to South African rule, but disillusionment with SWAPO leadership in the resistance struggle led to influential East Caprivians joining anti-SWAPO political factions. They were assisted in these endeavours by South Africa. In its zeal to provide basic infrastructure and other development in the country’s Oshivambo-speaking heartland, the post-independence government in Namibia may have failed to appreciate the economic and political impacts of an East Caprivi without the stimuli of the war economy. Otherwise, some of the recent unfortunate events might have been avoided. Caprivi remains a peripheral location. It may be that the negative components dictating the region’s peripheral location are so overwhelming that it is only in times of political or military crisis that the marginality of the region is reduced.

REFERENCES

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